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Abstract
An economic system based on the principles of the Islamic
law is proclaimed feasible. Interest as an equivalent to
Riba should be substituted. Profit-sharing financial
institutions have been established. The research attempts to
show how these institutions work, and what alternatives they
rely on to substitute interest as a motivation for
mobilising savings. The technique of investment of various
deposits which are held in one pool, as practised by some
Islamic banks, and the methods of determining each
depositor's share in investment and in profit, are
discussed. Profit generated from the investment is the
alternative proposed to substitute interest. Risks
surrounding investment environment and the difficulties
embodied in the technique used to distribute profit are the
major topics discussed. The research centres on a field
study, following the case study approach, whereby methods
for the distribution of profit used in three Islamic banks
in the Sudan are explained in detail with illustrating
numerical examples. A comparison between the various methods
is made. The historical background to the establishment of
Islamic banks is given as an introduction to the research.
Furthermore, models of investment used in Islamic banking
are explained and the difference between Islamic and
conventional banks is shown. By way of introduction the
concept of Riba in Islam is also discussed. Moreover,
accounting postulates are scrutinised and verified from an
Islamic perspective. A case study is made of FIBS and the
models of finance used along with an empirical examination
of its performance as the first and a leading Islamic
financial institution in the Sudan, and as an example of
Islamic banks. Other problems which arise as a result of
introducing a profit-sharing technique are also assessed,
classified and discussed. Among the recommendations drawn
are investment in Limited Mudarabah, using different periods
and values for Mudarabah certificates. Islamic banks should
also concentrate on profit-sharing models of finance; the
credit finance models used, although permitted, should
gradually be abandoned.
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I
INTRODUCTION
Introduction
Commercial banks have become a vital part of the
contemporary economic life of most societies. Their main
function is the mobilisation of society's savings in order
to channel them to economic and social uses. By extending
credit to suitable borrowers, commercial banks help to
increase production, expand capital investments, and
presumably achieve a higher standard of living. Other
services include the convenient method of making payment
through cheques and credit cards, the supply of foreign
currencies and purchase and sale of securities.' However,
the main goal of the commercial banks is the maximization of
profit, subject to a reasonable level of liquidity. They
achieve this goal mainly by working as an intermediary
between savers and investors, by borrowing money from savers
at a low rate of interest and lending it to investors at a
higher rate of interest.
Because of the vital role of commercial banks, their
presence in the Islamic world is desirable. However,
commercial banks in Muslim countries should work without
interest, which is prohibited in Sharia'h. There is complete
agreement among all schools of religious thought, that the
term Riba (usury)	 covers interest in all	 its
manifestations. 2 Therefore, Islamic banking needs a new
mechanism to replace interest. The tool which has been
17
suggested in Islamic banking is the replacement of interest
by profit-sharing. Although many economic and rational
arguments have been put forward by Islamic economists in
support of a profit-sharing system, the introduction of
such a	 system into commercial banks poses various
problems, some practical, others economic and others
concerning accounting. The aim of this research is to study
and examine these difficulties.
Scope, Importance and Objectives of the Study
The main purpose of the research is to study the problems
and difficulties associated with the distribution of profit
in Islamic Financial Institutions (Islamic Banking).
The Islamic banks stand on two principles from Islamic
Law (Sharia'h). The first principle is the abolition of
interest (usury). The second is the replacement of interest
by a profit sharing system whenever possible.
The difference between the conventional banking system
and the Islamic banking system is that, in the conventional
system, loans are made with a guarantee of repayment and a
fixed percentage return, while in the Islamic system,
investors share a fixed percentage of profit when it occurs,
i.e. the share of the two parties will vary according to the
profit achieved. Banks get back only a share of profit from
the business to which it is a party, and in case of loss the
business party loses none in terms of money, but forgoes the
reward for its activities during that period. Any losses are
18
borne by the the financier, so that if, for example, a
million pounds was advanced and the project failed, only 0.7
million pounds remaining, the bank would get only 0.7
million pounds. This is not the only tool used by Islamic
commercial banks; another is a partnership (Musharakah). The
bank can become an active partner in running enterprises.3
How the Islamic Banks Operate 4
Where normal banking practices do not clash with the Islamic
principles, the Islamic banks have adopted conventional
banking tools and procedures; where any clash arises, the
Islamic banks have devised their own tools and procedures to
accomplish their banking activities.
Islamic banks receive two types of deposits; deposits
not committed for investment, which take the form of current
accounts or saving accounts; and deposits committed for
investment, which are called investment accounts. Current
accounts operate in the same manner as in the conventional
banking system. Saving accounts are not obliged to be
rewarded, though because depositors allow the bank to use
their money, they are guaranteed return of the full amount
from the bank. Investment accounts are of two types;
accounts with authorisation, where the account holder
authorises the bank to invest his money in any one of its
projects, and receives profit after the expiry of a
specified period, and accounts without authorisation, where
the account holder may specify the project in which his
money is to be invested.
19
As Islamic banks cannot earn interest by lending money,
they have to undertake investment based on Islamic
principles, i.e. Musharakah, Mudarabah or Qirad, Murabaha,
Leasing etc. These will be discussed in detail later in the
research. However, a brief definition for the purpose of
this introduction is given.
Musharakah (Equity Participation) 
The banks and their clients agree to join in a temporary
partnership to execute a certain operation within an agreed
period of time. Both parties contribute to the capital of
the operation and agree to divide the net profit in
proportions agreed upon in advance. Hence, it is a joint
venture between the bank and an entrepreneur, in which each
partner provides part of the capital and shares the profit
or bears the loss in a predetermined ratio. Loss is always
borne proportionately with each party's share in capital.
Mudarabah or Qirad (Agencies) 
Mudarabah is again a joint venture, but in this type of
investment, the bank contributes all the financing for the
operation, while the client contributes only his managerial
efforts and entrepreneural skills, for which he receives an
agreed proportion of the profit actually realised. The bank
bears the full burden of any losses. In both Musharakah and
Mudarabah, both sides stand to share any profit, depending
on the actual performance of the operation. In a Mudarabah
contract, however, the Mudarib (labourer) is in the nature
20
of a trustee, as well as an agent of the business. As a
trustee, he is required to act with prudence and in good
faith, and is responsible for losses incurred due to his
wilful negligence. The Mudarib will lose nothing but his
effort, in the case of financial loss resulting from normal
business conditions.
Murabaha
In this procedure, the client requests the bank to buy
certain items on his behalf and he agrees to pay the bank
later on, upon the fulfilment of the purchase, the purchase
price plus an agreed percentage of profit. Murabaha is
essentially a form of trade credit, in which the bank
actually purchases and becomes legal owner of whatever the
client has ordered and then resells it to the client on
delivery, at a previously agreed, higher, price. However,
opinions differ as to whether the client has a legal
obligation to buy what the bank has purchased on his/her
behalf. Nonetheless, if the client has no legal obligation
to buy or, in other words, can exercise the option (Khiyar)
to reject the goods, then Murabaha would be generally
acceptable.
Leasing or Renting the Physical Capital/Equipment 
The bank, in this case, purchases equipment and rents it to
the client. This procedure can be converted into a reduced
renting procedure whereby the customer, by paying every year
a part of the value of the equipment reduces the rent, till
he has full ownership of the equipment and the rent is
21
eliminated.
The Problem to be Discussed in the Study
The above is a brief description of some of the activities
in which Islamic banks invest their money. The money used in
these activities consists of the bank's capital (from
shareholders), and a certain percentage of the funds of
current accounts, and funds in saving and investment
accounts. Saving accounts and current accounts are not
eligible for profit. so
 any profit will go to the bank
(shareholders). A holder of an investment account is
entitled to profit after the expiry of an agreed period of
time, and he has the right to withdraw his money or a part
of it at any time.
The first problem we have to face concerning
distribution of profit is, how can the bank determine the
actual profit of every holder of an investment account? The
bank's money is invested in various projects. Some of these
may be completed before the end of the financial year, and
their profits known. However, some of them are not, so the
bank cannot determine the profits from these uncompleted
projects. The right of every holder of an investment account
to withdraw part or all of his money at any time, also makes
it difficult for the bank to determine the real profit for
every financial year.
The second problem we face is that most Islamic banks
cannot use all the money available for investment, because
the central banks in some countries operate a ceiling policy
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to control the growth of the money supply. Thus it is
difficult for the Islamic bank to determine how much of the
invested money is its own, and how much belongs to the
investors. In Islamic banks all funds are held in one pool.
Three Islamic banks in the Sudan were selected to
illustrate, the main problem tackled in the research. These
are Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan (FIBS), Tadamon Islamic
Bank (TIB) and Islamic Bank for Western Sudan (IBWS). The
reasons for selecting these banks are: they are located in
one country, which makes comparisons between them reliable
and relevant, as the laws and regulations which organize
their work stem from the same source, i.e. the Central Bank.
Moreover, the researcher, being of Sudanese nationality, was
able to make use of personal experience and contacts, which
greatly facilitated the gathering of information and data.
However, the main reason for selecting these banks is that
all of them hold all funds in one pool, which provides an
opportunity to illustrate and explain the main theme of the
research, i.e. computing and distribution of profit in
Islamic banks.
Methodology of the Study
The research consists of both theoretical and empirical
elements. The purpose of the theoretical part is to provide
an introduction to Islamic financial institutions, their
establishment, activities and the concept of usury which
they have to avoid. Some accounting postulates and
principles are discussed to examine their acceptability as a
23
basis for accounting in these institutions. The empirical
study aims to demonstrate and explain problems facing
Islamic banks, with special reference to methods used by
specific banks to determine and distribute profit. The
research is based on primary and secondary data and
information. Data were collected through interviews and
discussions in Islamic banks. Methods of measuring,
computing and distributing of profit used by some Islamic
banks are discussed, explained and illustrated with
numerical examples.
The research was conducted through interviews and
discussions. How Islamic banks operate is explained with
reference to FIBS (Chapter 5). This example is felt
satisfactorily and reliable because forms of investment in
Islamic banks are similar. However, any differences in
practice, among the sampled banks, are shown when problems
are assessed in Chapter 9 and also in Chapter 10. How FIBS
operates was determined through discussions and interviews;
in some cases written material was provided. The Discussion
of the bank as a case study is therefore based on a
combination of information from discussions, interviews and
written material.
In order to familiarise himself with the methods of
computing and distributing profit, the researcher has spent
time with employees in these banks in the concerned
departments. Explanations of the methods used in each bank
were accompanied by the detailed discussion with bank
24
employees of at least one year of distributing profit, to
obtain a clear understanding. Any doubtful points were
raised a satisfactory reply obtained. The information so
gathered is presented in Chapters 6 and 7.
To assess the problems facing Islamic banks, a check-
list of seven topics was prepared, with main questions, to
be elaborated in the discussions. In addition to the banks
mentioned earlier, two other banks were added, namely Faisal
Islamic Bank of Egypt (FIBE) and al-Baraka Bank, in order to
broaden the range of Islamic banks being examined.
Accounting difficulties arising from the introduction of a
profit-sharing system were discussed and illustrated by
cases from three Islamic banks in the Sudan, namely Faisal
Islamic bank (FIBS), Tadamon Islamic bank (TIB) and Islamic
bank for Western Sudan (IBWS). The topics covered in the
check-list were discussed in detail with the interviewees.
Questions and unclear points were satisfactorily answered.
Objectives
The objectives of the research are to:
1- Show and illustrate methods of investment used in Islamic
banks and how these banks are operating in the absence of
interest.
2- Examine the acceptability and compatibility of some
accounting postulates and principles for Islamic financial
institutions.
3- Depict the problems and difficulties facing Islamic
banks, in such areas as accounting.
25
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4- Explain and illustrate the difficulties and problems
facing Islamic banks in computing and distributing profit,
with the aim of finding a more reliable formula for this
purpose.
Of these, the last is the primary objective of the
research.
Chapter by Chapter Summary
The first chapter, in the introductory preface stresses the
vital role played by commercial banks in the contemporary
economic life of most societies. This important role
necessitates their existence in Muslim countries, though
they should not operate with interest. The suggested
alternative of a profit-sharing system gives rise to
problems in various fields, i.e. economic, accounting etc.,
including the determination and distribution of profit.
These problems form the focus of the research. The scope,
importance and objective of the study are thus outlined. The
research method is also explained, and a number of key
concepts relating to Islamic banking are defined.
Chapter II
The second chapter discusses in brief the historical
background to the establishment of Islamic banking,
reviewing the theoretical and practical procedures which
prefaced the establishment of Islamic banks. The
contribution of conferences and seminars, and Governmental
experiences are shown. Islamic banking's distinctive
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characteristics and importance are explained and a brief
comparison made between Islamic and traditional banking,
showing that Islamic banking adopts a profit-sharing
technique, while traditional banking depends solely on
credit finance. The concept of usury in Islam is also
reviewed. It is concluded that the prevailing opinion among
Muslim jurists is that any predetermined return on a loan
(finance) is viewed as usury.
Chapter III
In order to establish a theoretical basis for accounting in
Islamic banking, this chapter reviews and discusses the
accounting postulates of entity, going-concern, accounting
period and unit-of-measurement and other accounting
principles. This chapter gives the basis of the material for
the next chapter.
Chapter IV
On the basis of the views of proponents and opposers of
accounting postulates and principles discussed in the
previous chapter, it is concluded that they are compatible
with Islamic jurisprudence and relevant to Islamic banking,
though some reservations are held with regard to the
consequences of the going-concern postulate. The unit-of-
measurement is accepted for both recording and valuation of
accounting transactions and assets under stable monetary
conditions, without a high rate of inflation; under
inflationary conditions, it is held to be useful for
27
recording transactions but not for valuation.
Chapter V
A case study is made of FIBS as an example of Islamic banks.
Its establishment, capital, objective, structure and
organisation are reviewed. Its activities, particularly the
substitution of alternatives to interest,	 such as
Musharakah, Mudarabah and BUrabaha, are discussed. The bank
also provides all the interest-free services which
conventional banks do.
Chapter VI
Distribution of profit is discussed here. By way of
introduction, profit is defined and its measurement
discussed. The concept of profit in Islamic banks is
explained. The application of the realisation convention in
some cases might cause injustice, but if compared to the
elimination of interest, this would be considered
acceptable.
The relationship between the Islamic bank as financial
intermediary and its clients (depositors) is discussed.
Distribution of profit is discussed with empirical examples.
It is shown that there are two types of investments using
Mudarabah contract. In some banks, depositors' funds are
invested separately. Profit is distributed, when projects
are liquidated, on a pre-determined basis, (e.g. 70% for
depositors and 30% for the bank). No difficulties arise, in
this case, when determining each party's share in investment
28
and profit. In the second type of investment, all funds are
held in one pool, which gives rise to difficulty in
determining each party's share in investment and profit. The
methods used to distribute profit are discussed and
explained by using numerical tables. Moreover, a comparison
between distribution of profit in two different years in
FIBS is made and the conclusion is drawn that depositors'
(investors') share in profit is a dependent of other
deposits, as the relationship between them is on a
proportionate basis (i.e. depositors' share in profit will
decrease if other deposits' participation in investment is
increased and vice versa).
Chapter VII
In this chapter, which continues the discussion of the
previous one, more examples of distribution of profit are
examined. The methods used by three Islamic banks are shown
and explained, with examples, and a comparison made between
the methods of the three banks. All of them apportion
various deposits for investment purposes, but some of them
do not apportion various deposits to a specified investment.
Furthermore, investment deposits are treated like other
deposits, and given no special priority. However, it is
concluded that investment deposits should given priority as
regards profit distribution, in order to maintain fairness.
Moreover, deposits should be apportioned to the actual
investment in the year concerned.
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Chapter VIII
The profiles of five Islamic banks are discussed in this
chapter. The ability of FIBS, as an example of Islamic
banks, to attract resources is shown by the development in
its capital and various deposits. Analytical appraisal of
the profile of the bank is made from its financial
statements, in order to evaluate its strengths and
weaknesses. The efficiency of the bank in the application of
resources is discussed with reference to the bank's
investment strategy, its participation in the country's
economy and its contribution to the important economic
sectors. Despite the deteriorating economic situation in the
country, the bank shows a reasonable performance and plays
an important role in socio-economic development, compared
to other commercial banks. The profiles of FIBE, TIB, BB,
and IBWS are also given to provide a general understanding
of these banks, discussions in which, provided some of the
information on which to assess the problems facing Islamic
Banks.
Chapter IX
In order to assess the problems facing Islamic banks, a
sample of banks is examined in terms of a number of
attributes: I- Structure and organisation of the bank: It
appears that all the banks examined are shareholder
companies, which accords with what was stated regarding the
acceptability of the entity postulate. 2- Avoidance of
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interest: All banks interviewed totally avoid interest. Any
doubtful transaction will not be executed until the
Religious Supervisory Board has been consulted. The special
situation of dealing with a foreign conventional
correspondent is also discussed. 3- Forms of investment: The
models of finance used by these banks are Musharakat,
diminishing partnership, Murabaha, ljara and Salem. The
difficulties which arise when using these methods are shown,
e.g. accounting difficulties and the monitoring of projects
financed by the bank. 4- Deposits: When all deposits are
held in one pool, difficulties arise when considering the
distribution of profit. Return is calculated, in these
banks, on the basis of the realised profit. Investment
deposits do not bear any of the administrative expenses of
the bank. 5- Valuation: Taxation departments determine the
rate of depreciation. Hence, valuation may not be realistic.
6- Relationship with the Central Bank: As the Central Bank
role is geared to facilitating the work of interest-based
institutions, it is necessary to enact separate regulations
to supervise Islamic banks. Moreover, credit ceilings
imposed by the Central Banks are shown to be problematic for
Islamic banks. 7- Other difficulties: It appears that most
accounting difficulties are generated from the substitution
of profit-sharing for interest. Furthermore, in the case of
a third party, who is not a shareholder or a creditor, i.e.
an investment depositor accounting principles do not require
financial transactions to be recorded for him. It is also
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shown that reserves are deducted after distributing the
depositors' share in the profit.
Chapter X
In this chapter, accounting difficulties are discussed. The
legal framework in Muslim countries is reviewed, showing
that it is not set out in accordance with principles
governing Islamic banking. Therefore, most Islamic banks are
established by special acts. Accounting difficulties are
discussed with illustrative examples. These difficulties
are: 1- Determining depositors' share in profit. 2-
Practical difficulties involved in finding the bank's share
in the partner's profit. 3- Incomplete projects and the
right to profit of depositors who withdraw. 4- Compensation
for short-term loans. 5- Difficulties which arise in
relation to the conservatism concept when determining Zakah
base and depositors' share in incomplete projects if they
withdraw. 6- Actual cost basis and depositors' rights. 7-
Full liquidation as a pre-condition for the distribution of
the profit in Mudarabah. 8- Administration; the necessity
generated by the nature of profit-sharing finance for banks
to monitor projects to ensure their success. 9- The need of
accounting standards for Islamic banking.
These problems are reviewed and discussed in the
research and suggestions for their solution are made. In
some cases different opinions are reviewed and analysed with
the aim of choosing the most appropriate. In other cases, a
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certain recommendation is adopted, even though it does not
represent the optimum solution, because of the impossibility
of realising the optimum one (e.g. full liquidation).
Chapter XI
This chapter discusses economic problems with the aim of
giving a more complete picture of Islamic banking. The
discussion is theoretical rather than empirical in nature;
since no completely interest-free system exists in relation
to which to view these problems. The problems are discussed
as objections which may be raised against interest-free
banking. It is feared that savings in a zero-interest-rate
would adversely effect investment and economic growth. It is
found that profit-rate can play the same role played by the
rate of interest and secures positive savings and economic
growth. Moreover, profit rate also maintains economic
stability and certainty and provides optimum allocation of
resources. The fear that banks might face a loss in their
de posits is answered by two suggestions, the first is
diversification of risks. The second is provision of a
system of deposits insurance. When government borrowing
needs are considered, it is found that practical
difficulties arise in applying the principle of profit-
sharing to such needs. Nonetheless, arrangements to satisfy
these needs are suggested: increasing taxation; using
profit-sharing in the appropriate projects; borrowing from
central, commercials banks and the public on an interest-
free basis; avoiding wasteful expenditure and keeping
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administrative expenditure to the minimum. The argument that
no such effective tool as interest is available to curb
inflation is accepted. However, other economic methods such
as credit control and increasing taxation can be used along
with a moral code. Moreover, the disadvantages connected
with the use of a high interest to curb inflation are shown
to favour profit-sharing. The claim that in profit-sharing
system the rate of inflation tends to be low is reviewed by
referring to profit-sharing as experienced in the West.
Chapter XII
In this chapter conclusions and recommendations are given,
and the contribution of the research outlined. Islamic banks
prove to perform reasonably successfully. The difficulties
facing them are not impossible to solve and it is possible
to learn to live with them.
Appendices
1- Murabaha
A definition of Murabaha and an explanation of its operation
in Islamic banks is given in the research. However, because
of the controversy surrounding it and its popularity
amongst Islamic banks, special consideration is given to it
in the appendices. After reviewing opinions for and against
it, the research concludes that it is a legitimate operation
if no obligation is stipulated. The operation is
controversial if the client is obliged to buy. However, in
practice, Islamic banks use Murabaha in both forms (i.e.
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with obligation and without). However, to realise the role
of Islamic banks which are originally profit-sharing
institutions, it is concluded that Murabaha is accepted only
at a transitional stage, as there is the danger that the
nature of the banks and their staff who are trained in
traditional banks might use the operation in a way
questionable in Islamic terms. However, it can be used by
specialized subsidiary companies.
2- Glossary
A glossary of Arabic terms used in the research, along with
other common terms in the field, is given in the appendices
to enable readers to familiarise themselves with these
important terms.
Also accounts of five Islamic banks sampled in the
research and a list of interviewees are included in the
appendices.
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II
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
ISLAMIC BANKING PRINCIPLES
Historical Background 
Islamic Banking: Establishment and Principles
The development of Islamic banking has proceeded through
various stages. At first, Muslim scholars and economists
concentrated upon the problems of the concept of interest.
The Islamic pos .ition against interest was reaffirmed and
Muslim economists and bankers were invited to change
financial institutions to conform with Islamic principles.
The need to establish banking on the basis of profit-sharing
was also indicated by some writers.
For the purposes of this research, the development of
Islamic banking is classified into two major phases:
I- The theoretical phase; literature on Islamic banking.
II- The practical phase; where practical steps were taken
towards establishing Islamic banking.
The practical phase will be classified into various
stages, though they are interrelated.
1-Theoretical Phase
At the first stage of this phase, writings on the subject
mainly addressed the contradiction between Islamic
principles and the concept of interest. At a later stage,
writings on the possibility of organising banking on the
basis of profit-sharing rather than charging interest were
introduced. Such writings did not differentiate properly
between Mudarabah and Musharakah, and misconceptions about
the former occurred. Suggestions were made that separate
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banking be established on the basis of partnership as well
as Mudarabah.
At a later stage, in the late sixties, a more mature
and comprehensive model of interest-free banking was
published. More contributions were made during the
seventies, which conceived an interest-free bank as a
financial intermediary mobilising savings from the public on
the basis of Mudarabah and extending funds to entrepreneurs
on the same basis. At this stage, works envisaging the
organisation and implementation of interest-free banking
were
	 produced, for example, 1 Najar (1972), Sadr, and
Siddiqi (1969). These writings led to the subsequent
practical phase (for a detailed literature review of this
phase see, 2 Siddiqi (1981) and Khan (1983)1.
Among the scholars who did pioneering work in the
field of money and banking from the Islamic perspective
during this phase are S.A.Mawdudi, A.I.Quraishi, S.M.Ahmad,
M.Uzair and M.N.Siddiqi from the Indian Subcontinent; and
I.Abdu, A. al-Arabi, B.al-Sadr and S.H.Homoud from Arab
countries.
II- Practical Phase
As a result of the theoretical phase, a general trend
towards adaptation of the financial sector to reconcile with
Islamic principles occurred. The issue of elimination of
fixed interest at the governmental level was brought up at
the Islamic Conference held in Jeddah 1973. Countries such
as Kuwait, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Pakistan have
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introduced measures to bring their financial system into
line with Islamic law (Sharia'h).3
However, reconciliation of financial systems with
Islamic principles in Muslim countries has resulted mainly
in the foundation of Islamic banks as interest-free
financial institutions..
A brief review of this phase will be given, classified
into three main groups: 1) Conferences, seminars and reports
about the subject; 2) Establishment of the Islamic
Development Bank (IDB) and 3) governmental experiences.
1- Conferences, Seminars and Reports
a) Governmental conferences and reports4
i- The Karachi Conference of the Finance Ministers of the
Muslim Countries in 1970, which led to the adoption of the
charter of the Islamic Development Bank, Jeddah (Saudi
Arabia).
ii- The Egyptian Study on the Establishment of the Islamic
Banking System; this was prepared for the Muslim
Countries Foreign Ministers Conference, held in Jeddah in
1972.
iii- The Jeddah Conference of Finance Ministers of Muslim
Countries in 1973, which issued the declaration of intent
to establish IDB.
iv- The report of the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) on
Elimination of Interest from the Economy; the Pakistan
Government asked the CII in 1977 to prepare a blue-print
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of an interest-free economic system. The CII Report was
prepared by experts in economics, banking and Islamic
law. 5
b)General conferences and seminars 
i- The First International Conference on Islamic
Economics; this was held in Makkah (Saudi Arabia) in 1976,
under the auspices of the King Abdulaziz University,
Jeddah. Over thirty papers in English and Arabic were
submitted to the Conference. Some of these have been
published in two volumes, 6 namely "Ahmad" (1980) and
"Sakr" (1980).
ii- The International Conference on Islam and the New
International Economic Order; held in London 1977.
iii- Two Seminars on Monetary and Fiscal Economics of
Islam, held at Makkah (1978) and Islamabad (1981). Papers
submitted to the Makkah Seminar were published in
"Ariff" 7 (1982). Papers presented at the Islamabad Seminar
were published in two volumes: 8 "Money and Banking in
Islam" and "Fiscal Policy and Resource Allocation in
Islam".
Many other conferences and seminars followed in
	
Dubai,
Abu Dhabi, Baden Baden, Kuwait and Dhaka.
c) Establishment of departments and research centres in
Islamic economics 
i- The International Centre for Research in Islamic
Economics (ICRIE) (later, the Centre for Research in
Islamic Economics); the idea of establishing a permanent
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centre for research in Islamic economics emerged from the
First International Conference in Islamic Economics,
Makkah 1976. Hence, ICRIE was established as a response to
the recommendation of the Conference in King Abdulaziz
University, Jeddah in 1977. The Centre's aim is to support
and co-ordinate research in Islamic economics by
establishing a specialised library; conducting and
providing research facilities; publishing research papers;
and helping to establish chairs for the teaching of
Islamic economics.9
ii- The Islamic Research and Training Institute (IRTI).
IRTI, an institute of the Islamic Development Bank, was
established in 1981 and started in 1982. The purpose of
the Institute is to undertake research to enable economic,
financial and banking activities in Muslim countries to
conform with Sharia'h and to extend training facilities
for personnel engaged in development activities in the
bank's member countries.10
iii- Departments teaching Islamic economics; Islamic
economics is now being taught at a number of universities
in the Muslim World. These include al-Azhar University,
Cairo; University of Jordan, Amman; University of Karachi,
Karachi; Islamic University, Islamabad and Ommul Qura
University, Makkah.
2- The Islamic Development Bank (IDB)11
IDB is an international financial institution established in
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pursuance of the recommendation of the Conference of Finance
Ministers of Muslim Countries, held in Jeddah in 1973. The
purpose of the bank is to foster economic and social
development of member countries in accordance with the
principles of Islamic law; to provide technical assistance
to member countries and assist in promotion of foreign trade
among member countries on an interest-free basis. An
important function of IDB, as stated in its Articles of
Agreement, is to undertake research to facilitate the
conduct of financial and banking activities in accordance
with Islamic principles.
3-Governmental Experience
Pakistan experiments; the Constitution12 of Pakistan,
1973 in Article 227 provided that all existing laws should
be brought into conformity with Islamic law (Sharia'h).
Article 37, dealing with principles of policy, enjoined the
State to eliminate usury (Riba) as early as possible. The
process of phasing out fixed interest payments in Pakistan
has been carried out gradually, along with replacement with
equity participation arrangements whenever possible to allow
incentives for savings and efficient resources allocation to
be retained in a manner consistent with Islamic principles.
As mentioned earlier, a report on elimination of interest
from the economy was prepared at the request of the Pakistan
government. The Report aimed to present a blue-print of an
interest-free economy. It was prepared by a panel of
economists and bankers appointed by the Council (CII). The
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Report was modified by the Council to bring some of its
recommendations into conformity with Sharia'h and has
finally adopted by the Council in 1980. In 1979 a time limit
of three years for the elimination of interest from the
economy was set.
Elimination of interest in Pakistan has developed
through many stages:13
1978, the Panel submitted its preliminary report to the
Council (CII).
1979: interest-free finance for housing and cultivation
was started. Funds are provided to prospective builders
of houses or purchasers of houses on a joint ownership
basis with rent-sharing arrangements (Musharakah
Mutanagisa). Finance to farmers is provided on the basis
of the Bai Muajjal arrangement or under the arrangement of
Bai Salem.
1980: Mudarabah companies law was issued.
1981: banks started accepting investment-deposits;
depositors had the option of choosing between interest-
bearing deposits and interest-free accounts. Depositors in
the latter are entitled to share in the profits and losses
of the investments financed by the banks.
1982: commercial banks started to invest in Mudarabah
certificates.
1984: the banking and financial services ordinance was
issued. seven other ordinances were modified by this Jaw
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to provide an appropriate legal framework for Islamic
operations, to which these ordinances were obstacles.
1985: Financial transactions of the government and the
public sectors were made interest-free. All banks stopped
accepting deposits in local currency on an interest basis.
Nevertheless, foreign currency deposits and loans from
abroad continue to bear interest.
In order to broaden the scope for commercial banks, the
State Bank of Pakistan (Central Bank) has authorised these
banks to use Murabaha or mark-up when financing on a
profit-sharing basis is not feasible. A margin of profit to
the seller is mutually agreed upon between the buyer and the
seller in advance. The bank arranges for the purchase of
goods requested by the customer and sells them to him on the
basis of cost plus the agreed profit margin. Nonetheless,
the CII Report recommends that it would not be advisable to
use such an arrangement widely or indiscriminately, in view
of the danger attached to its opening a back-door for
dealing on the basis of interest, though its conformity with
Sharia'h is recognised.14
To conclude, Pakistan has chosen to change its economic
system to an interest-free system through gradual
development. Therefore the change has taken place easily,
without enormous shocks to the economy. Pakistan's
experience has shown that Islamic banks can operate quite
successfully. 15
ii- Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) experience; the
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Constitution 16
 of IRI states that abolition of Riba is an
objective of society (Article 43). In August 1983 a
comprehensive Law for Islamic banking was issued, which
required the banks to convert all their operations in line
with Sharia'h within three years from the date of the
passing of the Law. In March 1984 it was brought into effect
and the banks no longer receive or pay interest on deposits.
Banks accept two kinds of accounts: a) free-interest
(Quard Hassan) deposits which consist of current and savings
accounts; the banks can offer incentives to encourage
deposits into such accounts; b) term investment deposits,
where banks invest funds on behalf of their customers
through Musharakah, Ijara, credit (deferred) sale, direct
investment etc.
Banks are obliged to repay the principal of free-
interest deposits (current and saving). Insurance of the
term investment deposits is also considered (Article 4). The
banks are not allowed to invest in unnecessary and luxury
goods (Article 8). They can construct residential units for
sale on instalment or hire-purchase (Article 10).
The Law gives the central bank (Bank Markazi) the
authority to regulate, control and supervise the banking
system. The central bank (Article 20) is empowered to
intervene in, and supervise monetary and banking activities
through various instruments, such as: (a) fixing minimum and
maximum profit-sharing ratios between banks and their
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clients; (b) designation of various fields for banks
investments; (c) determination of banks investment ceilings.
The central bank is not authorised to deal on an
interest basis with other banks; nor may the banks do so
among themselves (Article 21).
To conclude, Iran has chosen the radical way of change,
a complete transformation of the previous system to an
interest-free system. Therefore it is not surprising that it
has been constrained by shocks to the economy. Nevertheless,
the change was completed in a relatively short period of
time.
Establishment of Islamic Banking
These various stages led to the establishment of
Islamic banking. The Islamic banks that operate now except
those which operating in Islamic Republic of Iran and
Pakistan, are of three types:
1) Islamic banks which were established according to
special acts as in Egypt, Jordan, Sudan, Kuwait and
Bahrain.
2) Islamic banks which were established according to a
complete law regulating their activities, as in Malaysia
and Turkey.
3) Islamic banks which operate within the traditional
framework, as in Denmark and the United Kingdom.
The first experiment in Islamic banking was launched in
Mait Ghamer, 17 the local Egyptian saving banks, in 1963. The
initiators drew their inspiration from the German co-
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operative and mutual savings banks. However, the experience
came to an end after only four years. Nonetheless it had an
important impact on further development.
The idea emerged again when Nasir Social Bank, a state-
owned bank, was established in 1971, according to the law 66
for the year 1871. The third section of this law stated that
the bank was not allowed to deal with others in terms of
interest, that is, not to take or give interest. Nasir
Social Bank was established as a public corporation to widen
the social welfare of the citizens. The mandate of the bank
is the development of a social security system in Egypt.
After the Nasir Social Bank experiment, other Islamic banks
were established,, such as:
1- Dubai Islamic Bank (United Arab Emirates), established in
1975 (1395 h), as a public company.
2- Islamic Development Bank, (Saudi Arabia), 18 established
according to the communique of the Islamic Countries
Conference for Financial Ministers, held in Jeddah in 1973
(1393 h). Officially the Bank commenced operations in March
1975.
3- Baitul Tamweel Al-Kuwaitee; Kuwait Finance House
(Kuwait), A Kuwait public company, established by the
Ministry of Endowment and Islamic affairs, Ministry of
Justice and Ministry of Finance, in 1973 (1393h).
4- Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt, established in 1977 in
Egypt.
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5- Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan, established in August,
1977. It commenced operations officially in May 1978.19
6- Jordan Islamic Bank for Finance and Investment,
established in April 1978; its headquarters is in Amman. 20
7- Bahrain Islamic Bank, established in 1979.21
8- International Islamic Bank of Investment and Development
(Egypt), established in Cairo, in September 1980.
9- Islamic Finance House (Dar Almal Alislami, Bahamas),
established in 1981. It aims to be a comprehensive and
integrated Islamic establishment.
This brief historical background, is intended merely
to give some idea of the establishment of Islamic banking,
without examining its activities in detail.
The Importance of Islamic Banking:
Islamic banking in general aims to promote and develop
the application of Islamic principles, law and traditions to
the transaction of financial, banking and related business
affairs and to promote investment companies engaged in such
business activities as are acceptable and consistent with
Islamic principles. These forbid interest (usury), gambling
and all un-Islamic activities. 22 Islamic banks, by doing so,
will safeguard Islamic communities and societies from
activities which are considered bad from the viewpoint of
Islam.
Islamic banking helps to remove the contradiction in
Islamic societies, between belief in the illegality of
interest, and the existence of banks which deal with
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interest. Islamic banking also helps to remove the social
contradiction emerging from domination of capital over the
effort of labour. Such domination leads to the division of
society into two classes, those who have wealth and don't
work, and those who work but do not possess wealth.
Another advantage of Islamic banking is that Islamic
banks do not deal with loans. Instead they introduce
Musharakah and Mudarabah, which make the investment of the
Islamic bank depend on the usefulness and feasibility of the
project in which the money is invested, in contrast with
traditional banks which give their loans to the wealthy
client regardless of the use to which the money will be put,
because the bank knows that the client is wealthy enough to
pay it back.
Goals of Islamic Banking:
The main goal of Islamic banking is to deal without
interest. There is complete unanimity among all schools of
thought (Meth'ahib) in Islam that the term riba (usury)
stands for interest in all its types and forms. The
institution of Riba is wholly repugnant to the spirit of
Islam. 23
The main principles of Islamic banking are: 24
(i) prohibition of interest in all transactions
(ii) undertaking business and trade activities on the basis
of fair and legitimate (Halal) profits
(iii) giving Zakah;
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(iv) prohibition of monopoly and hoarding
(v) co-operation for the benefit of society and development
of all Halal aspects of business, trade and investment that
are not prohibited in Islam.
Some Islamic banks are more interested in the
development of Islamic countries than commercial activities.
Many of them are operating in sectors oriented towards
development in poorer countries. An example of such a bank
is the Islamic Development Bank in Jeddah.
Comparison Between Islamic and Conventional Banks:
Islamic banks, like conventional banks, are profitable
financial institutions. Their aim is to gain profit, but
they are not allowed to deal with interest or to engage in
any business or trade prohibited by Islam. In contrast,
traditional commercial banks have as their main goal the
maximisation of profit subject to a reasonable level of
liquidity. They tend to deal with loans only and do not
engage in direct investment as a main activity.
A traditional bank introduces services to its
customers. Some of these services are credit services;
others are pure services, like hiring boxes, opening current
accounts etc. Islamic banks in contrast can provide pure
services to their customers, but instead of credit services,
they offer their customers "partnership finance", that is,
profit and loss sharing (Musharakah and Mudarabah). Islamic
banks deal with credit finance in one of their activities,
that is, the (Mbrabaha). Murabaha or "mark up" technique is
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a form of credit finance, but it is a trade contract,
legally accepted in Islam.
In short, the main difference between conventional and
Islamic banks is that the finance in conventional banks is
credit finance or interest-based finance, while the finance
in Islamic banks is on a partnership basis. In the latter,
the bank may make a profit or loss, while in conventional
banks a bank is always guaranteed the principal and a fixed
rate or percentage, that is, interest.
The operations of Islamic banks can be divided into
three groups:
(1) Services with charge. These are the services which the
bank provides for its customers, for a fee, for example,
hiring boxes, transfer of money, etc.
(2) Investment of money on a Musharakah basis.
(3) Services without charge, such as collection and
distribution of Zakah, making interest-free loans to the
poor and needy (Quard hassan), etc.
One further difference between Islamic and conventional
banks is that Islamic banks work as commercial banks and
investment banks at the same time.
Most Islamic banks are established as public companies,
with their capital divided into shares and offered for sale.
The owners of these shares are the shareholders of the bank.
In other words, Islamic banks are established on the basis
of the western company concept. There is thus some
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similarity between these banks and public companies in
rules, structure, management, etc. It may be argued that
Islamic banks might be established on the principles of
(Shirkat el Anan). 25 This argument, it is believed, might
not always apply, because Shirkat el Anan, as practised in
the Islamic world, consists of few participants. However it
is possible to establish an Islamic bank on the principles
of Shirkat el Anan.
The Distinguishing Activities of Islamic Banking
1- Musharakah (Partnership or Equity Participation)26
The common feature of partnership contracts is that two
or more persons enter a contract by providing money as
capital for running a business, with the provision that they
will share in the profit or loss in some pre-determined
proportions. In case of profit, they can share that profit
as they agree. The proportion of their share in capital is
not a factor which determines their percentage in profit.
For example, if they participate in capital 50% each, they
may share profit 60% and 40%, if they are so agreed.
However, in the case of loss, they must share it in
proportion to their participation in the capital. If their
capital is 50% each, the loss should be borne equally
between them.
2-Mudarabah 27
Mudarabah means a contract in which one party provides
capital (Rub ul- Mal) as an owner, while the other party
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(Mudarib) transacts business and provides his labour or
effort under the agreement that the Mudarib will receive a
fixed percentage of dividend in the overall profit of the
business. This percentage should be pre-determined. If, on
the other hand, the business loses money, the owner (Rub ul
Mal) loses his money and the labourer loses its effort. The
exception is the case of negligence of the labourer. If the
loss which occurs is proved to be due to the labourer's
negligence, he will be responsible for it.
In this procedure of investment, the bank contributes
all the finance, while the customer contributes only his
managerial efforts or labour and gets an agreed proportion
of the profit actually realised.
There are several terms used to define this contract;
Qirad; Muqaradah and Mudarabah. Historically it was called
Mudarabah in Iraq, while it was known as Mugaradah or Qirad
in Arabia (al-Hijaz). In the Western world it came to be
known as commenda. Unlike Musharakah there are some
differences of opinion among muslim jurists regarding the
Mudarabah contract. There are three kinds of contract:
i- Money Mudarabah; in which the capital is money. This form
is accepted by all muslim jurists;
ii- Commodity Mudarabah; the majority of muslim jurists do
not accept this form as a basis for Mudarabah, unless the
goods are first sold and the resulting revenue is considered
as the base capital. The jurists stipulate the selling of
goods, so as to avoid any future dispute between the owner
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of the capital (Rab ul Mal) and the labourer (Mudarib or
A'mil);
iii- Productive MUdarabah (Istisnaa'); this is a contract
that requires the manufacture of goods and the sharing of
the production. Most muslim jurists reject this form, but it
is approved by the later jurists of the Hanafi schoo128
(Meth'hab). Those who reject this form of Mudarabah, do so
on the ground that the agent who performs a productive act
should be rewarded or compensated by a fixed wage rate and
the profit or loss should go to the capital.
In a Mudarabah contract, the owner of capital can
restrict the activities in which the labourer invests the
money, that is, the capital of Mudarabah. However, unless
specifically restricted from engaging in certain activities,
the labourer is free to act as he wishes for the pursuit of
profit. Mudarabah itself can be classified into two classes:
(a) Mudarabah with authorisation; 28 in which the agent or
labourer can invest the money as he likes. (b) Mudarabah
without authorisation; in this form the owner of the capital
chooses a particular project or activity in which the agent
may invest the money.
"Even in Mudarabah those who procure capital
and those who conduct the business may be different
individuals: those who have obtained the capital
may themselves jointly transact the business; or
capital may belong to one while others transact
business with it; or several persons procure the
capital and only one transacts the business. Loss
means the -diminution of the original capital. It
will, therefore, be distributed proportionately
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according to the size of capital invested in the
business and the investors will bear the same. The
party which has not made any iqxestment in the
business will not bear any loss"."
"Investment" in the last sentence means "financial
investment". In other words, those who do not provide money
will not share in the loss, even if they are involved in the
Mudarabah as agents or labourers (Mudaribeen).
3- Murabaha (mark-up)
Bai el Murabaha, is one of the legal contracts in
Islam. There is unanimity among all schools of jurisprudence
as to its legality. Murabaha is of two kinds; the first
involves deciding a sum of money as a profit over the
purchase price of the commodity or goods which will be sold
on the basis of Murabaha. The second form gives a profit as
a percentage of the purchase price of the commodity. 31 the
Murabaha or "mark up" technique 32 involves a sale in which
the profit margin, or mark up, of the seller has been
mutually agreed between the seller and the buyer in advance.
The profit margin or mark up can be either a sum of money,
or a percentage of the purchase price of the commodity.
According to this procedure (Murabaha) an agent approaches a
bank, asking it to obtain a commodity, and he agrees to pay
the bank an agreed-upon profit.33
Murabaha as carried out by some Islamic banks consists
of two joint contracts. The first contract between the bank
and its client requires a promise by the client to buy the
commodity when the bank delivers it. The second is the sale
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contract, which, in most cases, is deferred (Bai Muajjal).
Bai Muajjal is defined as "sale under which the price of the
item involved is payable on a deferred basis either in a
lump sum or by instalments." 34 The procedure of Murabaha in
some Islamic banks is as follows: a client orders his bank
to bring him a commodity with definite specifications, with
a promise to buy the commodity when it arrives or when the
bank delivers it. This is the first part of the transaction.
The second is that, when the Islamic bank buys and brings
the commodity, the client has to fulfil his promise and to
accept the commodity if it is as specified. The client has
to pay to the bank the purchase price of the commodity plus
the agreed profit, either in a lump sum or deferred.
There are some disputes among muslim jurists regarding
this form of transaction (Murabaha). Some accept it on
condition that the client has the right to reject the
contract, that is, not to buy the commodity from the bank
upon its arrival. In this case the commodity remains with
the bank, which can sell it to any other client.
• 35There are some economists, like Siddiql,	 who would
prefer Islamic banks not to deal in Murabaha and Bai
Muajjal, for it is argued that they may "become a cover
for continuing the present interest-based transaction."
According to this argument, those who need finance for the
purchase or import of goods approach a bank to buy it for
them with the commitment to buy them from the bank at a
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higher but deferred price. The mark up will tend to be
higher, the longer the period of time involved. The banks
will have the guarantee of receiving back the price they
actually pay plus a predetermined return as the result of
the mark up. This will create a tendency to prefer this
method to profit-sharing, it is argued, since it helps in
maintaining the status quo. Siddiqi agrees with the CII
report that Murabaha may open a back door for interest in
Islamic banks.
However, it is believed that this argument is not
enough to reject Bai Muajjal (deferred selling), as it is a
legal contract in Islam, and is accepted by many muslim
jurists. That the banks "will have guarantee of receiving
back the price they actually pay plus a predetermined
return", might not always be true, as the client has the
right to reject the goods. According to some Islamic banks,
the client is not obliged to accept the commodity which has
been bought for him. Therefore the banks may lose if the
price of the rejected commodity falls. The banks always face
this risk.
4- Diminishing Partnership (Musharakah Mutanaqisa)
In this type of Musharakah, a bank gives the right to its
partner to buy its share in the partnership. As a result,
one party can acquire the whole assets of the partnership,
by buying the other party's share. The CII report on
elimination of interest, suggests a similar transaction,
that is, "hire purchase" •36 Under such a system, banks may
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finance the purchase of equipment or consumer durable goods,
under a joint-ownership arrangement, subject to the
provision of security or surety. They would receive, in
addition to repayment of the principal, a share in the net
rental value (after allowing for depreciation) of these
items in proportion to their outstanding share in the total
investment. As defined by the Financial Times, 37 hire
purchase in Islamic banks is as follows: "the rental of
equipment is supplemented with lump sum payments or capital
payments into an investment account, whose accumulated
capital and profits permit the client to buy the goods."
Hire purchase agreements can be on a short, medium or long
term basis.
5- Bai Salem
Bai Salem is one of the legal contracts in Islam and is
accepted by all schools of thought. This form of sale is
approved by the Prophet's tradition (Sunnah). It was a
contract which the people of Arabia used before Islam, but
Islam made changes by adding some conditions, that is, (i) a
definite time for delivery of goods should be stated in the
contract, (ii) the weight or volume of goods should be
stated in the contract. Bai Salem is a deferred sale of
goods, the price being paid in advance.
As experienced in Arabia (al-Hijaz), Bai Salem was
usually in agricultural products, but it can include
manufacturing products. Islamic banks may enter into an
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agreement with a farmer for advance purchase of an
agricultural product, and the contract should specify in
full, the details of the commodity, that is, its weight,
time of delivery etc. The bank makes full payment of the
amount agreed upon at the time of entering into the
agreement. 38 The CII report 39 suggests that	 a law be
enacted to ensure the fulfilment of these conditions, that
is, specifying complete details of the commodity, its
quality, price and the place of delivery etc. because as
mentioned in the report, Bai Salem is a special type of
trading arrangement, subject to strict, stipulations and
conditions as laid down in the Prophet's tradition.
6- Leasing
There are two types of leasing which can be used: (a)
finance lease; (b) operating lease. The finance lease is
based on a contract between the lessor and the lessee for
hire of a specific asset. The lessor retains the ownership
of the asset and the lessee has possession and use of the
asset on payment of specified rentals over a period. Though
the lessor is the legal owner, the lessee is given exclusive
rights to the use of the asset for the duration of the
contract. The rentals during the fixed "primary" period are
sufficient to amortise the capital outlay of the leasing
company and provide an element of profit. The primary period
is closely related to the estimated useful life of the asset
and the lessee is normally responsible for all operating
costs such as maintenance, insurance, etc.
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The operating lease is more akin to a short-term hire-
purchase arrangement; the rentals, in this form of purchase,
are insufficient to enable the lessor to recover fully the
initial capital outlay. The residual value is recovered
through disposal or re-leasing the equipment to other
users 40
An Islamic bank can purchase equipment and rent it to
its client. This procedure can be converted into a reduced
renting procedure whereby the customer, by paying every year
an instalment of the value of the equipment , reduces the
rent, till the whole equipment is owned by him and the rent
is eliminated.
In using a leasing system, the Islamic bank acts as a
trading company, more than a bank.
7- Investment Auctioning41
Another method for replacement of interest in the case of
long and medium-term financing in the industrial sector is
the system of investment auctioning. Under this system,
Islamic banks may form a consortium with long-term financing
institutions and formulate industrial projects in full
detail. The consortium may then announce the project with
the assurance that it will make available the needed plant
and machinery as specified, and call for bids from
prospective investors for the purchase of the machinery. The
project may be awarded to the highest bidder if the party is
considered to be a sound one. Otherwise, the project may be
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awarded to the next highest bidder considered capable of
efficient implementation and running of the project. The
most significant advantage of this system, from the economic
viewpoint, would be that the price paid by the investor
would adequately reflect the potential profitability of the
project, which is essential for efficient allocation of
resources.
The last two methods, and others, are suggested by the
CII report as a substitute for interest in Islamic banks.
Although Islamic banks' activities differ from one bank to
another, the most common activities are Musharakah,
Mudarabah, and Murabaha. The Council, in its report
considers all models except Musharakah and Mudarabah as
secondary. The Council's report refers to Musharakah and
Mudarabah as a profit/loss sharing system. 42 Siddiqi 43 in
his comment on the Council's report, considers models other
than Musharakah and Mudarabah as methods which are second
best substitutes for profit/loss sharing, but not as
alternatives to it.
It has been argued that it would be better for Islamic
banks to depend solely on Musharakah and Mudarabah, because
they help the banks to develop their own activities and
their own way of doing banking. The use of methods other
than profit/loss sharing may disturb the system and its
development.
Although all these arguments are logical, there are
methods other than profit/loss sharing, used in Islamic
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banks, which are accepted in Islamic jurisprudence (Fiqh)
and related to the essence of Islam, for example, Murabaha.
It is strongly believed that the best way to conclude the
debate is to encourage Islamic banking to use the
profit/loss system as their major activity and to establish
at the same time specialised companies, for instance,
building companies, consumer durable goods companies, etc,
which would work on the basis of mark up (Murabaha or Bai
Muajjal).
The Concept of Usury (Riba) In Islam
Riba literally means an excess, addition, growth, rise or
increase. 44 However, as a term in Islamic Law it denotes the
excess fixed amount above the principal, in a lending
transaction, given from the debtor to the creditor.
Riba is mentioned in the Qur'an, the Holy Book for
muslims, many times. The verses which prohibit Riba in
Chapter two of the Qur'an are as follows:
Those who swallow Riba can't stand except as
stands one whom the devil hath prostrated by (his)
touch. That is because they say: Trade is like
Riba, whereas Allah bath permitted trade and
forbidden Riba. He unto whom an admonition from
his Lord cometh and (he) desists (in obedience),
he shall keep that which is past, and his affair
henceforth is with Allah. As for him who returneth
(to Riba) such are the rightful owners of the
fire. They will abide therein (11:275).
Allah hath blighted Riba and made Sadaqat
(charities) fruitful. Allah loveth not the impious
and the guilty (11276).
0, you who believe keep your duty with Allah and
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relinquish what remains of Riba, if you are
believers (11:278).
But if you do (it) not, then be apprised of war
from Allah and his Messenger; and if you repent,
then you shall have your capital. Wrong not, and
you shall not be wronged (11:279).
The word Riba, in these verses means: a fixed amount
over the principal. It is generally required on a basis of a
deferred selling or a loan: if one sells a product on the
agreement that a specified price be payable at some future
date, and if the buyer cannot pay on the maturity date, then
the seller would increase the price and extend the payment
period. Another form of Riba is to lend money to another on
the agreement that after a specified period of time the
borrower will repay an excess amount over the principal sum
due.45
This kind of R1ba46 is referred to as Riba al Nasi'ah
or Riba al Jali or Riba al Duyun, that is, clear usury or
loans usury. This kind of Riba is prohibited on the ground
that it is injustice for the borrower and it represents
exploitation. Besides this type of Riba, which is clearly
prohibited in the Holy Book, Prophet's tradition (Sunnah)
prohibits another type of Riba, that is, Riba al Fadl
(called also Ribs al Khafi or Riba al Buyu',) that is,
unclear usury or trade usury. This kind of Riba prohibits
barter trade in six commodities against themselves, that is,
gold, silver, wheat, dates, salt and barley. It is not
allowed to barter gold with gold or silver with silver, etc.
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If these six commodities are to be exchanged against
themselves they should be exchanged on the spot and be equal
and alike.
1- (From abu sa'id al Khudri: The Prophet, peace be
on him, said: "Do not sell gold for gold except when
it is like for like, and do not increase one over
the other; do not sell silver for silver except when
it is like for like, and do not increase one over
the other; and do not sell what is away (from among
these) for what is ready."
2- "From Ubada ibn al Samit: The Prophet, peace be
on him, said: "Gold for gold, silver for silver,
wheat for wheat, barley for barley, dates for dates,
and salt for salt - like for like, equal for equal,
and hand to hand; if the commodities differ, then
you may sell as you ash, provided that the exchange
is hand -to- hand".)""
Exchange of these commodities against themselves is
allowed if an exchange of an equal and like commodity takes
place on spot, for example, if anyone wants to exchange a
given quantity of gold against gold. The two quantities
should be equal and the exchange should be on the spot.
however, if the commodities are different, gold for heat,
for example, then one may sell as he wishes.
Since Islamic banks are mostly concerned with the first
kind of usury, that is, clear usury (Riba al Jail), the
second type of usury, that is, unclear usury (Ribs al
Ehafi), will not be discussed in detail.
However there are some economists48 who believe that
Riba in its wide meaning covers all forms of economic
injustice, exploitation and unearned income. It covers also
in their opinion, all excess over what is justified by
consideration. Chapra 49
 argues that Riba is derived from
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Raybah which literally means doubt and refers to any income
which has the semblance of usury (Riba) or which raises
doubts in the mind about its rightfulness. It covers all
income derived from injustice to, or exploitation of,
others.
Several justifications for the prohibition of Riba in
Islam are given by learned muslims:
1- At the individual level, Riba creates selfishness,
miserliness, greed and malevolence. At the social level,
wealth will be accumulated in a few hands, while the
majority of society remains poor. This may lead to a highly
unstable society. 50
2- Reward is justified by work. Any gain earned without
work is not legitimate. Any work or effort or enterprise
which assures its owner of a gain without risk is
illegitimate.51
3- The method of financing used by the interest
institution is unjust and results in maldistribution of
income and wealth in society. 52 If an entrepreneur obtains
money capital from a financier to carry on an enterprise, he
will be faced by fixed costs. Moreover he is not completely
sure that he will earn profit. However, a contractual
commitment to repay the financier the loan with interest is
not in harmony with this reality. If the enterprise incurs a
loss the entrepreneur is made to bear the loss and to pay
the interest out of his own assets, even though he may not
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as an entrepreneur be responsible for this loss. To punish
such entrepreneurs by taking some of the assets which they
made in the past is hardly justified.
47 Financing productive enterprise through interest-
bearing debts fails to channel invested funds into the most
productive directions. 53
 Loans, under this system, generally
go to the most credit-worthy parties, not to those with the
most promising projects, if they are not credit-worthy,
because the efficiency of the project in which the loan is
invested, comes as a second priority to the financier. He is
more interested in the financial capability of his debtor
than in the efficiency of his project.
5- Interest worsens the distribution of income and
wealth, because it "ensures a continuous flow of resources
from the debtors, who are many, to the creditors, who are
few.. 
6- By prohibition of Riba, "Islam wishes to establish
an economic system where all forms of exploitation are
eliminated, particularly, the injustice perpetuated in the
form of the financier being assured of a positive return
without doing any work or sharing in the risk, while the
entrepreneur, in spite of his management and hard work, is
not assured of such a positive return. Islam wishes to
establish justice between the financier and the
entrepreneur. 55
Islam, as a religion, is not alone in prohibiting
usury. Christianity 56 prohibits usury; in medieval times,
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the Roman Catholic church prohibited it. It was also
condemned by the Jews in the Old Testament, and by the Greek
and Roman philosophers. 57
Production and Consumption Loans
There is now a general acceptance amongst Muslim economists
and religious scholars that the Islamic concept of Riba
includes interest in all its manifestations, irrespective of
whether it relates to loans for consumption or for
productive purposes, whether the borrower is a government or
an individual, and whether the rate of interest is low or
high. 58 Nevertheless, there was once an opinion which
differentiated between interest on consumption loans and
productive or commercial loans; between low and high and
reasonable and unreasonable rates of interest. The idea
behind this distinction was to confine interest to one kind
of loan and to exclude others therefrom.
Such a distinction is based on the assumption that Riba
is prohibited in Islam on consumption loans only, as it
causes hardship to borrowers. Therefore, interest on
productive loans is not prohibited as the funds borrowed
generate profit; hence the lender could benefit from the
loan.
However, the assumption that Riba is forbidden on
consumption loans only is factually wrong.	 No
differentiation was made in the Qur'an and the Sunnah
between interest on consumption and productive loans.
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Moreover, the Riba which was annulled by the Prophet on his
Farewell Pilgrimage was that accruing to Abbas ibn 'Abdul
Muttalib which was on commercial loans. 59 So far as the
second argument is concerned, that productive loans generate
profit, it may be replied that investment does not always
generate profit. Why, therefore, should the lender share
that return in a pre-determined ratio? Granting a lender a
fixed return regardless of the uncertainty surrounding
investment cannot be justified from the point of view of
fairness.
It seems, however, that the debate on interest is not
yet a thing of the past. Recently the Egyptian Legal Opinion
Board Mar al-Ma)" issued a Statement (FaLwa) legalising
investment certificates (Shihadat al-Istithmar). These are
government bonds issued by a state bank; revenue from them
is used to finance government projects.
The reasons for considering these certificates
legitimate and acceptable from the Islamic point of view, as
argued in the Statement, are:
1- Investment certificates are issued by the Government to
finance its projects, which are compatible with the
public interest, and to encourage savings.
2- Profit (interest) on these certificates is paid by the
Government.
3- Investment certificates are considered as deposits, not
loans (no definition of or distinction between deposit
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and loan is given).
The Statement considers the return on these
certificates to be profit, not Riba. Determination of a
fixed percentage of profit, it is argued, is to protect the
owners of the investment certificates.
However, the Statement makes two recommendations:
first, changing the name of the return on these certificates
from interest to investment return or profit on investment;
second, establishing a new certificate with a variable
return. This means that the profit given to the owners of
these certificates would depend on the actual profit
generated; in other words they would be Mudarabah
certificates.
Nonetheless, this Fatwa is considered of an
individualistic nature, expressing a personal opinion only
and is rejected by other religious scholars.61 In the
majority opinion, the return on investment certificates
represents usury.
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III
ACCOUNTING POSTULATES AND
PRINCIPLES
Accounting Postulates and Principles
The following two chapters study accounting postulates and
principles to examine their compatibility with Islamic Law
and principles. This chapter provides a general review of
accounting postulates and principles; their compatibility
with Islamic Law will be considered in the next chapter.
Accounting postulates and principles merit a special
discussion as there is an opinion amongst Muslim
researchers 1 that some accounting postulates do not conform
with Islamic principles and teaching. In addition,
accounting postulates and principles are applied to Islamic
financial institutions; therefore, it is important to
confirm their compatibility with Islamic law and principles.
Theory tends to evolve over time. Errors in the
prescription of existing theories are examined and the
theories modified. Norms and societal beliefs also play an
important role in the evolution of theories . Accounting
theory has progressed through a long evolutionary process,
being affected by logic, policy-making, government
regulations and developments in finance, which itself
evolved from economics. 2
Accounting concepts are rooted in the value system of
the society in which they operate, and are socially
determined. Hence, value judgements are applied to the
interpretation and justification of economic and social
events. The subjective nature of these values implies that
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there is ample opportunity for controversy as to how events
should be measured and for whom such measurements are
intended. Accordingly, accounting development reflects a
response to changing social needs.3
Contemporary concepts of accounting evolved with the
growth of accounting theory in the Western world, in
relation to developments in economic life and the changing
needs of different groups for accounting information. This
is clearly explained by Catlett, who indicates that
accounting was created and developed to accomplish various
desired objectives and, therefore, it is not based on
fundamental laws or absolute precepts. Since accounting has
evolved over many years through trial and error, it should
be continually improved on a basis that is responsive to the
requirements of those groups in our society that use the end
product, namely financial statements. 4 Accounting principles
emerge from and express the values and essential
characteristics of a society.
Postulates are basic assumptions or fundamental
propositions concerning the economic, political and
sociological environment in which accounting operates. They
serve as a foundation for the logical derivation of further
propositions, and they must be generally accepted by
5accountants.
A review and definition of some key accounting
postulates and principles follows.
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The Entity Postulate
There is no unanimity among authors in accountin g in
defining postulates. Some authors refer to assumptions,
while others use the term concepts or conventions. 6 Paton
himself uses many terms, 7 including postulates, assumptions,
and concepts.
An accounting entity is defined as follows:
"Any economic unit which has been selected as the
subject to be accounted for ( that is, as the
accounting entity) is to be viewed, in the
accounting process, as a real entity, existing in
its own right, separate and distincX, from other
entities which have dealings with it." °
Therefore this postulate enables the accountant to
differentiate between the person or persons who own the
enterprise and the enterprise itself. It states that
financial accounting information relates to the activities
of a business entity only, and not to the activities of its
owners. The enterprise is something separate and distinct
from those who provide its capital. The business entity or
unit owns the resources of the company and is liable to the
claims of the providers of capital and to those of the
creditors. Accordingly the accounting equation is:
Assets = Liabilities + Stockholders' Equity.9
Paton argues that, although an institution is not a
person it may still be a very real thing. "A great
university is an institution, not a person, but has none the
less a distinct existence.”10
The idea or assumption of an accounting entity is now
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generally accepted. 11
 An entity becomes an accounting entity
because and when accounts are kept about it. The concept of
the accounting entity may include the legal enterprise, a
division of an enterprise or a superenterprise, as in the
case of consolidation of several interrelated firms.
The Going-Concern Postulate
The going-concern, or continuity, postulate holds that
the business entity will continue its operations long enough
to realise its projects, commitments, and on-going
activities. As most economic units are organized for
operation over an indefinite period of time, it is
frequently argued that the entity should logically be
viewed as remaining in operation indefinitely under normal
circumstances. The postulate assumes either that the entity
is not expected to be liquidated in the foreseeable future
or that it will continue for an indefinite period of time.
Such a hypothesis of stability reflects the expectations of
all parties interested in the entity. Thus, the financial
statements provide a tentative view of the financial
situation of the firm and are only part of a series of
continuous reports. 12
Newman and Mellman 13 define the continuity concept as
follows: "Unless and until the entity has entered into a
state of liquidation, it is to be viewed as having an
indefinite life."
Paton 14 argues that the going concern assumption is
entirely reasonable, for it is surely fair to assume the
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continuity of a particular business, in the absence of
evidence which gives a definite presumption to the contrary.
In his opinion, the accountant has the right to take it for
granted that the entity in which he is interested will
continue to operate.
From the valuation 15 point of view, the going-concern
convention is considered as very important: many assets
derive their value from their employment in the firm, and
should the firm cease to operate, the value which could be
obtained for these assets on a closing-down sale would
probably be much less than their book-value. That is the
reason why the valuation of assets used in a business is
based on the assumption that the business is continuing, and
not on the verge of cessation.
The postulate of continuity, however, has come under
attack from many accountants. Sterling describes it as an
unreasonable and absurd assumption. He argues that the high
rate of business failures makes it difficult to build an
evidential case for a projection of continuity. All
businesses, except those currently in existence, have ceased
operations. Thus, it would seem more reasonable to assume
cessation instead of continuity.16
Fremgen 17 also attacks the going-concern assumption,
arguing that it "is not a scientific fact or even a
completely rational assumption." He rejects the definition
of continuity given by the American Accounting Association,
that is: "In the absence of evidence to the contrary , the
entity is viewed as remaining in operation indefinitely.”18
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He suggests that this should be altered to read: "The entity
is viewed as remaining in operation indefinitely in
recognition of evidence to that effect, not in the absence
of evidence to the contrary." He further argues that, "the
going concern assumption has had no important influence on
9the formulation of accounting principles. 1,1
Accounting Period Postulate
The life of an entity is currently regarded as
consisting of a chain of periodical segments. The final
statements which report on the activities for a year and the
condition of the entity as at the close of that year, are
based on what is referred to by many writers as the
'accounting period convention ,20 . Belkaoui 21 claims that,
although the continuity postulate assumes that the entity
will exist for an indefinite period of time, users require a
variety of information about the financial situation and
performance of an enterprise to make short-term decisions.
In response to this constraint, the accounting period
assumption holds that financial reports showing changes in
the wealth of an enterprise should be published
periodically.
The accumulation, summarization and publication of
accounting information need to be as rapid as possible to
assure the availability of current information to the
shareholders and other users. Therefore, it is important
that financial statements, should be presented at frequent
intervals so as to reveal changes in the company's situation
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that may in turn affect the user's predictions and
decisions 22
Paton 23 considers this postulate as one of the
important conventions of accounting. For the purpose of
comparisons between revenues and applicable cost related to
a fiscal year, the accounting period postulate enables
accountants to analyse and rearrange original accounting
data to reflect immediate administrative decisions and
provides administratively useful data for future use.24
By requiring an enterprise to provide periodic, short-
term financial reports, the period convention thus implies
the accrual basis of accounting. "This entails the
assignment of revenue to the period in which it was earned
(rather than when received). n25 Sales of assets will be
considered as revenue during the year in which sales took
place regardless of when payment is received.
However, the accounting period postulate, besides
helping in investment decisions, assists in the prediction
of bankruptcies and risk and, hence, are useful in making
loans. 26
The Unit-of-Measure Postulate
The unit-of-measure postulate holds that accounting is
a process of measurement and communication of the
activities of the firm that are measurable in monetary
terms. This assumption assumes that the purchasing power of
the monetary unit is stable over time. 27 To express
accounting information in terms of money alone may exclude
factors such as quality of the product. Another disadvantage
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of this assumption is that it ignores changes in purchasing
power. 28
 "Even actual cost," as expressed by Paton, "is only
a tentative figure. Accounting deals largely with judgements
and estimates, not with certainties. Values are always more
or less conjectural and unstable. But an exhibit of cost is
in itself a significant statistical record; it gives a
fairly reasonable starting point, at least.” 29 He argues
that it is important for the accountant to assume that cost
indicates actual value for purposes of initial statement,
for cost is the only definite fact available when an asset
is purchased. It is therefore reasonable to charge the
appropriate asset account with the amount of this cost. 30
It is believed 31 that using monetary terms to measure
financial position at a given moment in time is the most
objective and least biased method. Under the historical cost
concept, transactions are measured on the basis of the
number of original units of money involved. Such
measurements are considered to be objective since the amount
of cost, or revenue, can be easily verified by referring to
invoices, cheques, and other documents. Therefore, using
historical cost is convenient, because it is much easier to
check from an invoice than to find a present price.
Newman and Mellman32
 argue that it is difficult, if not
impossible, to use any other medium of measurement than
money to express values in accounting, because economic
transactions are described and consummated on a money basis.
Moreover, money is homogeneous, being a common denominator
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which has the attribute of objectivity. It is also public in
character and universally understandable and acceptable.
Despite changes in the purchasing power of money,
accounting has been unwilling to introduce into the accounts
modifications of values in order to reflect changes in the
value of the monetary standard. Therefore, "values in
accounting are expressed in terms of money as a fixed and
03constant standard.
Paton and Littleton 34 do not agree that accounting
qualitative measurements should be designed to interpret and
influence business conduct. To do so, in their opinion,
overstates the purpose and subject matter of accounting.
They argue that the term "measured consideration" is more
appropriate than the word "value" to indicate the type of
information which makes up the subject matter of accounting.
If the value which expresses the mutual valuation of the
buyer and seller as of the moment of exchange, changes, the
recorded price-aggregate is still the best means available
for representing varied transactions in homogeneous terms.
Price-aggregate is used rather than cost because the latter
term is inadequate to designate the basic subject matter of
accounting. In their opinion, accounting uses money-price
only, because it is a convenient common denominator which
expresses diverse objects and services homogeneously, and
because it is the common mode of expressing bargained
exchanges. They assert that money and price are not
significant, and that the service is the significant element
behind the accounts, that is, service-potentialities, which,
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when exchanged, bring still other service-potentialities
into the enterprise.
However, the unit-of-measure postulate assumes that the
purchasing power of the monetary unit is stable over time.
If it changes, this change is insignificant. This assumption
is not always correct, especially in the current world-wide
inflationary environment. 35
Recently, however, accounting information resulting
from the application of the historical cost concept has been
questioned 36 by various financial-statement user groups. It
is argued that the use of historical cost information
frequently results in income not being recognised during the
period in which it occurs, and also results in overstating
income in periods of inflation. Changes in prices create two
accounting problems: (i) valuation; the value of individual
assets changes in relation to all other assets in the
economy, irrespective of any change in the general level of
price; (ii) measurement unit; the value of the measurement
unit changes because prices in general change.
Two different viewpoints exist as to how to present
financial information to account for the effect of changing
prices and values on an enterprise, to overcome the
disadvantages of historical cost information. One school of
thought advocates statements prepared on the basis of
current value to address the valuation problem. The other
proposes "price-level-adjusted financial statements", that
is, adjustment . of	 historical cost information to account
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for the effect of the overall change in prices. This
viewpoint addresses the measurement unit problem.
However, accounting for price level changes is
considered by some 37 to be part of a grand illusion; it is
argued that methods intended to account for the financial
effects of price and price level changes have neither done
so, nor are they capable of doing so; that what has been
presented to be a measurement of general purchasing power
gains or losses has usually not been a measurement of
general purchasing power gains or losses; and what has been
passed off as a measurement of "specific" purchasing power
gains or losses invariably has not been a measurement of
purchasing power gains or losses of any variety.
The Objectivity Principle
The usefulness of financial information depends heavily on
the reliability of the measurement procedure used. Because
ensuring maximum reliability is difficult, accountants have
employed the objectivity principle to justify the choice of
a measurement procedure. Financial reporting is considered
useful if it provides useful information to present and
potential investors and creditors and other users, on which
to base rational investment, credit and similar decisions.
The principle of objectivity has been subject to different
interpretations:38
1- An objective measurement is a verifiable measurement in
the sense that it is based on evidence.
2- An objective measurement is an impersonal measure and
free from the personal bias of the measurers.
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However, in some cases, objectivity can be realised
only from a short-term perspective, which might prove
disastrous to a going concern with a long life ahead. A
completely objective determination of depreciation, for
example, would appear only when the item of equipment was
permanently retired from service. Therefore, the basic
concept of verifiable, objective evidence contains an
element of variability. The highest degree of objectivity is
the best, provided attainment of that high degree does not
run counter to the long-run point of view of a going
concern. If accounting is to become increasingly scientific,
it must continue to develop new ways and means of obtaining
facts that are convincingly objective and at the same time
appropriate to the long run.39
The development of new ways and means for realizing
objectivity is particularly needed in the present situation
of inflation. Although historical cost, for example,
realizes objectivity for recording values of different
items at their acquisition it does not maintain the same if
used as the basis for valuation. Therefore, it is essential
to differentiate between measurement objectivity and
valuation objectivity.
The Matching Principle
The matching principle or convention holds that expenses
should be recognized in the same period as associated
revenue. Hence, the matching principle links revenue with
their relevant expenses. This means identifying the gains
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resulting from transactions and setting off against those
gains the expenses which are related to those
transactions. 40
One of the consequences of the conventional matching
principle is that it relegates the balance sheet to a
secondary position. It is merely a summary of balances that
result after applying the rules for determination of income.
The matching principle is responsible for deferred charges
that are not assets and deferred credits that are not
liabilities. 41
Three matching principles are employed by accountants:
associating cause and effect, systematic and rational
allocations, and immediate recognition. Applying these
principles involves a great deal of judgement. The
accountant should determine whether a cost pertains to
future revenues and hence should be deferred; whether a cost
is related to past revenues and therefore should be written
against prior income; or whether a cost, although not yet
paid, is related to current revenues and therefore should be
accrued. In making these decisions, official pronouncements
by authoritative bodies, conservatism and expendiency play
an important role. Some rules are very specific, others are
vague, such as recording a loss if it is probable that a
liability has been incurred. This may justify the criticism
of the application of the matching principle, especially
with respect to allocations. It is believed that allocations
are ambiguous and arbitrary, because they do not refer to
anything real in the external world.42
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The Consistency Principle
It is held that similar economic event should be recorded
and reported in a consistent manner from period to period.
The principle implies that the same accounting procedures
will be applied to similar items over time. Application of
the consistency principle makes financial statements more
comparable and more useful, especially within the same firm.
The usefulness and comparability of financial statements
depends largely upon the choice of accounting methods and
the consistency with which they are applied. The principle
does not preclude a firm changing accounting procedure when
such action is justified by changing circumstances or if the
alternative procedure is preferable. However, such a change
should be mentioned and its effect on accounting results
should be-pointed out.43
Comparing the accounts of different companies is more
difficult and the accounting methods of individual firms are
not always the same. There is no uniformity of accounting
methods which would provide the consistency of treatment of
information necessary for the comparison of the accounts of
different companies. Therefore, the needs of investors for
greater comparability of information between companies is
undermined by accounting conventions which accept internal
consistency, but allow different methods of measurement and
treatment which cannot yield comparable results. Therefore,
it is recommended that accounting standards committees are
charged with the task of finding a way to secure agreement
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on appropriate accounting methods which ensure a higher
degree of comparability of accounting information. 44
The Uniformity and Comparability Principle
This refers 45 to the use of the same procedures by different
firms. The desired objective is to achieve comparability of
financial statements by reducing the diversity created by
the use of different accounting procedures by different
firms. The principal arguments for uniformity are that it
would:
1- Reduce the diverse use of accounting procedures and the
inadequacies of accounting practices.
2- Allow comparisons of the accounts of different firms.
3- Lead to governmental regulation of accounting practices.
The Materiality Principle
This holds that transactions and events having significant
economic effects may be handled in the most expeditious
manner, whether or not they conform to generally accepted
accounting principles, and need not be disclosed.
Materiality serves as an implicit guide for the accountant
in terms of what should be disclosed in the financial
reports, enabling the accountant to decide what is not
important or what does not matter on the basis of record-
keeping cost, accuracy of financial statements, and
relevance to the user. An item should be considered as
material if there is reason to believe that knowledge of it
would influence the decisions of an investor or a user.
Materiality is primarily related to relevance. Tf an item is
not material, then it is not relevant. Materiality really
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matters because financial reporting is only concerned with
significant information. 46
The materiality principle, however, lacks an
operational definition. Most definitions of materiality
stress the accountant's role in interpreting what is and
what is not material. That may introduce an element of
subjectivity, as accountants vary in their considerations of
what is, or is not, material. However, empirical studies
indicate that the ratio of an income item to current income
is a popular guide for materiality judgements. It has been
suggested that accounting standards committees may furnish
quantitative guidelines on materiality to achieve uniformity
of practice. 47
The Cost Principle
This principle holds that the acquisition cost, or
historical cost is the appropriate valuation basis for
recognition of the acquisition of all goods and services,
expenses costs and equities. It implies that and item is
valued at the exchange price at the date of acquisition and
is recorded in the financial statements at that value or an
amortised position of that value. The historical cost may be
justified in terms of its objectivity and the going concern
postulate. 48
It has been argued 49 that an important feature of the
historical cost basis of preparing annual accounts is that
it minimises the extent to which the accounts can be
affected by the personal opinions of those responsible for
89
them. Although actual cost is only a tentative figure, it is
accepted as it is a significant statistical record for
exhibiting cost and it gives a reasonable starting point.
However, because of changes in price levels and
purchasing power, the actual cost basis has been subject to
much criticism. It is argued50 that although money can be an
adequate common denominator among diverse activities, it is
a less than satisfactory common denominator between
different periods of time. Historical cost valuation may
produce unrealistic figures if changes in the values of
assets over time are ignored. Due to the perceived
deficiencies of historical cost accounting, many
alternatives have been suggested to replace historical cost.
Such suggestions have been made, even at the level of
Accounting Associations and Boards.51 In order to make
accounting reports match with the general inflationary
environment it is suggested that accountants should avoid
the misleading information generated by using the historical
cost basis. It has been argued that current cost accounting
provides a better measure of an asset's value and is
necessary for calculating a real holding gain or loss on
non-monetary . assets . 52
Recently many books on Inflation Accounting have been
published; as defined by Tweedie and Whittington,53
inflation accounting is "eclectic, including all forms of
accounting which seek to reflect the consequences of price
changes, whether by means of general prices indices or by
reporting the market prices of specific commodities". In
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recent history, accounting for changing prices, (i.e. a form
of current cost accounting) has been adopted in the USA as
has been the case in the rest of the English-speaking
world. 54 Inflation has an impact on financial reports which
affects decisions made by users of financial reports.
Whereas accounting relies upon historical cost as the most
practicable means to value assets and to determine profit,
in inflationary periods, financial statements make little
sense. It has been pointed 55 out that money is no longer a
reasonably stable measuring tool. Consequently financial
reports based upon historical costs are no longer as useful
as was once the case, and might actually be misleading.
Therefore, if historical costs are to be used, they should
be retained only as the basis for preparation of the primary
financial-statements.
To summarise, as the objective of financial statements
is to report economic events and the economic status of an
enterprise as realistically as possible and to provide
useful information for managers to help them in decision-
making, it has been argued that under inflation financial
statements should be adjusted or current cost accounting
used to fulfil that role. It is argued" that adjusted
financial statements are essential for efficient management
and it is in the interest of shareholders that they should
be provided with that adjusted information.
Accounting difficulties are not solely related to
inflation; even without inflation there are substantial
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difficulties in determining the appropriate valuation for
assets and on which base to depreciate. 57
 As stated by
Whittington, 59 even in the absence of inflation, accounting
faces serious difficulties, as its field is characterised by
uncertainty and the different interest of different users of
accounting information.
Realisation Principle
Revenue can not berecorded except when it is evidenced by
cash receipts or an exchange has actually occurred.
Therefore, according to the dominant view, revenue
is recognised only when realised. 59
It has been argued 60 that a clear distinction should be
drawn between earned and realised revenue; earning should
not be identified with realisation. Revenue is earned when
the final product is delivered; on the other hand, it is
fully realised when it is represented by cash receipts or
when it is converted into cash or receivables. Revenue,
therefore, will not be recognised with respect to a
transaction that is incompleted at the close of an
Aaccounting perioa. 61 However, under certain circumstances 62 ,
revenue is booked which, although it has not been realised,
as revenue earned on the basis of percentage of completion,
under contracts, may perhaps be viewed as realised. In
practice 63 a deviation from the realisation rule may be
found as revenue may be recognised on the basis of sale,
completion of production, or percentage-of-completion of
production.
It has been pointed 64
 out that the main reasons for
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deferring profit realisation until receipt of cash, are the
risk of collecting in full and the possibility of incurring
additional expenses. Thus it sounds as if the justification
of the realisation principle is certainty.
Although the realisation convention is the dominant
current practice in accounting, it has been the subject of
much criticism. Some writers 65 have suggested that a
valuation system should be established for inventories. It
is argued that it is not fair to postpone the valuation of
inventories until realisation takes place. Valuation, to
avoid ambiguity, must be judged primarily on the basis of
its usefulness; if it serves the purpose for which is
intended and remains understandable then it is a useful
valuation. It has also been argued that the use of estimates
and statistical conclusions in many areas might improve the
timeliness of accounting reports without undue sacrifice of
exactitude. 66 Others 67 argue that although it is accepted to
value inventories of most businesses at cost of acquisition,
except where the "lower of cost or market" rule calls for
departure from historic cost, there are some cases where
inventory measurement at net realisable value is acceptable.
In practice, net realisable value (i.e. current selling
price less expected costs of realisation) is applied to some
products such as cotton, raw sugar and crude oil.
Other writers6 •8  argue that it is better to recognise
profit: or loss depending upon their critical event.
Recognition of .profit varies from one business to another.
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Selection of the moment at which profit is recognised
depends on the type of business. For merchandising, profit
is recognised at the point of sale, and that is the critical
event. For magazine publishers, the critical event is when
the magazines are distributed. However, the basis of the
critical event theory is that the realisation convention is
not satisfactory from an economic standpoint.
Accounting Associations have considered the
deficiencies of accounting reports using historical costs
(if realisation does not take place the "lower cost or
market" rule will be adopted); the American Accounting
Association argues for the reporting of both current and
historical costs on the assumption that a periodic
comparison between current costs and historical costs will
be relevant to investors' needs. 69 Moreover, it has been
"notedn that as the accounting entity is a going concern,
hence current assets are to be valued at selling or
realisable price. Such valuation conforms with the going
concern assumption as assets are valued in terms of their
intended useful purpose in the entity.
Shortcomings due to the adoption of certain accounting
principles, among them the realisation convention, have led
to many writings and suggestions aiming to improve
accounting information. It has been pointed out 71 that
accounting reports would be more informative if they were to
rely on forecasts of revenues and profits. Such information
must be reasonably accurate in order to be relevant and to
72serve various groups.
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The Full Disclosure Principle 73
There is a general consensus in accounting that there should
be full, fair and adequate disclosure of accounting data.
Fair accounting presentation necessitates the full
disclosure of material information. Full disclosure
requires that financial statements be designed and prepared
to portray accurately the economic events that have affected
the firm for the period and to contain sufficient
information to make them useful and not misleading to users
and average investors.
In general, it is expected that any matter of
significance, such as major commitments, will be disclosed
if knowledge of it would affect the decision of an average
investor. The term, "full disclosure", does not mean that
any and all information is to be included in the accounting
statements. It implies that adequate disclosure of
information which is of material interest to different
users.
Full disclosure, however, leaves several questions
open to interpretation; what is meant by full, fair and
adequate disclosure? Adequate connotes a minimum set of
information to be disclosed; fair implies an ethical
constraint dictating an equitable treatment of users; and
full refers to complete and comprehensive presentation of
information. Also what data should be disclosed so that a
prudent, average investor will not be misled, is another
question. Should the data he essentially accounting
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information, or socio-economic accounting, or inflation
accounting? However, it is recognised that the answers to
these questions rest on a proper determination of the users,
their needs, their level of sophistication and their
information-processing capabilities.
Conclusions
By trying to find postulates and principles for accounting
it is aimed to set a theory for accounting. Postulates form
the basic assumptions for accounting theory. Principles come
on a second level, acting as standards for accounting
theory. However, there is no complete agreement or
uniformity between accountants and academicians in
accounting, with regard to postulates, principles and
objectives. Some points are considered postulates by some
accountants, while the same are considered principles or
objectives by others. Many practices in accounting are due
to the direct influence of laws, rules of governmental
agencies, and pressures from business executives. Accounting
principles have developed on the basis of experience,
reason, customs, usage and to a significant extent,
practical necessity. Therefore, it can be concluded that
beliefs, customs and practical needs in the Muslim world
will affect development of accounting postulates and
principles, though that does not necessarily mean that all
accounting postulates and principles would totally differ
from those applied elsewhere.
Accounting theory serves as a blueprint for the
construction of an actual accounting system whose aim is to
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provide useful information to users. Accounting information
must be relevant and reliable. This can be achieved by
obtaining general agreement of principles, measurements, and
operations of accounting; and improving the standards of
competence and ethics for the profession. In practice,
however, no general agreement is reached in implementing the
principles and practices, because they do not necessarily
provide the most useful information for decision makers.
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IV
ACCOUNTING POSTULATES FROM ANIs LA MT -C PERSPECTIVE
Accounting Postulates From an Islamic Perspective
This chapter studies accounting postulates and accounting
principles to examine their compatibility with Islamic Law
and principles. In the previous chapter accounting
postulates and principles were defined and reviewed. Whether
they are acceptable to furnish a basis for accounting in
Islamic financial institutions, is discussed in this
chapter. General aspects of accounting from an Islamic
perspective are also discussed.
Accounting Entity From the Islamic Point of View
As we have already seen, under the entity theory
transactions are recorded from the viewpoint of the firm
rather than those of its owners, and income and expenditure
are defined from the viewpoint of the enterprise.
As a result, entity theory enables us to consider:
1. the firm as a separate and distinct entity from the
owners and other firms;
2. the firm as a real thing responsible for itself;
3. that the firm owns the resources;
4. that the accountant is to report the transactions of the
firm rather than those of its owners.
These points are now considered from the viewpoint of
Islamic principles and rules, in order to see whether or not
the accounting entity theory contradicts them. The
principles and rules which govern financial contracts in
Islam, as stated by Tbn al A'rabi, are:1
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1- Prohibition of interest and legitimacy of trade.
Although trade is allowed, there are restrictions on the
conditions and practices of trade.
2- Prohibition of 'unjustified' enrichment (akl amwal al
nas hi al bath)
	 "do not eat up your property among
yourselves for vanities".
3- Prohibition of 'dubious circumstances' and uncertainty
in trade (Rai al Gherer), that is, a sale which involves
fraud or unfair exchange.
4- Giving consideration to intentions and aims (al
Magasid) and to welfare (Masalih). Consideration of aims
indicates that the intentions of dealers must conform with
Islamic teaching. Therefore, it is not permitted to commit
an illegitimate act through a trick. For example, if a
person approaches a trader to buy from him a commodity for
110 units on a deferred basis on condition that the trader
should rebuy it from him at 100 units immediately and in
cash; although this transaction consists of two permitted
transactions, it is not legitimate as the intention of the
buyer is to obtain a loan of 100 units which he will repay
in the future with an increment of 10 units. In effect, the
transaction is a loan with interest.
The accounting entity theory does not conflict with any
of these four rules; indeed it is compatible with Islamic
principles for the following reasons:
1- The entity postulate makes matters easier for the
clients of the enterprise; instead of dealing with many
104
owners the clients are dealing with only one nominal person.
It is also easier for the accountant to prepare the
financial statements of this nominal person. This helps to
maintain the rights of all parties who are dealing with the
entity.
2- The entity postulate enables the establishment of huge
joint-stock companies, in which a large number of people are
shareholders. This can lead to the distribution of wealth
among a large number of people, while the possibility of
concentration of wealth in few hands is reduced.
3- The entity postulate makes it easier for the court to
deal with a nominal person in case of disputes.
4- The postulate is accepted, because in Islam everything
is permitted and lawful except that which is prohibited in
the Holy Book or in Sunnah.
5- Muslim jurisprudence (Fiqh) accepts entity or nominal
personality for endowment (Waqf), treasury (Baitul Mal) and
government. 2 This shows that the concept of an institution
as a distinct entity is acceptable in Islamic thought.
The Accounting Entity and Zakah
Zakah is one of the five pillars of Islam. "In the
legal sense it means a 'right on wealth' or 'the specified
part of wealth' designated by God to be given to certain
beneficiaries.” 3 Zakah is a religious levy or tax at the
rate of 2.5 percent per annum on liquid assets. The rate of
Zakah varies according to the type of wealth. "A major
objective of Zakah is to achieve alleviation of poverty.
Zakah revenue is earmarked to be spent on certain items
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detailed in the Qur'an. 4 Zakab is applied to all muslims
with a specified minimum wealth (Nisab)".
Some authors in Islamic economics see Zakah as a
religious levy resulting in a transfer of resources from
haves to have-nots. It provides a mechanism to prevent undue
concentration of wealth and to ensure at least the minimum
necessary for subsistence to all persons. 5
Abul 'Ala al-Mawdudi 6
 argued that joint stock companies
can pay Zakah in respect of the shares whose holders have
Nisab, that is, a specified minimum wealth. The shares whose
holders do not have the minimum specified wealth are not
liable to Zakab. Therefore the base of Zakah is:
TS - HS = NZ
Where TS is the total number of shares, HS is the number of
shares whose holders have not the minimum specified wealth,
while NZ stands for Zakah Nisab.
For example, let us suppose a company has one thousand
shares; the holders of 200 of these shares do not have
Misab, thus their wealth is not liable to Zakah as it is
below the specified level. If the value of a share is 10
units then the wealth subject to Zakah will be:
10000 - 2000 = 8000 units.
Some jurists 7 argue that a company should pay its Zakah
regardless of the minimum wealth of its shareholders. They
look at the company as a separate entity, so that if a
company has the minimum specified wealth it should pay
Zakah. According to these jurists the whole capital of the
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company is subject to Zakah. This again shows that the
entity concept is well-known in Islamic jurisprudence.
Therefore, companies should inform their shareholders that
Zakah has been paid for their shares, to avoid a double
levy of Zakah;	 because if the company	 does not
acknowledge its payment of Zakah on the wealth invested by
shareholders, those shareholders who own Nisab will pay
Zakah on their total wealth, including shares. Zakah on any
type of wealth should be paid once a year and should not be
doubled. 8 A practical difficulty may be raised here
concerning non-Muslim shareholders. Non-Muslims are not
eligible for Zakah. If the company were to pay Zakah on all
its wealth, then non-Muslim shareholders would also pay
Zakah. However, this difficulty can be solved by deducting
the shares of non-Muslims from the total wealth of the
company before Zakah is computed. This necessitates
classifying shareholders on a religious basis.
To conclude, if the company does not pay its Zakah then
the shareholders must pay their Zakah individually. Those
who do not have the Nisab may not pay Zakah. If, on the
other hand, the company pays Zakah then shareholders should
not pay Zakah on their shares, to avoid duplication. In this
case shareholders who do not have the Nisab are in effect
paying Zakah through the company though they are not liable.
However, if the company is considered as a separate entity
and has the Nisab, then it should pay its Zakah, regardless
of its shareholders' eligibility. Moreover, it is believed
that the difficulty is only theoretical as those who do
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not possess the Zakah Nisah are unlikely to be able to buy
shares.
Zakah Accounting9
On the governmental level, Zakah accounts should be kept
separately from other accounts (public finance resources),
because Zakah should be distributed among specified groups;
mixing Zakah with other accounts would jeopardise this
specification. On an individual basis the same is also
required.
Zakah accounts should be prepared and distributed
annually (Lunar year basis). However, if an entity's
accounts are prepared on the Gregorian year basis, the
difference in the two calendars can be allowed for by
increasing Zakah rate to 2.575% instead of 2.5% as
recommended by the First Conference for Zakah held in Kuwait
on 30th April - 2nd May 1984.10
Zakah should be paid on any wealth if the following two
conditions are realised: firstly, Nisab i.e., the person
should have a specified minimum wealth; secondly, the wealth
should have been in the possession of the person or company
concerned for a full Lunar year. This condition is not
applied to the profit or the increment.
Zakah is computed as follows: (Capital + reserves +
profit) - (Fixed assets + shares in other companies) = Zakah
base.
Zakah = Zakah base x 2.5%.
Every share's share in Zakah = Zakah divided over total
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shares.
If a loss occurs then Zakah base = (Capital+reserves) -
(Fixed assets + loss).
If the company does not pay Zakah for its
shareholders then it should compute every share's Zakah and
published it in the financial statements so that every
shareholder can pays the Zakah on his shares.
Religious Discrimination
This point is not directly connected with accounting,
however, as it related to accounting entity and shareholder
companies it is therefore discussed here.
In practice some Islamic banks choose to stipulate that
all shareholders must be Muslims; no subscription is
accepted from non-Muslims. The same condition is applied to
the bank's employees. This has been justified to ensure
harmony between the employees' beliefs and the ethos of the
organisation in which he works. 11
However, it is believed that such a stipulation is not
the final word on the subject, as other Islamic banks may
not impose it. It can be argued that Muslims and non-Muslims
(Christians and Jews) used to engage in mutual trade without
religious discrimination. Indeed when the Prophet of Islam
himself, passed away, his armour was kept as collateral
with a Jew. Non-Muslims in the early Islamic state were
eligible to financial support from Zakah. In addition
Muslims used to engage in partnership with non-Muslims,
provided that interest and prohibited goods were avoided.12
Non-Muslims' participation in Islamic banks can be
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argued for, for one or more of the following reasons:
1- They may be convinced by the idea and objectives of
Islamic banking; as shown earlier (chapter II), interest is
forbidden in some religions.
2- They may like to participate to benefit the high profit
rate Islamic banks may generate.
3- If they were prohibited from participating, that might be
considered as a violation of their rights as citizens and
constitute a religious discrimination.
With regard to the employment of non-Muslims, it is
felt that Islamic banks might, by imposing a religious
stipulation, deprive themselves of the chance to utilise the
experience and know how of a sector of the community and
non-Muslim institutions.
The Going-Concern Postulate from an Islamic Perspective
The continuity postulate assumes that the entity is a
going-concern or is remaining in operation in the absence of
evidence to the contrary. This assumption does not
contradict any of the Islamic principles. In Islamic
jurisprudence there is a principle similar to this
postulate, that is, "retaining", or "accompaniment"
(Istis'hab). 11 This means to retain any event or verdict
experienced in the past, until evidence is found that this
event or verdict has changed.
Although the continuity postulate does not contradict
any Islamic principles, the significant ideas which underlie
this postulate •and their consequences are questionable from
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the Islamic point of view. These include the recording of
assets at the lower or cost or market value. 14 One of the
most questionable consequences from the Islamic point of
view is the conservatism principle, which follows from the
going-concern postulate. "It holds that when choosing among
two or more acceptable accounting techniques, some
preference is shown for the option that has the least
favourable impact on the stockholders' equity. The principle
implies that preferably the lowest values of assets and
revenues and the highest value of liabilities and expenses
n15should be reported.
As argued by Newman and Mellman, 16 the concept of
conservatism may be expressed as a necessary condition for
the fair presentation of accounting data. They argue that
this concept comes into play because events or activities
which must be reflected in the accounting process are
characterised by uncertainty. The conservatism concept is
used to avoid risk in terms of accounting results and is
equivalent to taking a cautious or prudent approach to
valuation.
Hindmarch justifies this concept for the reason that
uncertainty prevails in the economic environment. He argues
that, "if it is possible to measure with accuracy then
conservatism has little impact, but there are many
situations where accuracy cannot be achieved and in such
situations this concept should prevent optimism.n17
Many authors criticise the principle of conservatism.
Sterling points out that "the Finney and Miller texts, which
mirror the mainstream of accounting thought, referred to
conservatism as a 'principle of accounting' through four
editions. In the fifth edition, however, they complain about
the 'fetish of conservatism , . 18 Finney and Miller 1-9 argue
that, in the early days of the development of accounting,
public accountants' records were required mainly for the
preparation of reports for bankers and grantors of short-
term credit, who were primarily interested in the margin of
security. When the interest of bankers and other short-term
creditors changed, accountants, who were influenced by their
attitude, changed their emphasis. Thus conservatism was a
more highly esteemed virtue in the past than it is today. As
stated by Belkaoui: "The present view of conservatism as an
accounting principle is bound to disappear.” 20 Sterling21
argues that "conservatism yields, not only zero information,
but also, misinformation", because historical costs, when
they are used, are themselves conservative. Hence, he
concluded, historical costs are justified if and only if
conservatism is justified. Thus historical costs also yield
misinformation.
As a result of the conservatism principle, profits may
be shifted from one year to another. Furthermore, valuation
of inventories under this principle minimises the base for
Zakah, which should be paid annually. For these reasons the
conservatism principle is not compatible with Islamic
principles and rules.
Accounting Period Postulate from an Islamic Perspective
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The accounting period postulate does not contradict any
Islamic principles, and is desirable rather than
questionable, for it helps in paying Zakah. Depicting the
financial situation of an enterprise periodically helps the
enterprise to know how much it should pay as Zakah. However,
accrual accounting entails the assignment of revenue to the
fiscal year in which it was earned rather than received.
This could cause firms to pay Zakah for revenues not yet
received, and according to the al Meth'hab al Maliki, Maliki
school of thought, loans are exempted from Zakah. 22 However,
this constraint is not enough justification to reject the
accrual basis of accounting, for revenues which are not yet
received can be deducted from the wealth which is subject to
Zakah. Furthermore, it is not universally agreed among
religious scholars, that loans are exempted from Zakah.
The Unit-of-Measure Postulate From an Islamic Perspective
Money as a unit-of-measure is accepted from the viewpoint of
Islam. 23 It is a currency like gold and silver and has their
attributes. it is generally accepted and is a store of
value. It has a value like gold and silver, and thus the
same rules concerning usury apply: it must not be sold
against itself unless like for like, equal for equal and
hand-to-hand; however, if the kinds of money differ, it is
allowed to sell them against themselves hand-to-hand, that
is, if the sale and transfer of the two quantities of the
different currencies take place on the spot.
Money as a unit of measure is accepted in Islam under
certain circumstances. The value of money should be stable
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to enable money as a medium of exchange to be a reliable
unit of account, a just standard of deferred payments and a
stable store of value. Stability in the value of money
maintains honesty and fairness in all human dealings which
are essential principles in Islam. Inflation, from the
Islamic point of view, has a negative impact on socio-
economic justice and general welfare. 24
As a conclusion, money as a unit of measure can be
accepted in Islam under a stable monetary system, where
stability in the value of money is maintained, because of
the unequivocal stress of Islam upon honesty and justice in
all measures of value: 25
Give measure and weight with (full) justice (VI:152).
Give just measure and weight, nor withhold fro the
people the things that are their due (VII:85).6°
However, in an inflationary environment money as a unit of
measure is questionable from the Islamic viewpoint, for it
implies that money is unable to serve as a just and honest
unit of account. It makes money an inequitable standard of
deferred payments and an untrustworthy store of value, and
enables some people to be unfair to others, even though
unknowingly. This contradicts Islamic principles, such as
"do not eat up your property among yourselves for vanities".
Inflation does injustice to the Riha-free lender by eroding
the real value of (Quard hassan), a loan extended without
either interest or profit-sharing. 27
It has been suggested that the problem of inflation can
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be overcome by indexation, or monetary correction, of all
monetary assets and incomes, but indexation has not yet been
accepted by any school of Muslim jurisprudence. 28 Others
suggest the use of replacement or present value to value
assets. 29
it seems, however, that the alternative which conforms
to Islamic principles is to maintain stability in prices and
value of money. Indexation, replacement price or current
value are merely temporary palliatives, not a permanent
solution to inflation.
The measurement convention, which limits the
recognition of activities to those which can be expressed in
monetary terms only, 30 though practical in registering
financial transactions, does not cover all aspects. In
Islam, fairness and justice is required, and measurement in
monetary terms does not always cover this concept.
Furthermore, in Islam, the deeds of every individual are
accounted for and recorded by two accompanying angels.
Behold, two (guardian angels) appointed to learn
(his doings) learn	 (and note "register"	 them),
one sitting on the right and one on the left.
Not a word does he utter but there is a sentinel
by h41n, ready (to note) it. (Holy Qur'an, L:17,
18)."
It is interesting to note the coincidence between the
double entry theory in accounting and the idea of having two
guardian angels accompanying the individual, one sitting on
the right hand to register good deeds (credit), and the
other on the left to register sins (debit).
Good deeds are registered in one's favour, at once, but bad
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deeds are not, as the angel on the left waits for a period
of time, giving a chance for repentance. If no repentance is
shown, the sins are then registered. The idea of waiting for
repentance, in a way, is similar to the conservatism concept
in accounting. The conservatism principle gives preference
to those options that have the least favourable impact on
the stockholders' equity, so that the firm which is a . going-
concern would not be harmed. The angel, on the other hand,
by giving a chance for repentance is favouring his protegee.
Conservatism, as pointed out earlier, sometimes
contradicts Islamic principles. However, in other cases, it
realises public interest and welfare. Therefore, it is felt
that a compromise should be reached. This principle will be
discussed in some detail in the research when consideration
is given-to accounting problems and difficulties.
Accounting Principles from an Islamic Perspective
Before considering the compatibility of accounting
principles with Islamic principles it would be useful to
consider briefly the stress that the Qur'an has given to the
justice and fairness in all measures of value. It is
instructed that measure and weight should be given with
justice and without withholding from people what is theirs
(Qur'an, 6:152, 7:29, 11:85, 17:35, 55:9, 57:25). Muslims
also are asked, when dealing in financial transactions
involving further obligation (debt), to write down
faithfully and precisely this obligation (Qur'an, 2:282).
Therefore, accounting which helps to keep and record all
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parties' rights and dues is required in Islam. It represents
an integrated part of the just system which Islam requires.
Accounting principles reflect the community's norms
and standards, and are directly influenced by laws,
regulations and rules of governmental agencies; therefore,
accounting principles for Islamic financial institutions
should also reflect and be influenced by the same. The plan
to study accounting principles from an Islamic perspective
is to review these principles from the viewpoint of the
major Islamic principles which govern financial dealings and
contracts, as mentioned in the Qur'an. These are:
1- Realisation of fairness and justice.
2- Preservation of all parties' rights and dues, without
withholding of people what is theirs.
3- Paying 7akah (that necessitates having accurate and just
financial statements which represent accurately and truly
the financial position of the entity).
Accounting principles are used to ensure provision of
useful information to different groups. The usefulness of
information is realised in Islamic financial institutions if
the above principles are maintained. Therefore, it can be
concluded that accounting principles in a Muslim community
should be formulated so as to provide fair and just
information (i.e. fairness accounting).
We have said that accounting based on accounting
principles is meant to be useful. One aspect of this
usefulness is providing an accurate reflection of financial
position. Accuracy, in a sense, involves an aspect of
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fairness. That may explain why most accounting principles
are felt to be acceptable from an Islamic perspective.
The research does not examine the acceptability of each
accounting principle individually. As most of these
principles formulate policy for accounting in some cases
suggesting standards for recording and/or depicting
financial transactions within the framework of usefulness
and accuracy, it is felt that they are generally accepted to
govern accountancy on Islamic financial institutions.
However, some of these principles are questionable as noted
earlier. These are, for example, the conservatism and cost
principles. Both of these conflict with justice and fairness
if valuation is based on them in an inflationary
environment. Further, financial information based on them
will affect passively, depositors who withdraw from
investment in Islamic banks. In addition, unrealistic
information as a result of inflation tends to reduce the
Zakah base. However, ways of solving these problems are
tackled and suggested later (chapter 10). The realisation
principle can also be classified within this category of
questionable principles, as it does not realise fairness for
withdrawing depositors in Islamic banks. Nonetheless, as
this principle is indispensable to accounting to guarantee
the going-concern of the entity, ensuring that its capital
is not distributed as profit, it is felt that a compromise
solution should be adopted as discussed in chapter 6.
Another questionable, from an Islamic point of view, is
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the objectivity principle. Objectivity is a desired
principle for fairness accounting, especially when recording
different transactions, i• e • assets, goods and services at
the price (historical cost) at the date of acquisition.
However, objectivity turns out to be anything but objective
when valuation is taken according to historical cost in an
inflationary environment. Therefore, the objectivity
realised by using cost price at acquisition date is not
necessarily achieved when valuation is made at a later date.
As a result, it is believed that objectivity can be accepted
for recording transactions at acquisition date's prices in
Islamic financial institutions. However, in certain
circumstances it yields unobjective information. Therefore,
other methods of valuation, e.g., current value, should be
adopted. Difficulties embodied with alternatives should not
prevent the acceptance of the need for change. Indeed, it
is believed that any difficulties involved with other
methods can be solved by practice.
At the other extreme, the most desirable and acceptable
principles for fairness accounting are the matching and
consistency principles. The matching principle as it
allocates expenses to their related revenues, provides
fairness and justice simultaneously to shareholders and
depositors in Islamic banks. The consistency principle helps
to provide more useful information and more accurate and
fair financial statements. Failure to maintain consistency
might lead to unrealistic profit with obvious implications
for Zakah.
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Full disclosure, is also one of the desired principle
for fairness accounting. It provides the public with the
needed information for sound financial decisions. Zakah base
and value and its distribution can also be shown as a result
of this principle. It has been pointed out 32 that disclosure
is minimal in some Islamic banks, as there is no strong
pressure form the public nor from the shareholders.
Depositors generally feel that their money is safe so they
do not concern themselves further.
To conclude, accounting principles, are generally
accepted for fairness accounting for Islamic banks. Although
Islamic banks operate in a different way from conventional
banks, that does not mean that they are totally different
financial institutions which need entirely different
accounting. They, like their traditional counterparts, also
aim to generate profit which involve them in credit and debt
transactions, which must be recorded in such a way as to
produce useful, accurate and fair financial statements.
Differences in aims and objectives among different groups in
financial. institutions focus on different accounting
principles; as a result, priority can be given to certain
accounting principles, polices and procedures. Hence, all
principles and procedures which maintain fairness and
justice are accepted in accounting for Islamic banks.
Accounting Reporting in Islamic Banking
It has been suggested 33
 that accounting reports should
expand to include an employment statement and social
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accounting, e.g., compliance with anti-pollution, safety and
health measures. Furthermore, areas of inter-action with the
rest of the world, the philosophy of a company's board of
directors, policies and objectives, further prospects and a
statement of commitments should also be reported.
The balance sheet of a reputable company should at least
reveal the minimum required information. This includes:34
1- Statement of financial position.
a) Fixed assets less accumulated depreciation.
b) Current assets.
c) Liabilities.
d) Capital and reserves.
2- Statement of Income.
a) Credit items, e.g., revenues, investment income etc.
b) Debit items, e.g., depreciation expenses, audit fees
etc.
3- Accounting concepts, policies and materiality.
Islamic banks, FIBS and TIB, for example, comply with
this statutory minimum of disclosure. In their annual
reports, the profit and loss account and balance sheet are
shown. The items mentioned are fairly produced. Auditors'
reports are also shown, stating the compliance of the
accounts with standard auditing principles. Valuation is
based on the conservatism and historical cost principles.
For example, return on investment and Mudarabah operations
are usually calculated on the basis of actual income.
Profits are considered only after the finalization and
liquidation of operations. The profit from Mudarabah
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certificates is also calculated in the same way. Valuation
of assets is generally based on historical cost. As shown
earlier, conservatism and historical cost, do not comply
with the need for fairness in accounting. They produce
unrealistic information, harm depositors and affect the
Zakah base.
Islamic hanks can claim that their ways of reporting
are in accordance with the general and accepted principles
and regulations and the minimum statutory requirements. In
addition, the suggested alternatives to conservatism and
historical cost are not yet wholly accepted and many
practical difficulties are impeding their implication.
External auditors are usually linked with international
auditors who are subject to standards formulated by
Accounting Associations. These standards are not necessarily
useful in developing countries where Islamic hanks are
located. Furthermore, it has been pointed out 35 that the
influence of foreign professional accounting bodies may
possibly prove to be harmful to recipient countries.
One way of overcoming the problem would he for Islamic
banks to prepare two financial statements for each year, the
first using the prevail. big principles in producing
information the second adopting principles suggested for
accounting fairness. Zakah should he calculated and paid on
the information produced in the second financial statement.
Profit can be distributed according to the first financial
statement and a reserve should be retained (the difference
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between profits in the two statements, as it is assumed that
profit in the second statement would be higher as a result
of inflation) and be distributed upon realisation. This
suggestion is dealt with later in the research (chapter 10).
Furthermore, it is suggested 36 that, in Islamic banks,
significant accounting policies should be disclosed clearly
as an integral part of the financial statements. Any changes
in accounting policy should be mentioned, with the reason
for the change and its effect on accounts from one year to
the other. Accounting policy regarding investment in these
banks should also be clearly disclosed.
As mentioned earlier, it has already been suggested
that social reporting should be included in financial
statements. Islamic banks can benefit from the experience
and are recommended to report accordingly. Zakah, sources of
donations and distribution should be reported and disclosed.
A distinction should be made between the Zakah fund and the
bank's other funds. The involvement of Religious Supervisory
Boards in the banks' activities should also be disclosed in
a way to ensure and guarantee conformity with the Sharia'h.
Participation of these banks in the economic and social
development and essential economic activities, e.g., long-
term investment and infrastructure, should also be included
in the banks' reports.
Losses Incurred on Deposits
Losses on deposits in a profit-sharing system may jeopardise
mobilisation of deposits and hence the continuity, and even
existence, of Islamic banking. As this could be a serious
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problem, it is discussed later. Two solutions are suggested,
i.e., diversification of investment and insuring these
deposits. However, to minimise the seriousness of the
problem, insurance companies' experience in investing the
premiums fund to reduce each premium's value, could be
quoted here and adopted. Tncome from earnings on invested
funds in insurance companies also helps meet the cost of
insurance for policyholders. 37 As the suggestion has
accounting implications, it is considered in this part of
the research.
In insurance companies, a vast fund is accumulated out
of premiums paid to these companies. The fund usually
exceeds the compensations which have to be paid out, for
18three reasons:'
1- New persons join in and more premiums are paid.
2- For conservatism reasons, premiums.paid are slightly
higher than the computed premium, which would absorb the
actual compensation.
3- Premiums are paid frequently, regularly and
systematically, while compensations are paid out relatively
infrequently, leading to an accumulation of reserves and the
build-up of a huge fund.
However, a part of this fund is usually invested by
insurance companies and the profit generated enables the
premiums paid by the people to be reduced. The practice is
to invest policyholders' reserves in outlets that have a
high degree of safety as to repayment of principal. There
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are many ways by which life insurance companies ensure the
safety of investments:39
1- insured mortgage loans involve a high degree of safety.
2- The investment portfolio is diversified in various ways:
a) among various types of assets - mortgage loans,
corporate bonds, corporate stocks and government securities;
b) among various types of business activity;
c) geographically.
Therefore, it is felt that Islamic banks can use the
same technique and benefit from the experience of insurance
companies. Islamic banks may keep a part of Mudarabah's
profit as a reserve and invest it in order to compensate any
losses in the future. This reserve can be retained by mutual
agreement between the banks and the depositors. However, as
shown later, a large percentage of profit goes to the bank
as a result of the use of current and savings deposits;
therefore, the reserve can be retained wholly or
substantially from the profit generated from these deposits.
Central banks are advised to intervene to regulate and
organise conditions related to such a practice.
It might be argued that insurance companies usually
invest in interest-bearing bonds. To what alternative can
Islamic banks resort? The obvious answer is the use of a
profit-sharing system. The practicability, safety of
investment and efficiency of this system in business is
shown in the research.
Nonetheless, many practical issues are raised by such a
suggestion. The questions arise:
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How long should retention from yearly profit continue? If
profit in a year is low or non-existent, should the retained
reserve be used to increase profit distribution? How should
accounts of this reserve be kept? Should it be a part of the
bank's financial statements and hence appear therein? Who
would be responsible for monitoring this reserve and its
investment? If the bank is responsible, should it be
compensated, and on what basis?
Many other questions can be raised. However, special
regulations in the light of these questions can be
formulated at the suggestion of the Central Bank. It is
believed that if this suggestion, were put into effect, it
would be of great help in strengthening the position of
Islamic banking.
Conclusions
Accounting postulates are generally accepted and can be used
as the basis of accounting in Islamic banks. Accounting
principles are also largely accepted. However, some of these
do not comply with fairness accounting; they are subject to
considerable debate and criticism, even from a conventional
point of view.
Accounting for Islamic institutions should be based on
justice and fairness, to ensure all parties' rights and
dues. All principles which helps to achieve the objective of
justice are acceptable and desireable. Compromises, however,
are inevitable in some cases, though even these should be
within the general framework of Islam and should maintain
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welfare. In other words, realisation of major objectives
might justify some compromise on principles of less
priority.
Although Tslamic banking has abandoned interest, that
does not necessarily mean that accounting for it should be
different. However, some accounting principles and concepts
are more desireable than others.
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CASE STUDY
( FIBS )
CASE STUDY
Introduction: Scope of the Case Study
The main purpose of the research is to study the problems
in relation to the distribution of profit in Islamic
Financial Institutions.
Islamic banks stand firm on two principles of Islamic
law. The first is the abolition of interest; the second is
the replacement of interest by a profit-sharing system
whenever possible. As a result of this, Islamic Banks have
introduced their own models of financing to by-pass these
constraints. The finance used consists of the bank's capital
from shareholders and a certain percentage of the funds of
current accounts and saving and investment accounts. A
holder of an investment account is entitled to profit after
the expiry of an agreed period of time, and he has the right
to withdraw his money or a part of it at any time.
As far as the distribution of profit is concerned, the
first problem is how the bank determines the profit of each
holder of an investment account. The bank's money is
invested in various projects; some of these may be
completed before the end of the financial year and their
profits known, but some of them may be incomplete, so the
bank does not know the profits resulting from them. The
right of holders of investment accounts to withdraw money
at any time creates additional difficulty in determining the
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profit of each financial year.
The second problem is that most Islamic banks cannot
use all their available money for investment, because the
Central Bank in some countries adopts a ceiling policy to
control the growth of the money supply. How can Islamic
banks know how much of the invested money belongs to them
and how much of it belongs to the investors, since in
Islamic banking all funds are held in one pool?
Methodology of the Case Study
The research was based on a case study approach, with
special focus on the distribution of profit. Both primary
and secondary data and information were collected. Methods
of collecting data were:
a- interviews and discussions;
b- published reports;
c- published materials about the subject under
consideration.
Interviews and discussions were conducted by the
researcher, relying to a considerable extent on personal
contact and the relations developed between the researcher
and these institutions during his employment in the Centre
for Research in Islamic Economics in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
This period afforded the opportunity of handling research
material in Islamid Banking and attending several seminars
and meetings on the subject.
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Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan
Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan (FIBS) was chosen as one of the
banks sampled for the case study for a number of reasons:
1- FIBS is located in the researcher's own country, which
makes it easy to collect data and information. The
researcher has a good relationship with the administrative
personnel of the bank.
2- FIBS was established with no previous experience to draw
on and had to learn by trial and error. Many other Islamic
banks established subsequently have referred to its
experience. It has thus achieved recognition, both locally
and internationally.
3- In FIBS all funds are held in one pool, which makes it a
useful focus for examination of the distribution of profit.
Establishmentl
FIBS was established on August 18th, 1977, as a limited
public company. Eighty-six persons from Sudan, Saudi Arabia
and other Islamic countries had met in Khartoum in May 1977
and agreed to establish FIBS, providing half the share
capital of six million Sudanese pounds (LS) between them.
However, when the bank was officially established its
authorised capital was LS 10 million.
The bank was established according to a special Act, to
operate in accordance with Islamic law. According to the Act
the bank has the right to transact any banking, financial,
commercial and investment business. It may establish
133
subsidiary companies in the field of insurance and trade and
can participate in economic and social development projects
inside and outside the Sudan.
The Act granted concessions to the bank which involved
exemptions from all types of taxes, including personal
income tax on salaries of all its employees and the funds
deposited with the bank for investment purposes. The bank
was also exempted from several other laws2 , such as those
which govern service and post-service benefits, on condition
that salaries, wages and post-service benefits paid by the
bank should not be less than the minimum wage in the
country. FIBS was also exempted from the laws which organise
insurance and the Auditor General Act for 1970, and any
other related laws. It was also exempted from the
regulations related to credit policy imposed by the Central
Bank on other commercial banks. These concern the
determination of bank rates, reserve requirements and the
restriction of credit activities by the Bank of Sudan.
However the bank's credit policy is supervised and directed
by the Central Bank.
The property and profits of the bank, in addition to
the funds deposited with it for the purpose of investment,
are thus exempted from all types of taxation. However the
bank pays out Zakah, calculated as 2.5 per cent of all
profits, capital and reserves annually. The salaries, wages,
gratuities and pensions of all employees of the bank, the
chairman and members of its Board of Directors and the
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Sharia'h Supervisory Board are also exempted from taxation.
In addition, the bank enjoys any other exemptions or
concessions provided for in any other law. The Governor of
the Bank of Sudan may exempt FIBS from the provisions of the
laws regulating exchange control within such limits as he
considers appropriate. The bank's dealings and movements of
capital funds and its deposits originating in foreign
currencies are exempted from the exchange control
regulations.
Finally, the Act states that the property of the bank
shall not be subject to confiscation, nationalisation,
sequestration or forfeiture, while the funds deposited with
the bank shall not be sequestered or forfeited except by a
judicial order.
Five years after the bank's establishment, the Act was
changed, and the exceptions and exemptions which had been
given to the bank were withdrawn. However, by this time the
bank was securely established and it had acquired
considerable experience.
It could be argued that the need to establish FIBS
under a special Act shows that the general legal framework
in the Sudan is not suited to Islamic banking. This is true
of Islamic banks throughout the Muslim World, and still more
so in other countries.
FIBS commenced operations officially on May 10th, 1978.
In addition to the head office, which is located in
Khartoum, FIBS has nineteen branches spread all over the
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Sudan. It also has a number of subsidiary companies, namely,
Islamic Insurance Company, Islamic Trading & Service Company
Limited and Real Estate Development Company.
Capital
When FIBS was established, its authorised capital was LS 10
Million divided into one Million shares of LS 10 per share.
In December, 1979 the paid-up capital was LS 3.7 million.
According to the original Memorandum of Association, the
capital of the bank was shared, 40 per cent to be owned by
Sudanese, 40 per cent by Saudis and 20 per cent by other
Muslims. This, however, has since been changed, with 40 per
cent of the capital to be held by Sudanese and 60 per cent
by Muslims from other countries. On May 1st, 1981, the
General Meeting of the bank increased the authorised capital
to LS 50 Million and in 1983 a further increase was made, to
reach LS 100 Million, divided into 10 Million shares of LS
10 each. The paid up capital is now LS 58.4 Million, and
FIBS is the largest Sudanese bank in terms of capita13.
Objective
The objective of FIBS is to carry on banking activities in
accordance with Islamic Law. Islamic banking is an integral
part of the Islamic System, and the role of an Islamic bank
is to serve the Islamic community in accordance with its
beliefs. Hence the objective of FIBS is to "strive to
consolidate community development by performing all banking,
financial, commercial and investment business.
FIBS has many special characteristics which distinguish
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it from conventional banks.
a- Islamic characteristic: FIBS operates in accordance with
Islamic Law, which means that it has religious, as well as
economic objectives.
b- Development characteristic: The aim of the bank is to
contribute to the economic and social development of
society.
c- Investment characteristic: In addition to the banking
facilities which the bank offers to its clients, FIBS is an
investment institution. The use of a profit criterion
encourages the bank to engage in investment activities,
whether directly or indirectly.
d- Social characteristic: FIBS has a department of Zakah,
which handles the distribution of Zakah for both the bank
and its clients. The 'bank also extends loans without
interest or profit-sharing to the needy, and makes
donations.
Management
There are four major bodies or offices that manage and
supervise the activities of FIBS:
1- The General Meeting
The General Meeting of the bank consists of the
shareholders and is the highest authority in the bank.
Every shareholder has the right to attend the General
Assembly which is normally held annually and convened at
the request of the chairman of the Board of Directors.
Shareholders may vote in person or by proxy, and the quorum
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is the attendance of shareholders who possess in total 20
per cent of the total shares. The General Meeting is the
authority which approves the financial statements of the
bank and the Sharia'h Supervisory Board's report. It also
approves the motions of the Board of Directors for the
appointment of the Auditor and his remuneration, and the
remuneration of the Board of Directors and the Sharia'h
Supervisory Board.
ii- The Board of Directors
Article 37 of the Memorandum of Association regulates
the authority and activities of the Board of Directors,
giving it executive authority to manage and supervise the
bank to the extent that this does not conflict with the
authority of the General Meeting. The Board of Directors
consists of not less than ten and not more than fifteen
members, 60 per cent of whom are citizens of Saudi Arabia
and other Muslim countries, the remaining 40 per cent being
Sudanese, so that the representation of the various
countries on the Board of Directors is proportionate to the
capital provided. Membership of the Board of Directors is
for three years, but may be renewed. The Board of Directors
has the right to form a committee of its members, to which
it may delegate some of its financial and managerial
responsibilities'. Any such committee should work in
accordance with the rules and resolutions of the Board of
Directors. The present membership of the Board of Directors
is fifteen, the maximum permitted, and the chairman of the
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Board is Prince Muhammad el-Faisal.
iii- The Sharia'h Supervisory Board
Article 73 of the Memorandum of Association deals with
the formation, authority and structure of the Sharia'h
Supervisory Board. This contains between three and seven
members selected from Islamic scholars and jurists, who are
appointed by the General Meeting, which also fixes their
remuneration. Membership of the Board is for three years,
renewable for further periods. If, for any reason, a
position on the Board falls vacant between General Meetings
the Board of Directors will appoint a substitute.
The main task of the Board is to ensure that all
activities and dealings of FIBS are run in accordance with
Islamic principles and teachings. This task is carried out
through:
a- Full involvement in designing contractual models for the
bank's basic activities to ensure their conformity with
Islamic Law.
b- Giving legal opinions (Fatawa) in response to queries
from the bank's staff.
c- Auditing all aspects of the bank's activities from the
Islamic point of view.
d- Reporting annually to the General Meeting regarding the
compatibility of the bank's activities with Islamic
principles.
e- The right of the president of the Board, or his deputy,
to attend the General Meeting; he has speaking rights but'
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may not vote.
f- Suggesting appropriate topics for inclusion on the agenda
for the General Meeting.
iv- The General Manager
The appointment, responsibilities, remuneration etc.
of the General Manager, are regulated under article 62 of
the Memorandum of Association, according to which his
appointment, remuneration and job description are determined
by the Board of Directors, which has the right to terminate
his appointment at any time and to appoint a replacement.
The General Manager is the highest managerial authority
in the bank. The departments which lie under his supervision
are: (a) Inspection department (b) Internal audit department
(c) Secretariat of the Board of Directors (d) Computer
department and (e) Three advisory committees in the fields
of economics, law and information. The General Manager has
three deputies and five assistants, the latter supervising
the investment, legal, foreign currency, Zakah and shares
and banking and services departments.
FIBS ACTIVITIES
FIBS offers various banking facilities and services to its
clients, and operates as both a commercial bank and an
investment bank. • As a commercial bank, it provides all the
services any other commercial bank provides, except those
which are unacceptable from the Islamic point of view. The
services which conflict with Islamic teachings are modified
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to suit Islamic Law. Thus the activities which are generally
carried out under credit finance in the conventional banks
are substituted by a participation system in FIBS.
The activities and services provided by FIBS are as
follows:
Current Accounts 
FIBS, like other commercial banks, opens all types of
current accounts for individuals, companies etc. However,
the bank seeks the client's agreement that the bank shall
use the money in its activities, with a full commitment to
the client's withdrawals. Deposits in current accounts may
be made by cheque or in cash; withdrawals can be made by
cheque or by written order signed by the client. The bank
does not allow overdrafts; cheques which will overdraw the
account are rejected and returned to the drawer. Bank
charges for current accounts are debited to the client's
accounts. Current accounts are not entitled to a fixed
return, but theoretically speaking, the bank may pay a
return on these accounts, if it wishes and without prior
agreement.
Savings Accounts 
The bank also accepts savings accounts, which incur no
charges and receive no fixed return. The minimum sum of
money to be held in these accounts is just one Sudanese
pound; this is with the aim of encouraging small savers.
Funds may be withdrawn from savings accounts without any
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restriction and without notice. The client has a pass-book,
in which each withdrawal or deposit is registered, as it is
in the books of the bank. Although savings accounts in FIBS
are not entitled to a fixed return, the bank can pay returns
on these accounts to encourage savers. This, however, is
without pre-agreement.
Investment Accounts 
Investment accounts may be opened in local or foreign
currency. The minimum sum for an investment deposit was
initially LS 100, but this has been raised many times to
reach LS 1000 or the equivalent. Drawing is unrestricted and
does not require prior notice. The funds in these accounts
are renewable annually. If the client does not notify the
bank of his desire to withdraw his money, the balance is
assumed to be renewed and participates in the bank's
activities.
Funds must remain in the investment account for six
months to be entitled to profit. The share of profit gained
is proportionate to the amount in the account and the length
of time for which it has been held. It is calculated at the
end of the financial year, and distributed between the bank
and the depositor in the ratio of 30 per cent to the bank
and 70 per cent to the depositor (formerly 25 per cent and
75 per cent for the bank and the depositor respectively).
The ratio is subject to increase or decrease upon the
agreement of both parties. If the bank were to incur'
a loss, a situation which has not yet arisen, the depositors
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alone would bear that loss and their funds would fall by the
amount concerned.
Technically, investment accounts are considered to be
unconditional commenda (unconditional Mudarabah) see chapter
II. The depositors are the owners of the capital (Rub ul
Mal) while the bank acts as the agent or labourer (Mudarib).
The relationship between the Islamic bank and a holder of an
investment account is thus based on the commenda (Mudarabah)
contract. 5
Banking Services
1- Documentary Credits
Documentary credits are the modern method of
international commercial dealings. Banks help to consolidate
the rules of this system, which can be defined as a promise
or an undertaking by a bank for discharge or acceptance of
drawings presented by the beneficiary of the documentary
credit according to the stipulations therein stated. 6 The
documentary credit is a commercial operation between two
parties in two different countries; it guarantees the seller
the value of his goods and at the same time guarantees that
the buyer will obtain the goods. Documentary credits as
practised in FIBS are provided for export and import.
The 'finance by interest of documentary credits offered
by banks to clients is prohibited under Islamic Law. 7
 FIBS
uses two alternatives to this kind of finance: The mark-up
technique (Murabaha) and partnership or participation.
(MUsharakah).
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Mark-up (Murabaha): the bank buys the imported goods and
pays their value in hard currency. The client buys the goods
from the bank on a Murabaha basis with a mark-up. The client
pays in local currency at the rate prevailing on that date,
in a lump sum or by instalments. However the mark-u p is pre-
determined taking into account the terms of payment. If the
client fails to pay any of the instalments by the due date,
the mark-up does not increase.
Partnership (Musharakah): Under this system the bank acts
as a partner to the client. On arrival of the goods from
abroad the client pays his share in local currency. The bank
shares with the client the profit on the sale of the goods
in accordance with a predetermined percentage, taking into
account the amount and the term. 8 Should the final result be
a loss, the bank has to share the loss in proportion to its
contribution to the total capital of the venture. Both the
bank and its client have a right to manage the venture,
though the bank may decide not to exercise this right. 9
 The
bank's share in profit may not be in proportion to its
capital, but the loss should be shared in proportion to both
parties' contribution to the total capital of the operation.
Documentary credit operations are regulated by the Bank
of Sudan, which does not encourage the import of all goods,
which are grouped in three categories:
Strategic goods: import of these goods is encouraged.
ii- Non-strategic goods: these goods can be imported only
144
after a licence has been issued.
iii- Luxury goods: these may not to be imported.
i- Strategic goods:
Goods in this category, such as medicines, agricultural
equipment etc., may be financed by FIBS.
ii- Non-Strategic goods:
The bank will open a letter of credit for such goods
only if the client has obtained a licence from the Ministry
of Trade. The client, in this case, should cover the full
value of the goods plus other charges.
iii- Luxury goods:
Goods in this category cannot be imported, for it is
believed that imports of such goods reduces the availability
of resources for productive and essential purposes.
2- Letters of Guarantee
FIBS issues letters of guarantee to its clients, charging a
fee to cover its expenses. The fee is not related to the
amount of the letter of guarantee and is not for the
guarantee, but for the actual expenses which arise. The
procedure for issuing a letter of guarantee in the bank is
as follows:
a) An application is made by the client.
b) If the bank accepts the application, the client will pay
a part of the value of the letter of guarantee, usually
between 20% - 60%. This deposit remains with the bank as
long as the letter of guarantee is valid.
c) A warranty or mortgage should be given by the client.
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It is argued that the guarantee, according to
traditional Islamic jurisprudence, is classified under "non-
lucrative contracts" and as such it is assumed to be
rendered as a personal service, free of charge. 10
However, this argument seems questionable, as non-
lucrative contracts in Islamic jurisprudence are for the
poor and needy, whereas a client who applies for a letter of
guarantee does not normally fall into this category.
In fact, the offer of the guarantee does not, in
itself, conflict with Islamic principles. Islamic banks can
issue letters of guarantee and charge fees for this service,
though fees and commissions should not be related to the
amount of the letter of guarantee. The problem arises if the
client fails to cover his financial commitment. In this
case, if the fees were a percentage of the amount of the
guarantee, then the operation would be equivalent to
finance with interest.
3- Other Services
i- Collecting commercial papers and bills
FIBS accepts and collects commercial paper, though it
does not sell or buy them at discount. The bank charges its
clients for this service, because it acts as a debt-
collection agent. The fees for this service are considered
as wages.
ii- Financial Instruments
Of the two kinds of financial instruments, that is,
shares and securities, FIBS deals only in shares. Dealing in
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securities, which bear interest, is forbidden in Islamic
Law.
1- FIBS acts as an agent for other companies to sell their
shares to the public and charges fees for this service. This
service is only extended to companies whose activities do
not conflict with Islamic principles.
2- FIBS acts as an agent to collect the profits on the
shares for its clients.
3- FIBS holds some shares in other companies.
iii- Foreign currencies operations
FIBS buys and sells foreign currencies.
iv- FIBS transfers money inside and outside the country,
through traveller's cheques, bank drafts etc., and charges
fees for these services.
v- Safe deposits
The bank provides lockers for deposit oL valuables and
charges fees in return. The bank also rents store-houses.
vi- Distribution of Zakah
FIBS pays Zakah on its wealth, in addition to tax. The
bank also collects and distributes its clients' Zakah if
asked to do so.
Collection and distribution of Zakah by Islamic banks
is the subject of controversy among Muslim economists. Some
believe that it is not advisable to mix Zakah, which is a
religious levy, with the commercial ventures of the bank.
They argue that individuals who have suffered losses in
business, so that they become poor and are unable to repay.
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their loans, can resort to the Baitul Mal (Treasury)
operated by the state. Islamic banks, which are commercial
enterprises, should not be allowed to administer Zakah,
because if they do so, then there is a possibility of misuse
of the funds and a conflict of interest may arise. 11
In fact, administration of Zakah by Islamic banks,
increases their power. Misuse of Zakah funds may occur if
the bank is the sole supervisor. However, the bank normally
administers Zakah through its Supervisory Board. Faisal
Islamic Bank of Egypt has set a good example, by opening a
separate Zakah fund, which is financially and legally
independent. 12
The Government could supervise the distribution of
Zakah in Islamic banks, through the Ministry of Endowment,
for example. If such supervision were provided the potential
misuse and the conflict of interest, if any, would
disappear. At the same time this would maintain the
collection of Zakah as a religious and social service.
Investment Policy in FIBS
Investment policy refers to the general rules and controls
that organise the methods of investment , for optimal use of
the available resources, in a manner according with the
objectives of FIBS.
The first investment policy of the bank was prepared in
1979. It aimed to:
1- minimise investment risks by investing in the least risky
projects, whether, trade, local or foreign;
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2- realise a reasonable profit for share-holders and
investors to prove the practicability of Islamic modes of
finance;
3- support the national economy by meeting the country's
needs for essential and strategic goods for production and
consumption;
4- support economic and social development by expanding
finance from the bank to medium and long term operations.
In 1980, FIBS began to make finance available to medium
and long term operations and to artisans and small
investors, the period of investment ranging between two to
three years.
Investment Activities
Investment activities in FIBS are divided into two groups:
(I) indirect investment and (II) independent (direct)
investment.
I- Indirect Investment
Indirect investment in FIBS is carried out through one of
the following devices: (a) Mudarabah (commenda). (b)
Musharakah (participation or partnership). (c) Murabaha
(mark-up). (d) Bai Muajjal (credit sales).
(a) Mudarabah (Commenda)
As an intermediary financial institution, FIBS collects
funds from the general public and supplies them for
investment. When a client opens an investment account, he
authorises the bank to invest this money in any of its
projects. However, the bank supplies this money for'
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investment on a restricted Mudarabah (commenda) basis,
whereby all the conditions of the operation are written into
the contract. FIBS acts as an agent or entrepreneur
(Mudarib) when the money is deposited-into an investment
account, and as the owner of the money or financier (Rub ul
Mal), when it supplies the money for investment.
Under this form of finance, FIBS provides the capital
for the operation and the client, or entrepreneur, provides
the management. The profit of the operation is shared
between the bank and the client in an agreed proportion. The
entrepreneur manages the funds placed at his disposal by the
bank in accordance with the contract. If there is a loss,
the bank will bear it and the entrepreneur gets no reward
for his management, while if the entrepreneur shares in
equity he bears any loss only to the extent of his share in
the total capital of the business. However, if the loss is
caused by the negligence of the entrepreneur, or if he
breaches the conditions of the contract, he will bear the
loss. For this reason FIBS sometimes holds mortgages to
secure its capital.
However, FIBS does not favour this type of activity
because it involves uncertainty, for, where the entrepreneur
manages the operation independently, the bank has to
investigate closely the business, experience, reputation and
the integrity of the entrepreneur.
(b) Musharakah (Participation or Partnership)
Musharakah is a form of business organisation where two
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or more persons contribute to the financing as well as the
management of the business, in equal or unequal proportions.
Profits may be divided in an equitable, but not necessarily
equal, ratio agreed upon between the partners. Losses must
be borne in proportion to the capital."
FIBS engages in various methods of Musharakah:
i- Long term or permanent partnership.
ii- Direct partnership (for financing trade operations).
iii- Decreasing partnership.
i- Long term or permanent partnership: FIBS participates in
such operations by selling shares of companies or by
participating in the capital of projects. In the case of
participation in an established project, after valuation of
the project, the partner's participation should be at least
20% of the project's capital. In the case of new projects,
the percentage of capital of each party will be determined
in advance. Both parties contribute to the capital of the
project. The net profits are divided in proportions
determined in advance, and there is no fixed formula for
profit-sharing; different ratios may be agreed upon with
different partners.
ii- Direct partnership (for financing trade operations)
Under this method, the bank and its partner agree to
join in a partnership to finance a trade operation. Both
parties contribute to the capital of the operation and they
agree in advance upon the ratio for distributing profit. Any
loss will be divided in proportion to their share of the
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capital of the venture. If the bank's partner takes part in
the actual management of the operation, he is entitled to a
certain percentage of the net profit agreed upon in advance,
in addition to his original share in the profit according to
the predetermined ratio.
iii- Decreasing partnership
Decreasing partnership or partnership ending in
acquiring ownership of the title is used in industrial,
agricultural and service projects. The bank finances the
project in part, and takes a percentage of the realised
profit for a period of time. Within this period the bank is
expected to retrieve its share of capital plus a suitable
sum of profit; the ownership of the whole project then
passes to the partner (the bank's client), who pays back the
bank's share of the original capital in instalments.
The bank can finance the purchase of revenue-producing
items, a motor-car, for instance, with the proviso that the
bank receives a percentage of the actual revenue after
deduction of running costs such as fuel, maintenance, wages
of the driver (partner) etc. The remaining revenue will be
set aside to repay the capital provided by the bank for the
original purchase.
Example: Let us assume that a cab-driver asks a bank to
purchase for him a . car to be used as a taxi. The purchase
price and other expenses of the car come to LS 20,000; in
the first year the total revenue of the car is LS 5,600 and
the running expenses and the partner's wages are LS 1,600;.
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the share of the bank in profit is 10% annually. Then the
annual repayments by the partner and the bank's profit can
be shown as follows:
Table No. 1
1	 Total	 :Running	 :	 Net	 Bank's	 :Repayment
1Revenue:Expenses: 	 Revenue:	 Profit
1	 2	 :1-2	 =	 3	 :10% x 3	 =	 4	 3-4	 =	 5
1st year 5600 1600 4000 400 3600
2nd year 5500 1700 3800 380 3420
3rd year 5400 1800 3600 360 3240
4th year 5300 1900 3400 340 3060
5th year 5000 2000 3000 300 2700
:total profit:	 20000
Column number 4 shows the profits which the bank earns.
Column number 5 shows the repayments paid annually by the
partner. When the partner has repaid the bank's money, then
the ownership of the car is transferred to him. However, the
repayment might be a fixed sum of money e.g. LS 4000
annually. In this way the partner can pay back the bank's
money in only five years, after which he owns the car.
In this example it was assumed that the bank finances
the whole operation. However, FIBS does not use this method
on the ground that it is not partnership, because the
capital is provided by one party; in partnership
(Musharakah) all parties participate in the capital of the
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venture. Thus, it is possible also for the partner of the
bank to pay a part of the capital. In this case he will also
be entitled to a part of the annual profit, or he may prefer
a reduction in the bank's share of profit.
This form of partnership is also applicable to the
industrial and construction sectors. The shares of both
parties are determined; both are entitled to the revenue
from the venture. The partner can agree with the bank to buy
its share by degrees until the ownership of the whole
venture transfers to the partner.
(c) Aftirabaha (Mark-up)
This form of transaction is called " sale based on cost
plus profit to he who orders a purchase". It consists of a
promise to purchase and a resale with mark-up. This form was
introduced by Dr. Homoud in his book, Islamic banking.14
Since then, many Islamic banks have adopted it.
FIBS practices this form of transaction, but the bank
does not compel the client to accept the commodity; the
client has the right to default from the purchase. The
operation is executed thus: a client approaches the bank
with a request to buy for him a commodity according to
given specifications, along with the necessary documents
such as primary invoice, licence etc. The client promises to
buy the commodity -on the basis of resale with a mark-up of,
say, 10% or 20% of the original cost of the commodity. When
. the bank makes the commodity available to the client, he may
accept or reject it. If he accepts it he will pay its value
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(total cost plus the agreed mark-up). The price of the
commodity may be paid as a lump sum or in instalments.
(d) Mai Muajjal (Credit Sales)
This form of transaction may be defined as a sale in
which the price of the item or commodity is payable on a
deferred basis. This is the essential element which
distinguishes it from a normal sale. Payment may be either
in a lump sum or in instalments.
FIBS uses this form when the bank sells durable goods
to clients and when it buys raw materials or equipment for
artisans. In the third year after its inception, FIBS
extended its finance to artisans and small workshops to
provide them with equipment, machine tools and raw
materials. A special branch was set up in Omdurman city for
artisans. Each of FIBS's branches all over the country has a
special section to provide services for artisans and owners
of workshops. Examples of the goods provided are: 15 tools
for carpenters, tools for car maintenance, wood, iron bars
and sheets, spare parts for cars and trucks, tractors,
agricultural equipment, equipment for chemists, equipment
for medical clinics, etc.
The table below shows the numbers of transactions with
artisans and the bank's contribution to them, for the five
years following the introduction of this service.
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For Iyear
1981 203 203 1171 1171
1982 152 355 1491 2662
1983 208 563 2365 5027
1.984 238 801 2302 7329
1985 325 1126 4078 11407
Table No.2
LS "000"
Year No. of Operations	 Total bank's
contribution
Independent (Direct) Investment
Under the FIBS Act, the bank is allowed to engage in
investment business. For this purpose it has established
many subsidiary companies, such as:
Islamic Company for Trading and Services,
Islamic Insurance Company, and
Real Estate Company.
1- Islamic Company for Trading and Services
This company was established in 1978 as a subsidiary
company of FIBS, according to Sudanese Company Law of 1925,
with a capital of LS one million. The aim of establishing
the company was to facilitate large-scale operations for
FIBS. The company buys and sells various commodities, e.g.
equipment, trucks, tractors etc., and operates by the
Murabaha (mark-up) system.
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2- Islamic Insurance Company
In the belief that conventional commercial insurance
companies do not conform with Islamic principles, and that
they involve an element of interest and gambling, it was
suggested that a non-profit mutual or co-operative insurance
company be established.16
A resolution for establishing an Islamic Insurance
company was issued in March, 1978 by the Board of Directors
of FIBS. In January, 1979, Islamic Insurance Company was
established as a subsidiary company of FIBS, with a capital
of LS one million. In August 1979, the company extended its
operations to deal with the public. The company is organised
on a co-operative basis and its benefits are confined to its
participants. It engages in all types of general insurance
(fire, marine, etc.). Life insurance based on Mudarabah was
recently introduced. The company's objective is to provide
an insurance service, not to gain profit. The participants
do not receive profits from the invested surplus which
remains from the premiums paid by them after payment of
compensation. The resulting profit and the surplus is
reserved to meet any losses in the future. However, the
participants are entitled to any profits gained from the
investment of the capital.
3- Real Estate Company
Real Estate Company was established in 1.982	 as a
subsidiary of FIBS. The company deals in:
1- financing and/or constructing all sorts of buildings,
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such as houses, hotels, etc.;
2- transactions in all kinds of raw materials and equipment
for construction and dealing in construction contracts;
3- establishing industries for construction materials;
4- exporting construction equipment;
5- carrying out studies and technical consultation in the
field of construction.
The bank thus offers a variety of banking service to
its clients, the charges and fees from which are an
important source of revenue to the bank. The bank also
accepts demand deposits and investment deposits. The latter
are entitled to an agreed percentage share of the profits
accruing to the bank on the profitable employment of the
pooled 'Mudarabah' deposits. As mentioned before, these
funds are liable to losses, though limited to their amount.
The bank invests its funds, that is, 'Mudarabah' deposits,
capital and a proportion of demand deposits and saving
deposits in a variety of ways, one of which is supplying
funds on a 'Mudarabah' basis to business.
The investment equation of the bank can be shown as
follows:
I = (K + Md) - R + Cp
Where I = the volume of funds supplied by the bank for
Investment; K = the part of . the bank's capital supplied for
investment; Md = Mudarabah deposits or investment deposits;
R = legal reserves; Cp = part of saving and demand deposits.
FIBS acts as an intermediary, collecting money from
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the public on a Mudarabah basis and supplying it to business
and entrepreneurs on the same basis. These funds are
entitled to profit and liable to losses, limited in amount.
The following diagram shows the investment circle in an
Islamic bank:
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The diagram shows that different types of deposit are
pooled in the bank. The bank applies these deposits (minus
the legal reserves) to investment. The bank receives these
funds on a Mudarabah basis, in this case acting as an agent
(Mudarib). However when the bank applies these funds to
investment, it acts as an owner of capital (Rub ul Mal), as
discussed earlier.
To conclude, an Islamic bank can be established on the
basis of a shareholder company. Its main role is to offer
banking services and activities according to Islamic law,
with the purpose of earning profit. Nonetheless, other
objectives, such as social welfare, are claimed (paying
Zakah and offering free-interest loans are examples).
Islamic banking offers all the interest-free services and
activities which conventional banks do; interest-based
activities are substituted, if possible, by a profit-
sharing technique.
Islamic banks have come a long way in covering the
various functions carried out by conventional banks.
Nonetheless, further development is required to cover other
functions, and a concentrated effort is needed to develop
new acceptable models. Such a task needs the co-operation of
experts in many disciplines such as Islamic law, economics,
accounting, banking, etc.
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VI
DISTRIBUTION OF PROFITS
IN FIBS
DISTRIBUTION OF PROFITS
This chapter deals with the distribution of profits in FIBS.
As mentioned before, all deposits are held in one pool and
used for investment. This practice makes the determination
of each party's share in investment, and hence in the
profit, a difficult task. Since only a portion of each
party's deposits is invested, the task is made even more
difficult. Before explaining the methods used by FIBS to
distribute profits, it is necessary to define profit and
consider the question of profit measurement.
Profit Measurement
Profit is a broad term which is used to indicate earnings.
Samuelson .1
 
 defines it as what is left over from the sale of
a product after all factor costs have been paid. It is a
return arising from innovation and/or uncertainty. Benham 2
similarly argues that profit is whatever is left from the
receipts after all the costs have been paid. According to
Schumpeter, 3 if receipts exceed costs, that is profit.
Some writers differentiate 4 between pure profits and
other profits. Pure profits equal gross income minus all
expenses including rent, interest, wages of labour and
salaries of management. The term gross profit or ordinary
profit is used, sometimes, to cover all income that is
disbursed as interest, rent and salaries of management, .
together with all that is left over.
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The definition of business income which has gained most
acceptance among contemporary economists, is the one which
regards the income of a business for a particular year as
being equivalent to the amount that can be distributed to
its owners while permitting the business to remain as well
off at the end of the year as at the beginning 5 . The
followin g diagram shows these different approaches to
profit:
Diagram 1
pure
profit
minimum
profit
pure profit
salaries
and
wages
rent
interest or
investor's
share in
business
profit
1
gross
or
1 ordinary
profit
profit
The diagram shows that gross or ordinary profit = pure
profit + minimum profit. Minimum profit = salaries and wages
+ rent + interest (or investor's share in profit). Business
profit = pure profit + salaries and wages.
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Generally speaking, profit is equal to total revenue
minus total cost. 6
Revenue results from the sale of goods or rendering of
services, and it is measured by the charge to customers,
clients, etc., for goods or services furnished. Revenue
also includes gains from the sale or exchange of assets
(other than stock in trade), dividends earned on investment,
and capital gains7.
Profits have their origin in uncertainty and risk 8 . If
the uncertainty or risk is high, the expected profit is also
high, which is the reason why profits are related or
connected with entrepreneurism. 9 Profits are the rewards
held out to efficient management or entrepreneurs, while
losses are the penalties for inefficient methods or the
allocation of resources to uses not desired by spending
consumers 10 . Interest, unlike profits, has its origin in
certainty, and is the reward for waiting and the return to
capital.
Profit, for economic theorists, is the compensation for
entrepreneurship. It is the reward for bearing risk: the
risk of enterprise, the risk of venturing in business, the
risk of owning something in the hope of selling it later. In
other cases, profit includes, in addition to the economist's
reward for hearing the risks of enterprise, interest on the
owner's investment and in some cases, 'wages' to the owner
of an unincorporated enterprise".
In Islamic banking, no interest is allowed, so the
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profit includes only the reward for bearing the risks.
However, the investors' share in profit, with which this
part of the research is largely concerned, is similar to the
interest in conventional banking, though variable in amount.
This observation represents a reply to the claim that
Islamic banking does not stand on an equal footing with
conventional banking in Muslim countries.
From the above discussion it can be concluded that:
a- Profits are the rewards or return for (entrepreneurship).
b- Profits, unlike interest, have their origin in
uncertainty and risk.
c- Profits arise from innovation.
d- Profit, in Islamic banking, is the same as the profit of
the economist; it does not include interest.
If we take Samuelson's 12 view that profits arise from
innovation and are the grubstake for new ventures, then
Islamic banks, which are profit-seeking institutions, are
more concerned with development than are the capitalist
institutions which seek their own advantage in a secured
interest returns, because profit occurs from genuine
entrepreneurship. Hence, Islamic banking may be more
desirable in developing countries than interest-based
financial institutions.
The terms profit and income are often used
synonymously. They are net concepts and refer to the
balances after the deduction from revenue of cost of goods
sold, expenses and losses. Gross income or profit is often
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used as the equivalent of revenue. Net profit is a term used
to designate the results of operations after deducting from
revenues all related costs and expenses and all other
expenses and losses applicable to the period".
The problem of accounting is not the simple measurement
of the difference between total revenues and total costs,
but that of measuring the difference between revenues and
costs for a given period of time 14
 .
Income or profit is recognised only after revenues and
expenses are appropriately matched from one accounting
period to another. The amount remaining is net revenue or
Income, if the balance is unfavourable, then that is net
loss. The assignation of costs to revenues is thus crucial
to periodic income measureMent. 15 Only costs which have
definitely been incurred are assignable to revenue. 16 This
brings about the question of deferred costs,- which should
not be deducted from current revenue. Deferred costs can be
defined as costs which are not incurred directly in relation
to the revenue of the accounting period concerned, and are
assignable to future accounting periods.
Profit is thus seen as a net value after deducting from
revenues all related expenses. These expenses and losses
should be applicable to the accounting period concerned.
This brings about the concept of matching or assigning
expenses to revenue of the same accounting period.
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The Profit Concept in FIBS
The matching concept is believed to be a very useful
concept to realise justice. By allocating expenses to their
related revenues it is ensured that disbursements of the
period are related to the revenues of the same period. Thus
the matching concept provides fairness and justice to the
owners (shareholders) and depositors. However, other
accounting principles such as the realisation convention
might harm transitional investors who withdraw from
investment. As mentioned before, depositors in FIBS have the
right to withdraw their funds at any time. Thus if some of
them withdraw before the full liquidation of the project in
which their funds or part of them have actually
participated, they may lose a part of the profit that might
be realised in the future.
There is a great emphasis on justice and fairness in
Islamic teachings. Fairness is an indispensable norm in
Islam. The Qur'an stresses justice in many verses:
And do not eat up your property among yourselves
for vanities. And give measure and weight with
(full) justice." (6:152).
" Give just measure and weight, nor withhold from
the people the things that are their due." (7:85).
" And give not short measure and weight." (11:84).
Investment accounts, Mudarabah accounts in FIBS, are
entitled to a part of the realised profits for the
accounting period. As we have seen, since these profits do
not include profits (positive or negative) of projects which
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are not yet liquidated, investors who withdraw at this stage
may well not share in the profits of some of the projects in
which their moneys have actually participated. Hence it may
be argued that this conflicts with the requirement of
justice and fairness.
To tackle this problem it is necessary to look at the
whole picture. Tn Islam, justice is as much required as is
the elimination of interest. Should it be necessary to
choose between an activity (although containing some
injustice) which helps to eliminate interest, and interest,
it would probably be preferable to choose to eliminate
interest, especially if the injustice contained is minor and
the investors themselves understand and accept the
situation.
It could be argued that another method, fair both to
the bank and investors, namely, limited commenda (Midarabah)
can be used instead. In this situation, investors
participate in a specified project and get their money back
as well as profit after liquidation. If they wish to
withdraw, they may lose their chance to obtain profit. This
argument is valid, but the limited commenda, in this case,
has many disadvantages; the most serious being that it is
not effective in mobilising savings. Nor is it practicable
for commercial banks.
Justice is a relative concept. No absolute justice can
be obtained in commercial operations, for a certain degree
of uncertainty prevails in all commercial transactions. Even
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in Islamic jurisprudence, a small degree of uncertainty
(Gherer) in trade is accepted. Thus it is likely that a
degree of unfairness which may affect the bank or its
investors, may be considered acceptable , especially if it
results in the elimination of interest.
Even for an owner, if he decides to withdraw by selling
some or all of his shares, the price which he may obtain for
each share is uncertain, even though it will reflect the
financial situation of the company. The value of a share
depends, to a large extent, upon dividends payable over the
life of the company. Hence, valuation of the share depends
on these dividends. However, it is difficult to know in
advance the likely growth in dividends, and the market price
in the shares at the predicted date of sale 17 . Moreover,
share prices in the stock exchange market are not always
fair, and often fluctuate in response to speculative forces.
Investment Accounts in FIBS
As explained in the previous chapter, FIBS accepts
investment accounts (Mudarahah funds) and uses them in
investment. The owners of these funds are entitled to profit
according to the participation of their funds in the actual
investment. The bank does not use all these funds in
investment, but retains a part of them to meet withdrawals.
Theoretically, these reserves, along with new deposits which
are continually being made, enable the banks to meet all
demands for withdrawals.
FIBS is entitled to 30 per cent of the profit as an
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agent (Mudarib), and also to a part of the profit as an
owner (Rub uJ Mal) of that part of the bank's funds
participating in investment. These funds include a
proportion of the bank's capital and of current and saving
accounts. The return of profit for these funds goes to the
bank.
Commenda (Mudarabah) Expenses
There has been disagreement among Muslim jurists with
regard to Mudarabah expenses. Some hold that expenses are
incurred by the capital of the Mudarabab, others that they
are incurred by the entrepreneur (Mudarib). Others
differentiate between expenses related to the work
(Mudarabah) and those related to the entrepreneur. A
distinction between expenses in travelling and in settled
areas (towns or villages) has also been drawn. If, for
example, the MUdarabah requires the Mudarib to travel, then
expenses such as food and transportation will be incurred by
the Mudarabah capital. Other jurists have connected expenses
with stipulation, so that any expenses stipulated in the
Mudarabah contract as being incurred by any party, are
1a1lowable 8 . If, for example, the Mudarib stipulates that
his food and accommodation expenses should be incurred by
the Mudarabah capital, in travelling and in settled areas,
then such a condition is allowable.
However, jurists' opinions about the Mudarabah expenses
were related to simple Mudarabah, whereby the entrepreneur's
needs and expenses are simple and limited and can be easily
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accounted for. However, in the case of Mudarabah in Islamic
banking it would be impracticable and unfair if Mudarabah
expenses were to be borne by the capital of the Mudarabah,
for the following reasons:
Firstly, the bank as an entrepreneur is entitled to a
certain percentage of the realised profits (30 per cent in
the case of FIBS).
Secondly,	 Mudarabah expenses may exhaust all the
realised profits. FTBS's profits for investment deposits
were approximately LS 6.5 million and LS 3.9 million for the
years 1985 and 1986 respectively, while administrative
expenses were LS 12.7 million and LS 17.4 million
respectively for the same years.19
Thirdly, it is very difficult to distinguish between
the Mudarabah expenses and the administrative expenses.
It would probably be preferable for the- bank to bear
the Mudarabah expenses. The bank can increase its share in
profit, by mutual agreement, if it finds that these expenses
are high.
When the bank acts as an owner and provides Mudarabah
funds to entrepreneurs, the expenses to be incurred by the
bank and by the entrepreneurs, will be determined
20separately.
'Accounting in Islamic Banking
Revenues in Islamic banking are the result of services
rendered by these banks, and profits from participation
(Musharakah, Mudarabah). The account books of Islamic banks
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contain a commenda (Mudarabah) account, in which the
balances from different commendas (positive or negative) are
shown. The resulting balance in this account is transferred
to the profit and loss account. In the profit and loss
account, all revenues and expenses are shown. The balance,
positive or negative, is transferred to the balance sheet.
Tf any profits are to be distributed, then they will be
shown in the distribution account.
Financial statements in Islamic banking aim to measure
the various activities of the bank in order to show the
performance of the hank and the profit or loss of every
activity. By aggregating the balances of all activities of
the hank, an amount of net revenue is shown. These financial
statements are prepared in accordance with accounting
principles, rules and concepts, which, in the case of
Islamic banking, should be in conformity to Islamic Law. In
an earlier chapter the conformity of some of these concepts
and rules to Islamic Law was discussed. Questionable
accounting principles or rules will be discussed later.
Distribution of Profit in FIBS
Net profit on investment deposits (Mudarabah deposits) in
FIBS is calculated according to principles that have been
suggested by the Sharia'h Supervisory Board. These
principles can be summed up as follows:
1- All investable deposits (90 per cent of the total
investment deposits) are to be considered as actually
invested. The remaining 10 per cent are kept as reserves to
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meet withdrawals.
2- With the exception of earnings from banking and other
services, investment depositors share in all income
generated.
3- Administrative expenses are to be borne exclusively by
the shareholders.
4- Profits are to be distributed among the shareholders and
the investment deposit-holders, taking into consideration
items 2 and 3 above.
5- Tnvestment depositors are not entitled to participate in
profits from current and savings deposits.
FIBS as an owner (Rub 0 Mal) and an agent (Mudarib) is
entitled to two shares in the profit; firstly, a percentage
of the profit as Mudarib and secondly, a share of the total
profit proportionate to the bank's share in the Mudarabah's
capital.
The following Table shows the funds of different
deposits actually invested in FIBS for the year 1984.
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Table A
(LS	 '000')
Type of Actual Tnvestment Funds for Actual
deposit deposit percentage Investment Invested
Funds
1	 2	 1x2	 =	 3	 4
MS(000)	 LS	 (000)	 LS	 (000)
January 1984
Current deposits 157,037 70% 109,926 75,540
Tnvt.	 deposits 77,228 100% 77,228 53,070
Savings deposits 12,454 90% 11,209 7,703
Shareholders 58,536 100% 58,537 40,226
Total 256,900	 176,539
February 1984
Current deposits 161,198 70% 112,839 74,433
Tnvt.	 deposits 76,007 100% 76,007 50,137
Savings deposits 13,117 90% 11,805 7,787
Shareholders 55,951 100% 55,951 36,908
Total 256,602 169,265
March 1984
Current deposits 163,553 70% 114,487 76,563
Tnvt.	 deposits 76,151 100% 76,151 50,926
Savings deposits 13,600 90% 12,240 8,185
Shareholders 54,266 100% 54,266 36,291
Total. 257,144	 171,965
April	 1984
September 1984
Totals may not add due to rounding.
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The percentage of investment deposits ready for
investment in the bank for this year was 100%, held at 90%
as stated above. However, the funds which are available for
investment are not fully invested. The actual investment
is thus apportioned between the different sources. For
example, the actual invested fund for current deposits in
January, 1984 is equal to:
current deposits in column 3 x total actual investment
divided by total funds ready for investment.
The amount which is ready for investment is: 109,926
(i.e. 157,037x 70%).
The actual invested fund is: 75,540 calculated as
follows:
109,926 x 176,539
= 75,540
256,900
The shareholders' share is represented by the capital
plus reserves plus retained profits minus fixed assets and
direct investment. This means that bank's capital minus
(fixed assets + direct investment) is equal to the amount of
the bank's capital which is used in investment.
Table B, shows the total investment for FIBS for the
year 1984. The information in this table is divided into
three groups.
a) The monthly actual investment which represents the total
sum in column No.4, Table A.
b) The investment deposit funds which actually participated
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a) Credit facilities
(Actual investment)
b) Investment
deposits
c) Shareholders
(Include current &
saving deposits)
in the bank's investment. These funds are shown in column
No.4, Table A, against investment deposits.
c) Shareholders; the returns from shareholders + current and
savings deposits will go to the bank (shareholders) .
Therefore, these three items are considered as one. This is
shown in column No.4, Table A. The total sum of money in
this column is equal to (a) - (b) above (i.e., in January
1984, it was LS 123,459,000.
Table B
(LS '000')
January:February: March
11
1	 1
176,5391169,265
	
1171,965
1	 53,0701	 50,137	 :	 50,926
123,4691119,128	 1121,039
Total
:	 annual
:investment
1
1
1,532,422
...:	 431,791
1,100,630
The term credit facilities, used by the bank, is more
appropriately applied to the credit finance which is used in
conventional banks. In the case of Islamic banking it may be
preferable to use the term "investment" instead.
Investment deposits shown in the Table are the
deposits which participated in the actual investment.
Investment deposits which are ready to participate in
investment are more than these sums, as shown in Table A,
column No.3.
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The profit generated from investment in the financial
year 1984, was LS. 15,278,000, which consisted of two types
of earnings:
(LS 000)
1- Earnings from investment activities: 	 12,244
2- Earnings from foreign currency:
	 3,034
Total
	
15,278
These profits do not include net revenues from banking
services and other revenues generated from direct
investment, such as, subsidiary companies.
The above profit is distributed between shareholders
and investment depositors in the ratio 72% and 28%
respectively, calculated as follows:
1- The percentage of shareholders' funds used in the actual
investment is equal to: total of shareholders'- funds divided
by total annual investment, multiplied by 100, that is,
1,100,630
x 100 = 72%
1,532,422
2- The percentage of investment deposits used in the actual
investment is equal to:
total investment deposits divided by total annual investment
multiplied by 100; that is,
431,791
x 100 = 28%
1,532,422
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1	 2
Total foreign currency
in branches
(converted to LS)
Total local
currency
in branches
373,716 291,404
a) Share of shareholders in profit is ( LS. '000')
72
- x 15,278 = 11,000
100
b) Share of investment depositors in profit is ( LS. '000')
28
- x 15,278 =	 4,278
100
a + b, that is, total profit is equal to:
11,000 + 4,278 =
	 15,278
Table C, shows the investment deposits in foreign and
local currency. These consist of two types; foreign currency
deposits and local currency deposits. The investment
depositors' share in profit would therefore be divided
between foreign and local currency deposits.
Table C
(LS '000')
1 + 2 = 3
Total foreign
and local
currency
665,120
The total foreign and local currency in branches is
divided by 9 to obtain an average, though there is no need
to do so, as the resulting amount (share of deposits in
profit) will be the same in both cases. However, as the aim .
is to show the methods used by the bank the research follows
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the same procedures used by the bank. The profits are
calculated for nine months only, because the bank has by
agreement with its depositors, increased its profit ratio to
30%, as from the beginning of the tenth month of 1984. The
financial year also was changed to the Hijri calendar,
therefore:
The average of foreign currency is (LS '000'):
373,716
= 41,524
9
The average of local currency is (LS '000'):
291,404
= 32,378
9
Total: 41,524 +32,378 = 73,902 or: .
665,120
= 73,902
9
a) Distribution of profits between deposits in foreign and
local currency
As shown earlier, the share of depositors in profit is
LS 4,278,000.
1- Share of foreign currency in profit is:
Average deposits in foreign currency divided by average
deposits in foreign and local currency multiplied by
depositors' share in profit, that is, ( LS. '000'):
41,524
x 4,278 = 2,403
73,902
2- Share of deposits in local currency in profits=
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Average deposits in local currency divided by average
deposits in foreign and local currency multiplied by
depositors' share in profit, that is, (LS '000'):
32,378
	
 x 4,278 = 1,874
73,902
b) Share of depositors in profits after deducting the bank's
share
1- Share of investment deposits (foreign currency)=
Share of investment deposits in profit x 75% ( LS '000') =
2,403 x 75% = 1,802
2- Share of investment deposits (local currency) =
Share of investment deposits in profit x 75% (LS '000') =
1,874 x 75% = 1,405
Total (LS '000') = 1,802 + 1,405 = 3,207
As shown above, the share of FIBS in the profit as an
agent is 25%. However this ratio increased to 30% in the
following years. The profits for the last three months of
1984 are calculated on this new ratio. For simplicity the
discussion will ignore these three months' profits.
Distribution of the investment depositors share in profits
between branches (foreign and local currency)
Table D, shows deposits (foreign and local) in each
branch, and how profit is distributed among the different
branches.
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Table D
(LS	 '000')
Branches Foreign currency Share in	 Local	 Share in
(Converted to
local currency)
profits
	
currency	 profits
Branch A 128,996 0.626 110,072 0.498
Branch B 1,445 0.007 3,459 0.015
Branch C 1,900 0.009 1,360 0.006
•
Total	 175,435 0.851	 186,654	 0.845
Note: as stated above profit was distributed for only 9
months, thus foreign currency deposits (converted to local
currency) and local currency deposits at the time of
distributing profit were 175,435,000 and 186,654,000
respectively.
a) Share of investment deposits (foreign currency) = total
of investment deposits (foreign currency) in branches
divided by total of investment deposits for the financial
year multiplied by the depositors' share in profits (foreign
currency) = ( LS '000')
175,435
	
 x 1,802 = 0.845 (see b above)
373,716 (from Table C)
b) Share of investment deposits (local currency) = total of
investment deposits (local currency) in branches divided by
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total of investment deposits for the financial year
multiplied by the local currency deposits share in profit
(see 2 in b above) = ( LS '000')
186,654
	
 x 1,405 = 0.900
291,404	 (from Table C)
c) Branch A's share in foreign deposits profit = total of
investment deposits (foreign) in branch A divided by total
for all branches in the financial year multiplied by all
branches' share in profit, that is: (LS '000')
128,996
	
 x 0,851 = 0.626
175,435
By using the same technique, the share in profits can
be calculated for each branch.
Distribution of Profits in FIBS in 1405(1985) 
The following review of the distribution of profits for the
year 1405 (1985) permits a comparison between this year and
the previous one. The first thing to observe is that, the
financial year has been changed from the Gregorian calendar
to lajri.
The following Table shows the various deposits which
were mobilised for investment in FIBS in the financial year
1405 (1985).
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Table Al
:Actual	 :Investment
:deposits:
(LS	 m)	 1405
Deposits
ready for
investment
(1985)
Actual
invested
funds
1	 2	 :1	 x	 2	 =	 3	 4
The 1st Month
Investment deposits 66.1 90% 59.5 59.5
Shareholders 48.0 100% 48.0 48.0
Savings deposits 15.4 90% 14.0 14.0
Current deposits 194.9 70% 136.4 59.0
Total 257.9	 180.5
The 2nd Month
Investment deposits 70.7	 90% 63.6 63.6
Shareholders 44.1	 100% 44.1 44.1
Savings deposits 15.6	 90% 14.0 14.0
Current deposits 204.9
	 70% 143.4	 61.3
Total 265.1 183.0
The 12th Month
Investment deposits 59.1 90% 53.2 53.2
Shareholders 8.0 100% 8.0 8.0
Savings deposits 23.0 90% 20.7 20.7
Current deposits 254.5 70% 178.1 74.5
Total 260.0	 156.4
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It is clear from Table Al that the part of current
deposits which participated in actual investment is computed
as a balancing figure, while it was computed as a proportion
of total investment in 1984. The reason for that was to
favour investment deposits, as they are deposited with the
primary aim of obtaining profit. In contrast, current
deposits are not liable to profit and the profit generated
from them is transferred to the bank. The change was made
according to a recommendation from the Sharia'h Supervisory
Board. It is argued that investment deposits should be given
the priority as far as distribution of profit is concerned.
For example, in January 1984, the amount of investment
deposits which actually participated in investment was LS
53,070,000, while the total amount available was LS
77,228,000. If the 1985 method was used, then the investment
deposits which should have participated in investment would
have been 77,228,000 x 90%= LS 69,505,000.
Table Bl shows the annual actual investment and the
share of investment deposits and shareholders' funds
(including current and savings deposits) in the actual
investment.
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Table Bl
(LS	 m)	 1405(1985)
Month Shareholders Invt.'deposits Actual
funds (used in invt.) invt.
(used in invt.
1	 2	 1+2=3
The 1st Month 121.0 59.5 180.5
The 2nd Month 119.4 63.6 183.0
The 3rd Month 112.2 63.0 175.2
The 4th Month 114.4 61.0 175.4
The 5th Month 99.0 76.4 175.4
The 12th Month
Total	 1,264.8	 744.2	 2,009.0
From Table B1 the following information is obtained:
i- The total annual actual investment is LS 2,009 m.
ii- The total annual investment deposits which participated
in investment were LS 744.2 m.
iii- The total annual shareholders' funds which participated
in investment were LS 1,264.8 m.
We know that the total profit for the year 1405 is LS
24.9 million, generated from two activities:
a) Investment activities' profits 	 LS 20.1 m.
b) Foreign currency profits	 LS 4.8 m.
Distribution of profits can be calculated as follows:
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1,264.8iii
- x 100 = x 100 = 63%
Percentages of investment deposits and shareholders' funds
in investment
1- Percentage of the investment deposits in investment =
total annual investment deposits invested divided by total
annual investment x 100:
ii
	
744.2
- x 100 =
	
	
= 37%
2,009
2- Percentage of the shareholders funds in investment =
2,009
Share of depositors and shareholders in profits
1- Share of investment deposits in profits =
24.9 x 37% = LS 9.2 m.
2- Share of shareholders' funds in profits =
24.9 x 63% = LS 15.7 m.
Total (I + 2) = 9.2 + 15.7 = LS 24.9 m.
Table Cl shows the investment deposits (local and
foreign currency) in the branches of FIBS. The information
in this Table is used to obtain the share of local and
foreign currency deposits in the profits generated from the
investment deposits, that is, 9.2 m; and hence to compute
the share of the bank in the profits as an agent.
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Branch
Branch A
Branch B
Branch C
Branch D
Foreign currency
deposits
(converted to LS)
362.3
7.7
132.2
23.0
Local
currency
deposits
2
224.0
22.0
2.5
16.5
Total
1 + 2 = 3
586.3
29.7
134.7
39.5
1
Table Cl
(LS m)
•
Total
	
536.8
	
306.0
	
842.8
a) Local currency deposits = 306 m divided by 12 = 25.5 m.
b) Foreign currency deposits 536.8 in divided by 12 = 44.7 m.
c) Total (a + b) = 25.5 + 44.7 = 70.2 m.
(Again it is not necessary to divide by 12. However, as the
purpose is to illustrate the method as used by the bank,
then the procedures used are shown).
Share in profits before deducting the bank's share as an
agent
1- Local currency deposits share in profits =
a
	 25.5
x 9.2 =	 x 9.2	 = LS 3.3 m.
70.2
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2- Foreign currency deposits share in profits =
44.7
x 9.2 -	 x 9.2	 = LS 5.9 m.
C
	 70.2
Total profits = 3.3 + 5.9 = LS 9.2 m.
Share in profits after deducting the bank's share in profits
i- Share of deposits (local currency) in profits =
3.3 x 70% = LS 2.3 m.
ii- Share of deposits (foreign currency) in profits =
5.9 x 70% = LS 4.1 m.
Total = 2.3 + 4.1 = LS 6.4 m.
The bank ratio as an agent is 30%. The share of the
bank in profit is:
9.2 x 30% or 9.2 - 6.4 = LS 2.8 m.
Distribution of the investment depositors profits among
branches (foreign & local currency)
Table D1 shows the share of each branch in profits (foreign
& local currency deposits). The information in this Table is
used to calculate each branch's share in the profits (column
No.2 and No.4).
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Table D1
(LS m)	 1405	 (1985)
Branch Deposits	 in Share in Deposits Share
foreign currency
converted to LS
profits in LS in
profits
1 2 3 4
Branch A 362.4 2.8 224.0 1.7
Branch B 7.7 0.06 22.0 0.2
Branch C 132.2 1,0 2.5 0.02
Branch D 23.0 0.2 16.5 0.1
Total
	
536.8
	
4.1
	
306.0
	
2.3
i- Investment depositors share in profits after deducting
the bank's share is = LS 6.4 m
ii- Total of foreign currency deposits = 536.8 m.
iii- Total of local currency deposits = 306 m.
iv- Total of foreign & local currency deposits = 536.8 +
306.0 = 842.8 m.
a) Foreign currency depositors share in profits = Total
foreign currency deposits/total of foreign & local
currency deposits x investment deposits' share in profits,
that is,
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ii/iv x i = 536.8/842.8 x 6.4 = LS 4.1 m.
b) Local currency depositors share in profits =
iii/iv x i = 306/842.8 x 6.4 = LS 2.3 m.
Share of Branches in Profits
Branch A's share in profits = Branch A total in foreign
currency/total for all branches in foreign currency x total
share of all branches in profits, that is:
362.4
x 4.1 = LS 2.8 m.
536.8
By using the same method, each branch's shares in
profits can be computed.
Comparison Between Distribution of Profits in 1984 & 1405
In the year 1984, the proportion of current deposits
available for investment was 70%. The actual funds from the
current deposits which participated in investment were a
percentage of these deposits computed on the 70% basis. The
average proportion was 45% of the total actual investment,
that is: 695/1,532 x 100.
The proportion of investment deposits available for
investment, for the same year, 1984, was 100%. However,
these funds were not wholly invested. The proportion
actually invested was 67% of the total funds, that is:
430/645 x 100. These funds represented 28% of the total
actual investment, that is 430/1,532 x 100.
In 1405 (1985) the current deposits were used to fill
the gap between the amount of total actual investment and
the amount of other deposits, that is, saving deposits,
192
investment deposits and shareholders funds. However, the
percentage of current deposits used in investment to the
total actual investment was 794/2,009 x 100 = 40%. This
percentage is 5% less than the percentage of current
deposits used in investment in the previous year. This,
however, shows that a large proportion of the generated
profit is considered to be generated from current deposits.
As mentioned before, the actual beneficiaries of such profit
are the shareholders.
The proportion of investment deposits which
participated in total actual investment in 1405 (1985) was
90%, as demonstrated previously (Table Al), a difference of
23% over the previous year. This means that the 5% of
current deposits in investment in favour of current deposits
(shareholders) in 1984, was filled by investment deposits.
This is the reason for the increase in the percentage of
investment deposits by 23% in the year 1405. This, in turn,
increased the percentage of investment deposits in the total
actual investment to 37%, that is:
744/2,009 x 100, compared to 28% in 1984.
If we examine the shareholders' share in total
investment we find that it consists of three elements: the
shareholders fund, the current and the savings deposits. The
shareholders fund percentage which participated in actual
investment is very low compared to its share in profits,
because the share of current and savings deposits goes to
shareholders. For example, the shareholders fund in 1984 was
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LS 330 m, while their share in total actual investment was
LS 1,100 m. This means a sum of LS 770 m is pooled from
current and savings deposits: about 233% of the shareholders
fund. The current and savings deposits represented 50% of
the total investment, that is 770/1,532 x 100, while the
shareholders proportion was only 22%, that is: 330/1.532 x
100.
The position is similar for the year 1405 (1985). The
shareholders fund was LS 275 m, while the share of
shareholders in total actual investment was LS 1,265 m;
almost LS 1,000 in is pooled from current and savings
deposits, representing about 364% of the shareholders fund.
The current and savings deposits represented 49% of the
total investment, that is:
990/2,009 x 100, while the shareholders' percentage in total
investment is only 14%, that is: 275/2,009 x 100.
As mentioned before, an Islamic bank might give the
holders of current and savings deposits a part of the
profits earned, though without pre-agreement. By so doing,
FIBS might encourage holders of these deposits to deposit
more. At the same time, the practice will not harm the bank,
because, as we have seen, these profits are mostly generated
from the investment of current and savings deposits. The
bank has to guarantee the principal of these funds, whether
its investment results in profit or loss.
The share of investment deposits in profits for 1984 .
was LS 3.2 m ( for 9 months), a percentage of 4.3% (3.2/74 x
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100), (table D), while their share in profits for 1405
(1985) was LS 6.4 m, 9.1% of the total investment, that is,
6.4/70.2 x 100 (table Cl). Althou gh the investment deposits
ratio in profits decreased to 70%, compared with 75% in
1984, their percentage in profits increased to 9.1% in 1405
(1985), as opposed to only 4.3% in the previous year. This
is again because the share of investment deposits. which
participated in total investment increased at the expense of
the shareholders' share, or to be more accurate, at the
expense of current deposits.
A comparison between the investment deposits share in
profits and the interest rates in conventional banks is not
given, because it is assumed that investors in FIBS are more
interested in interest-free banking than in a high return of
profit. Recent studies 21
 show that almost all depositors in
FIBS choose Islamic banking for religious reasons rather
than other factors, although a comparison between rates of
profits from one Islamic bank to another would be
desirable. However, it is believed that the depositors in
Islamic banks are more interested in an efficient service
and strict adherence to Islamic teachings than in high rates
of profit. It can thus be concluded that the volume of
investment deposits is a function of efficiency and strict
conformity to Islamic teachings.
Limited Mudarabah
From the above methods used by FIBS to distribute
profits between the holders of investment deposits (Rub al
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Mal) and the bank 'shareholders' (Mudarib), it is observed
that many difficulties arise, because different funds are
held in a single pool. As mentioned before, some Islamic
banks distinguish between investment of Mudarabah funds and
that of other funds. An example of these banks is al Baraka
Bank (Sudan).
The method by which every fund is separately invested
might be called "Limited Mudarabah", whereby an Islamic bank
issues Mudarabah securities, or certificates. These are a
special kind of promissory note, issued in LS 10 or other
denominations. When such securities are issued, they
represent a share in an investment project monitored by the
bank that issues them. The relationship between the bank and
the holders of these securities is based on the Mudarabah
contract. The investment lasts for a specific period of
time, pre-determined according to the feasibility study.
When the investment, which might be a project or a trade
operation, is liquidated or completed, then the profit will
be distributed in the pre-determined ratio between the bank
and the security-holders. If a loss occurs, the holders of
Mudarabah securities would bear it, as explained earlier
when discussing the Mudarabah contract. The distribution of
profit between security-holders themselves would be
according to the number of securities held by each.
Mudarabah securities may thus be likened to 'common
stocks, .22 While the stockholder provides 'equity' and .
shares in profits and losses and, in theory, in the control
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of the business the Mudarabah security-holder shares in
profits and bears losses, though he does not effectively
share in the control of the business. His is a more risky
venture.
However, Mudarabah securities can be classified under
ordinary shares. They aim to finance a specified project or
trade operation, in other words a venture. A share in a
company entitles its holder to the proportionate share in
the assets and profits of that company. Hence the owner of a
share in a company whose capital is represented by 100 such
shares, owns one-hundredth of the assets of that company and
is entitled to one-hundredth of the profits. 23
 However, the
difference between the Mudarabah security-holder and an
ordinary shareholder is that the former does not play any
part in the management of the business, but shares in the
profits and the risks.
This similarity between Mudarabah securities and
shares does not mean that the consequences are the same -
as, for instance, in selling, discounting or using these
securities as a mortgage.
Shares can be offered for sale in the stock market, and
the purchaser of the shares is entitled to all the rights
appertaining to those shares. He will thus be entitled to
vote in respect of his shares and will receive dividends.24
Although Mudarabah securities are similar to shares,
they represent capital for a short-term project, which will •
be liquidated in the near future, unlike shares, which
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represent a capital for an entity which will continue for an
indefinite period of time. Another drawback to the supply of
Mudarabah securities for sale is that their holders are
liable to bear the whole loss in a project.
The discount of Mudara.bah securities might seem
irrelevant, because the holder can easily withdraw from
investment by withdrawing his money. It is true he might
lose his chance to make a profit, but his right to withdraw
is not denied. Moreover, the value of the security depends
on the feasibility of the project and the efficiency of its
management, which makes the value of the security uncertain.
Usually, a security which can be discounted is a security
which forms a loan and a promise by the borrower to pay back
that loan within a stated period of time. Such a bill can be
sold or discounted before maturity. However, discounting of
bills or securities is not permitted according to Islamic
Law, because it is another form of interest.
As far as mortgage is concerned, it is acceptable to
use Mudarabah securities as guarantees.
However, limited Mudarabah as a form of finance has
many disadvantages. The main drawback is that financial
institutions which use this method would not be efficient in
mobilising public savings, for they would mobilise only the
savings of the high-income groups; within the high-income
classes, only those with a low propensity to consume, are
expected to acquire such an investment. Furthermore, •
liquidity-preference, which depends on the transaction-
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motive and the precautionary-motive , 25 will increase. The
public will tend to keep a relativel y high percentage of
their income in cash rather than channelling it into
financial institutions for investment, because funds
deposited for investment should be kept in the bank and will
not be immediately available to meet transaction and
unforeseen needs.
It might be argued that such moneys can be pooled into
current accounts, so that they participate, partially, in
investment, yet are available and can be called at any time.
However, the mobilisation of money into the banking system
will be more efficient if incentives are given to the
public. We find that in the U.K. , most commercial banks have
introduced a current account called "current plus", whereby
all current accounts will start earning interest. The point
to be emphasised is that incentives make mobilisation of
different kinds of money into the banking system more
efficient, whereas Limited Mudarabah will increase the
tendency towards keeping more cash with the public for
transaction and precautionary purposes.
Another disadvantage of limited Mudarabah is its
impracticability for commercial banks. It is more orientated
to investment banking than to commercial banking, and it
would be difficult and costly for a commercial bank to
manage and follow up projects financed by this method.
The most important role played by limited Mudarabah is
that it provides a type of finance whereby the depositors'
199
fund is segregated from the bank's money. Thus each party's
share in profit is more easily distinguished and hence
distributed. It also helps to put an end to the
controversial point of "full liquidation". Full liquidation
or realisation of the goods of Mudarabah, that is,
converting it to money (Tandeed) is required by jurists
before profit can be distributed. The aim is to enable the
financier (Rub ul Mal) to recover his capital, in the first
place, and then the profit accruing will be shared between
him and the agent (Mudarib) as agreed. Valuation of the
inventory of the operation would not stand as an alternative
to full liquidation, because the price of the goods may
appreciate or depreciate, as stated by Ahmed Ibn Hanba1,26
founder of the Hanbali school of Islamic thought (Meth'hab).
To conclude, two techniques for mobilising deposits in
Islamic banking may be used to substitute interest based
deposits; namely, (a) Mudarabah contract, where all funds
are held in one pool for investment and (b) Limited
Mudarabah contract, where each group of Mudarabah
certificates is invested in one project and profit is
distributed when the project is liquidated.
The first technique, though efficient in mobilising
different classes of savings, is problematic as regards
determining each party's participation in investment and
hence in profit. Moreover, the situation is more problematic
when considering the right of depositors to withdraw and add
to deposits. The second technique, (i.e. Limited Mudarabah),
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though not as efficient in mobilising savings as the first
has the advantage that each depositor's share in investment
and in profit can be easily determined and distributed.
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VII
DISTRIBUTION OF PROFIT IN
ISLAMIC BANKS
Distribution of Profit
in Islamic Banks
This chapter continues the discussion of the distribution of
profit in Islamic banks, with a brief examination of the
FIBS basis of distribution of profit for the years 1406-
1408(h) (1986-88). The method used in calculating and
distributing profit was explained previously, and the
following section is mainly to update the data. However, the
focus of the research is on the method used by Islamic banks
to distribute profit rather than the profit figures
themselves. Therefore tables showing profit distribution in
Islamic Bank for Western Sudan (IBWS) and Tadamon Islamic
Bank (TIB) are also shown. The methods used in the
distribution of profit are considered and differences in
application between the three banks pointed out. The common
feature between these banks is that all deposits are held in
one pool and used for investment. They all face similar
difficulty in the determination of each party's share in
actual investment and therefore in profit.
Distribution of Profit in FIBS 1406-08h (1986-88):
The method used in FIBS to distribute profit was shown in
detail in the previous chapter. The illustrations which
follow serve merely to update that information and it is
therefore not discussed in detail.
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Distribution of Profit in FIBS in 1406h (1986):
Table A06 shows the way in which the bank determined the
share of each deposit in the actual investment.
Table A06
Deposits in FIBS in 1406(1986)
LS	 (m)
Types of	 :Actual	 InvestmentlFunds for 	 :	 Actual
deposits	 :deposits	 %	 investmentlinvestment
i	 1	 2	 3	 4
1st Month
Investment deposits	 58.1 90% 52.2 52.2
Shareholders
	
7.1 100% 7.1 7.1
Savings deposits 	 :	 24.3 90% 21.9 21.9
Current deposits
	 :	 259.1	 70%	 181.4 74.6
Total 155.8
2nd Month
Investment deposits 	 51.0	 90%	 46.0	 46.0
Shareholders	 3.6
	 100%	 3.6-	 3.6
Savings deposits	 26.0	 90%	 23.4	 23.4
Current deposits	 256.3	 70%	 179.4	 91.1
164.1
3rd Month
Investment deposits	 50.2	 90%	 45.2	 45.2
Shareholders	 3.4	 100%	 3.4	 3.4
Savings deposits	 27.8	 90%	 25.0	 25.0
Current deposits	 251.8	 70%	 176.3	 85.8
159.4
'
12th Month
Again the part of current deposits which participated
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in the actual investment is computed as a balancing figure.
In the first month, for example, the actual investment was
LS 155.8 m, consisted of 90% of the investment and savings
deposits, and 100% of the shareholders, -which was equal to
LS 81.2 m. A part of the current deposits, i.e. LS 74.6 m,
was taken to complete the actual investment.
Table B06
Total Investment in 1406
LS (m)
Months : Actual	 :Investment :Shareholders (include
: investment: deposits :current & savings
1	
:	 deposits1
1st	 155.8	 52.2	 103.6
2nd	 164.1	 46.0	 118.1
3rd	 159.4	 45.2	 114.2
4th	 156.9	 43.7	 113.2
12th
Total
156.3
	
43.8
1,951.1	 527.6
112.5
1,423.5
The profit generated and to be distributed among holders
of the investment deposits and shareholders was LS 20.9 m.
This consisted of two types of investment: profit generated
from foreign currency investment (converted to local
currency) was LS 1.5 m; and profit generated from local
currency investment was LS 19.4 m.
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Investment deposits percentage in profit:
527.6
x 100 =	 27%
1951.1
Shareholders' percentage in profit:
1423.5
x 100 =	 73%
1951.1
Investment deposits share in profit:
27% x 20.9 = LS 5.6 m.
Shareholders' share in profit:
73% x 20.9 = LS 15.3 m.
Investors' share in profit after deducting the hank's share:
5.6 x 70% = LS 3.9 m.
Table CO6
Investment Deposits in Foreign
and Local Currency in Branches
LS (m)
Branches	 Investment
	
Investment
deposits in foreign	 deposits in local
currency (Converted LS) 	 currency
A	 18.6	 -
B	 194.3	 196.0
C	 5.6
	
17.0
Total	 317.9	 262.9
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a) Investment deposits (local currency) =
262.9
=	 21.9 m.
12
b) Investment deposits (foreign currency) =
317.9
-	 26.5 m.
12
a) + b)	 = 21.9 + 26.5 = 48.4 m.
(Again there is no need to divide by 12, as the results
would be the same in the two cases).
Share of investment deposits (local & foreign currency) in
the profit before deducting the bank's share as Mudarib.
i) local currency = 21.9
x 5.6 = LS 2.5 m.
48.4
ii) foreign currency = 26.5
x 5.6 = LS 3.1 m.
48.4
Share of investment deposits after deducting the bank's
share:
a) local currency	 = 2.5 x 70% = LS 1.7 m.
b) foreign currency = 3.1 x 70% = LS 2.2 m.
a + b	 = LS 3.9 m.
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Table DO6
Distribution of Investment Deposits
Profit Among Branches
Branches Foreign
currency deposits
(converted to LS)
1
Share
in
profit
2
Deposits
in LS
3
LS	 (m)
Share
in
profit
4
A	 18.6	 0.1	 -	 -
B	 194.3	 1.3	 196.0	 1.3
C	 5.6	 0.04	 17.0	 0.1
D	 3.0	 0.02	 5.3	 0.04
Total	 317.9	 2.1	 262.9	 1.8
Totals in columns 2 and 4 are calculated as follows:
Column 2 = total foreign currency deposits divided by total
foreign & local currency deposits multiplied by the share
of foreign & local currency deposits in profit; i.e.
317.9
	
 x 3.9 = LS 2.1 m.
580.8
Column 4 = total local currency deposits divided by total
foreign & local currency deposits multiplied by the share of
foreign & local currency deposits in profit; i.e.
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262.9
x 3.9 = LS 1.8 m.
580.8
Each branch's share in profit can be computed as follows:
Branch's deposits divided by the total deposits in all
branches multiplied by the share in profit. Branch A's share
in profit, for example, is
18.6
x 2.1	 = LS 0.1 m.
317.9
Other branches' share in profit can be computed by
using the same method.
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Distribution of Profit in FIBS
in 1407 (1987)
Table A07
Deposits in FIBS 1407
LS (m)
Types of	 Actual : % : Funds for :	 Actual
deposits	 deposits:	 : investment: investment
1st month
Investment deposits 47.3
	
90%	 42.6	 42.6
Shareholders	 -	 100%	 -	 -
Savings deposits	 30.0	 90%	 27.0	 27.0
Current deposits
	 246.5	 70%	 172.6	 83.4
Total	 153.0
2nd month
Investment deposits 47.3
	
90%
	
42.6	 42.6
Shareholders	 -	 100%	 -	 -
Savings deposits	 30.8	 90%	 27.7
	
27.7
Current deposits	 249.9	 70%	 174.9
	
83.9
Total	 154.2
12th month
Investment deposits 40.7	 90%	 36.6	 36.6
Shareholders	 -	 100%	 -	 -
Savings deposits	 42.1	 90%	 37.9	 37.9
Current deposits	 320.2	 70%	 224.1	 99.8
Total
	 174.3
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Table B07
Total Investment in 1407
Months
	 :
:
Actual	 :	 Investment	 :
investment:	 deposits	 :
LS	 (m)
Shareholders
(savings & current)
1st month 153.0 42.6 110.4
2nd month 154.2 42.6 111.6
3rd month 160.0 39.0 121.5
4th month 177.2 40.6 136.6
12th month 174.3 36.6 137.7
Total 2,054.7 472.1 1,582.6
'
The profit realised and to be distributed was LS 23.1
m, which consisted of two parts:
returns on investment operations = LS 22.2 m
returns on foreign currency operations = LS 0.9 m.
Investment deposits share in profit =
472.1
x 23.1 = LS 5.3 m.
2,054.7
Shareholders share in profit =
1,582.6
x 23.1 = LS 17.8 m.
2054.7
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Investors share after deducting the bank's share =
5.3 x 70% = LS 3.7 million.
Table CO7
Investment Deposits in Foreign
& Local Currency in Branches
LS (m)
Branch
	
Investment
	
Investment
deposits in foreign 	 deposits in LS
currency (converted to LS)
A
	 43.6	 _
B
	 160.4
	
182.3
C
	 4.4
	
15.2
D
	 2.7
	
4.6
'
Total
	
283.8	 239.4
Calculation of share in profit
a) local currency deposits	 = 239.4
12
b) foreign currency deposits = 283.8
12
a) + b)	 = 523.2
= 19.9 m
= 23.7 m
= 43.6 in
12
Share in profit after deducting the bank's share:
a) share of the deposits in local currency =
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A
B
C
D
Total
19.9
---- x 3.7 = LS 1.7 m
43.6
b) share of the deposits in foreign currency=
23.7
x 3.7 = LS 2.0 m
43.6
Table DO7
Distribution of Investment Deposits
Profit Among Branches
LS (m)
Branch Foreign' Share1
currency	 : in
deposits (in LS): profit
Local
	 1 Share
currency	 1	 in
deposits	 : profit
43.6 0.3 _ _
160.4 1.1 182.3 1.3
4.4 0.03 15.2 0.1
2.7 0.02 4.6 0.03
283.8 2.0 239.4 1.7
Total foreign & local currency deposits =
283.8 + 239.4 = 523.2 m
Share of the foreign currency deposits in profit=
283.8
x 3.7 = LS 2.0 m
523.2
Share of the local currency deposits in profit =
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239.4
x 3.7 = LS 1.7 m
523.2
Each branch's share in profit:
Branch A's share in profit (local currency), for example, is
43.6
x 2.0 = LS 0.3 m
283.8
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1st month
Investment deposits 	 40.2	 80%
Shareholders	 -	 100%
Savings deposits	 42.7	 90%
Current deposits	 341.2	 70%
Total	 185.5
2nd month
44.9
-
39.8
258.3
Investment deposits	 56.1	 80%
Shareholders	 -	 100%
Savings deposits	 44.2	 90%
Current deposits	 369.0	 70%
44.9
39.8
- 104.4
	
32.2	 32.2
_
	
-
	
38.4
	
38.4
	
238.8
	
114.9
Distribution of Profit in FIBS in 1408h
Table A08
Deposits in FIBS in 1408h
LS (m)
Deposits	 Actual	 Funds for	 Actual
deposits	 %	 investment investment
Total	 189.1
12th month
Investment deposits 	 49.0	 80%	 39.2	 39.2
Shareholders	 -	 100%	 -	 -
Savings deposits	 52.3	 90%	 47.1
	
47.1
Current deposits	 409.1	 70%	 286.4
	
125.7
Total	 212.0
Table A08 shows that the depositors' percentage in
investment changed from 90% in the previous years to 80% in
the current year (1408h). The reason for this is that the
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Central Bank increased the reserve requirement to 20% of the
total deposits of the bank. However, it is felt that savings
deposits should have been treated in the same way. The share
of current deposits in the actual investment was also
calculated as a balancing figure.
Table B08
Total Actual Investment in 1408
LS (m)
Month	 Actual	 Investment	 Shareholders
investment	 deposits	 (savings & current
deposit )
1st month
	
185.5
	
32.2
	
153.3
2nd month	 189.1
	
44.9
	
144.1
3rd month	 207.6
	
44.5
	
163.2
4th month
	
222.0
	
42.8
	
179.2
12th month	 212.0
	
39.2	 172.7
Total	 2,480.1	 488.3	 1,991.8
Profit to be distributed	 =	 LS 14.6 m
Investment operations return 	 =	 LS 13.7 m
Foreign currency operations return =	 LS 0.9 m
Investment deposits share in profit =
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488.3
x 14.6 = LS 2.9 m
2,480.1
Shareholders share in profit =
1,991.8
x 14.6 = LS 11.7 m
2,480.1
Investors share after deducting the bank's share =
2.9 x 70%	 = LS 2.0 m
Table CO8
Investment Deposits in Foreign
and Local Currency in Branches
LS (m)
Branch Investment
deposits in foreign
currency (converted to LS)
Investment
deposits in local
currency
Branch A 113.7 _
Branch B 237.8 173.5
Branch C 71.9 1.1
Total 455.6 226.3
Share in profit
a) local currency deposits 	 = 226.3
= 18.9 m
12
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455.6
b) foreign currency deposits 	
	
 - 38.0 m
12
•	 681.9
a) + b)	
	 - 56.8 m
12
Share in the profit after deducting the bank's share:
a) share of the deposits in local currency =
18.9
- x 2 = LS 0.7 m
56.8
b) share of the deposits in foreign currency=
38.0
- x 2 = LS 1.3 m
56.8
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Table DO8
Distribution of Investors' Profit
Among Branches
LS (m)
Branch	 Foreign	 Share	 Deposits
	
Share
currency deposits	 in	 in LS	 in
(converted to LS)
	
profit	 profit
A 113.7 0.3 - -
B 237.8 0.7 173.5 0.5
C 71.9 0.2 1.1 0.003
Total
	
455.6
	
1.3
	
226.3	 0.7
Each branch's share in profit can be computed as follows:
Branch A's share in profit (foreign currency) =
113.7
x 1.3 =' LS 0.3 m
455.6
Branch B's share in profit (foreign currenc y ) =
237.8
	  x 1.3 = LS 0.7 m
455.6
Branch B's share in profit (local currency) =
173.5
x 0.7 = LS 0.5 m
226.3
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Branch C's share in profit (foreign currency) =
71.9
x 1.3 = LS 0.2 m
455.6
In 1408 profit was increased by transferring profit
from the accumulated profit from previous years. However,
this profit is not considered in the above discussion. The
aim of transferring profit was to increase shareholders'
dividend in this year. The accumulated retained profit is
deducted from shareholders' profit alone (the bank retains
profit after distributing depositors share. Thus, they are
not eligible to retained profit).
Distribution of Profit in the Islamic
Bank for Western Sudan (IBWS)
IBWS began operations in 1984 (an introductory description
of it is given later). All funds in this bank are held in
one pool. Thus, IBWS is a good example to illustrate the
topic under discussion, i.e. profit distribution.
A sample of three years' distribution of profit has
been chosen in order to explore and explain the methods used
by the bank to determine and distribute profit among various
eligible parties. Tables given are self explanatory;
nonetheless, explanations for these tables are given for the
first year. Any differences or inconsistencies between the
three years are pointed out, though tables for the last two
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years are not explained in detail, to avoid repetition.
Table A86 shows capital, savings, current and
investment deposits in IBWS in 1986.
Table A86
Savings Deposits in 1986
LS '000'
Month
	
Savings	 Change in	 Period	 Weighted
deposits	 deposits (in months)	 share
1	 2	 3	 4 = 2 x 3
January	 437.1	 -	 12	 5,245.2
February	 434.6	 (2.5)	 11	 (	 27.5)
March	 481.8	 47.2	 10	 472.0
April	 568.1	 86.3	 9	 776.7
May	 685.3	 117.2	 8	 937.6
December 1,293.7	 249.3	 1	 249.3
Total
	
9,158.6
Figures in column 2 (change in deposits) are the
differences between the deposits in two successive months;
multiplied by the period (column 3) in which the funds
actually participated in investment, in order to find their
weighted share (column 4).
Note: negative figures in column 4 were not deducted, but
they were added. Column 4 equals the figure in column 2
multiplied by the figure in column 3, except for January of
every year where it equals column 1 x 3.
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Table A86 shows how IBWS calculates the weighted share
of savings deposits which participate in profit. As with
FIBS, savings deposits' share in profit is pooled with the
shareholders' share. Savings deposits are not eligible for
profit, but the bank can use them in investment with a
guarantee of their availability upon request. The bank alone
is responsible for any losses incurred by these deposits.
Table B8
Current Deposits in 1986
LS (m)
Month	 Current
	
Change in	 Period
	
Weighted
deposits	 deposits	 (in months)
	 share
1	 2	 3	 4 = 2x3x90%
.
January	 18.1	 -	 12	 195.5
February	 16.4	 (1.7)	 11	 (16.8)
March
	 19.3	 2.9
	 10	 26.1
April
	 20.7	 1.4	 9	 11.3
December	 35.3	 0.7	 1	 0.6
Total	 335.6
Current deposits are calculated in the same way as
savings deposits (Table A86). Only 90% of the current
deposits are assumed by the bank to participate in profit,
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therefore column 4 is multiplied by 90%. The 10% was kept as
a reserve to meet withdrawals. Again the current deposits'
share in profit is pooled into the shareholders' share. The
same conditions which apply to savings deposits are also
applied to current deposits, i.e. the bank insures against
their losses and guarantees their availability upon request.
Table C86
Capital in 1986
LS (m)
Month
	 Capital	 Change in	 Period	 Weighted
capital (in months)	 share
1	 2	 3	 4 = 2x3
January	 8.50	 -	 12	 102.0
February	 8.66	 .16	 11	 1.76
March
	 8.69	 .03	 10	 0.30
April	 8.74	 .05	 9	 0.45
December	 9.52	 .04	 1	 0.04
Total	 109.32
The part of capital which participates in profit is
calculated in the same manner as the previous deposits. This
is shown in Table C86 above.
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Table D86
Investment Deposits
in 1986
LS million
Month
	
Investment Change in	 Period	 Weighted
deposits	 investment (in months) 	 share
1	 2	 3	 4 =2x3
January	 7.10	 -	 12	 85.2
February	 7.30	 0.20	 11	 0.22
March	 7.31	 0.01	 10	 0.10
April
	 7.56	 0.25	 9	 2.25
December	 8.66	 0.28	 1	 0.28
Total	 93.55
Table D86 shows the investment deposits which
participates in profit, calculated using the same methods
used to determine participation of other deposits.
Profit which was available for distribution in 1986 was
LS 3.5 m.
Investment deposits (100%) 	 = 93.6 m
Capital	 (100%)	 = 109.3 m
Savings deposits	 (100%)	 =	 9.2 m
Current deposits 	 ( 90%)	 = 335.6 m
Total	 547.7 m
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Investment deposits share in profit before deducting the
bank's share:
93.6
	  x 3.5	 = LS 0.6 m
547.7
Investors share in profit after deducting the bank's share
as Mudarib:
0.6 x 75% = LS 0.45 m
Distribution of Profit in IBWS in 1987
I_
The following Tables show the distribution of profit in IBWS
in 1987. The method for calculating the weighted share of
different deposits, used in the previous year, was used in
1987. As in the previous year, 90% of current deposits
participated in profit. Both savings and current deposits'
share in profit were pooled into the bank's share.
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Table A87
Savings Deposits
LS (m)
Month
	
Savings	 Change in	 Period	 Weighted
deposits deposits	 (in months)	 share
1	 2	 3	 4 = 2x3
January	 1.26	 -	 12	 15.12
February	 1.09	 (0.17)	 11	 (1.87)
March	 1.38	 0.29	 10	 2.90
April	 1.39	 0.01	 9	 0.09
December	 2.30	 0:53	 1	 0.53
Total	 51.21
Table B87
Capital
LS (m)
Month
	 Capital Change in	 Period	 Weighted
capital	 (in months)	 share
1	 2	 3	 4 = 2x3
January	 9.52	 -	 12	 114.24
February	 9.53	 0.01	 11	 0.11
March	 9.54	 0.01	 10	 0.10
April	 9.55	 0.01	 9	 0.09
December	 12.59	 0.04	 1	 0.04
Total	 120.72
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Table C87
Current Deposits
LS (in)
Month
	
Current
	
Change in
	
Period	 Weighted
deposits deposits	 (in months)	 share
1
	
2	 3	 4 = 2x3
January	 36.58	 -	 12
	
438.96
February	 33.68
	 (2.9)	 11	 (31.90)
March
	
37.47
	
3.79
	
10
	
37.90
April
	
38.02
	
0.55
	
9
	
4.95
December	 44.56	 2.96	 1	 2.96
Total	 561.22
90%	 .505.10
t
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Table D87
Investment Deposits
LS (m)
Month	 Investment	 Change in	 Period	 Weighted
deposits	 deposits	 (in months)	 share
1	 2	 3	 4 = 2x3
January
	
8.84
	
-	 12	 106.08
February	 9.31	 0.47	 11	 5.17
March	 9.34	 0.03	 10	 0.30
April
	
9.53	 0.19	 9	 1.71
December	 7.70	 (2.16)	 1	 (2.16)
Total	 120.88
Profit to be distributed in 1987 was LS 2.8 m.
Capital
	 (100%)	 = 120.72 m
Investment deposits (100%)	 = 120.88 m
Savings deposits	 (100%)	 =	 51.21 m
Current deposits	 ( 90%)	 = 505.10 m
Total
	
797.91 m
Share of investment deposits in profit before deduction of
the bank's share:
120.88
	  x 2.8 = LS 0.42 m
797.91
Share of investors after deduction of the bank's share:
0.42 x 75%	 = LS 0.32 m
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Distribution of Profit in IBWS in 1988
The following Tables show the distribution of profit in IBWS
in 1988. The method used to determine the weighted share of
the different deposits is the same as previously, with one
difference, i.e. positive figures in column 4 are added
while negative ones are deducted. In the previous years all
figures were added. Moreover, the ratios of capital, current
and savings deposits participating in profit changed, as
will be shown at the appropriate point. However, as in the
previous years, savings and current deposits' shares in
profit were transferred to the shareholders.
Table A88
Investment Deposits
LS (m)
Month
	
Investment	 Change in
	
Period	 Weighted
deposits	 deposits	 (in months)	 share
1
	
2	 3	 4 = 2x3
January	 7.37	 -	 • 12	 88.44
February	 7.24	 (0.13)	 11	 (1.43)
March	 7.17	 (0.07)	 10	 (0.70)
December	 5.03	 0.07	 1	 0.07
Total	 78.60
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Table B88
Savings Deposits
LS (m)
Month
	
Savings
	
Change in	 Period
	 Weighted
deposits	 deposits	 (in months)
	 share
1	 2	 3	 4= 2x3
January	 2.51	 -	 12
	
30.12
February	 2.73
	
0.22
	
11
	
2.42
March	 3.57
	
0.84
	
10
	
8.40
December	 6.36	 0.46	 1	 0.46
Total	 49.55
Table C88
Capital
LS (m)
Month	 Capital : Change in :	 Period	 1 Weighted
1 capital : (in months): share
' 4 = 2x3I
January
	
12.59	 _	 12
	
151.08
February	 12.59	 _	 11	 -
March	 12.59	 _	 10	 _
April	 12.60	 .01
	
9
	
0.09
December	 11.11	 (1.45)
	
1	 (1.45)
Total
	 143.80
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Table D88
Current Deposits
LS (m)
Month	 Current : Change in 	 Period	 : Weighted
deposits: deposits : (in months):
	
share
1 2 3	 ; 4 = 2x3
January	 46.19
	 -	 12	 554.28
February	 40.78
	
(5.41)	 11	 (59.51)
March	 46.28	 5.50	 10	 55.00
December	 74.55	 6.26	 1	 6.26
Total	 679.60
Note: negative figures in column 4 of each Table have not
been deducted from the total of deposits (capital,
investment, saving and current deposits); instead these
figures were added. For example, in Table C87 column 4, in
February the current deposits was (-31.90) m, but this
figure was added to the total. However, the addition of
negative figures occurred in 1986 and 1987, but in 1988
negative figures were subtracted and positive figures added.
Profit for distribution among investors and
shareholders in 1988 was LS 4.1 m.
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Capital	 (90%) = 143.8 x 90% = 129.42 m
Investment deposits 	 (100%) = 78.60 m
Savings deposits (70%)	 49.55 x 82% x 70% = 28.44 m
Current deposits (90%)
	 679.6 x 82% x 90% = 501.54 m
Total = 738.00 m
18% of the savings and current deposits were held at
the central bank as reserves. 18% of the investment deposits
were also held but they were not considered. The purpose of
this might be to increase the share in profit of investment
deposits.
Investment deposits' share in profit:
78.6
	  x 4.1	 =	 LS 0.44 m
738.0
Investors' share in profit after deducting the bank's share:
0.44 x 85%	 =	 LS 0.37 m
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Table E88
Distribution of Profit Among Investment Depositors
Deposits
balances
1
Period
(in months)
2 3 =1x2
:	 Average
1
1
3
4 = --
12
LS	 '000'
Share in
profit
5
A)	 7.0 2	 14 1.17	 0.07
B)	 125.0 12	 1,500 125.00	 7.37
e)	 11.0 3	 1	 33 2.75	 0.16
Total 6,275.00
Table E88 shows how the bank calculates each
depositor's share in profit. This shows that the bank takes
each deposit and multiplies it by the number of months it
stays in the bank, then divides the result by 12 to give the
average for a year, as profit is distributed on an annual
basis. Thus profit is computed on a proportionate basis as
follows:
Each investment deposit's share in profit (column 5) is
calculated as follows:
Average of each deposit (column 4) divided by the total of
deposits (6,275) x investors share in profit, for example,
deposit (B) share in profit=
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x 370,000 = LS 7,371
6,275
Note: the total deposits figure, 6.275 m, concerns only one
branch. The weighted share of total investment deposits as
shown in Table A88 was 78.6 m.
From the previous demonstration of IBWS distribution of
profit among shareholders and investors, which is based on
the Mudarabah contract, the following points are noticed:
1- The bank's percentage in profit as Mudarib is not fixed;
it was 25% in 1986 and 1987, but only 15% in 1988. This
indicates that either this percentage was not pre-
determined, or the bank had given up a part of its share to
increase the depositors' share in profit. However, the
bank's annual report for 1988, shows that 57% of the bank's
revenue was generated from banking services, while
investment operations generated only 40% of the total
revenue. The remainder was generated from shares and foreign
currency operations. This suggests that the bank had given
up a part of its share to depositors who were not eligible
to participate in profit from banking services. It is likely
that the bank decreased the participation of other kinds of
deposits (savings and current) in order to increase the
depositors' share in profit.
2- The percentage of the capital and saving deposits which
share in the profit varies from one year to another. While
all capital and saving deposits participated in profit in
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1986 and 1987, in 1988 this changed to 90% for capital and
70% for saving deposits.
Most likely the bank wished to increase the
depositors' share in profit. Therefore, it decreased the
participation of deposits from which it benefited, i.e.
capital and savings deposits. As mentioned before, the
method for distribution of profit in 1988 was changed, which
in particular, had an adverse effect on depositors' share in
profit. Moreover, investment revenue was relatively low,
while that from banking services was high. As we have seen,
depositors share in investment revenue only, while
shareholders share both revenues, along with savings and
current deposits' share in profit.
3- In 1988, 18% of the current and saving deposits were
deducted as . reserves at the Central Bank. The same
percentage was applicable to investment deposits but it was
ignored, as mentioned, to increase the depositors' share in
profit. Moreover, 70% of saving deposits and 90% of current
deposits were considered available for investment. The
reserve at the Central Bank (18%) was deducted from the
available funds. The reserve percentage in 1986 and 1987 was
20% for all kinds of deposits, but these percentages were
not deducted from the deposits as far as the distribution of
profit was concerned.
4- The investment deposits in 1988 (table A88, column 4)
were relatively low, for two reasons: the first was that
investment deposits were low; the second was that negative
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balances were deducted from the total. Other deposits should
have been affected similarly, but as the ceiling policy
discourages Islamic banks from accepting new investment
deposits and investors (depositors) usually withdraw,
therefore these deposits were particularly adversely
affected.
5- Current deposits were relatively high, therefore they
absorbed a large percentage of the profit. The beneficiaries
were the shareholders, as the current deposits share in the
profit goes to them.
6- Profits were not distributed among the actual investment
funds which generated them. Instead, the inclusion of a
variety of different deposits adversely affected investors
share in profit.
7- There is no consistency in calculating the deposits. The
negative figures in 1986 and 1987 were added to the total.
However, in 1988 negative figures were subtracted and
positive figures added.
Comparison Between Methods of Distribution Profit in FIBS
and IBWS
In FIBS, as in IBWS, the profit share of current and savings
deposits goes to shareholders. In FIBS, investment deposits
were given priority for profit distribution purposes. The
proportion of them which participates in profit was computed
first; current deposits were computed as a balancing figure,
with the exception of 1984, as mentioned earlier. Moreover,
in FIBS an actual investment fund is always available and
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the participation of different deposits in investment is
calculated accordingly. Determining the actual investment
helps to maintain fairness, for deposits compete to
determine their share within that framework.
In contrast, no actual investment fund is available in
IBWS, thus the proportions of deposits are determined
merely by availability. If deposits other than investment
deposits are high, then consequently, the share in profit of
investment deposits will be low. This might explain the
inconsistency of the methods used by IBWS. For example, 100%
of capital and savings deposits, and 90% of current deposits
participated in sharing profit in 1986 and 1987; only 90% of
capital and current deposits, and 70% of savings deposits
participated in sharing profit in 1988 (18% of current and
savings deposits were deducted in 1988 as reserves). As
distribution of profit depends on the availability of
deposits, the bank changes the ratios to suit its purposes.
Thus, it is believed that the method used by FIBS is
more fair to both parties, i.e. the bank and its depositors
(investors), as their share in profit is always calculated
on the basis of the actual invested fund, whereas in the
case of IBWS, all deposits are apportioned for profit
according to their availability. Therefore, it is
recommended that IBWS should distribute profit according to
the actual investment instead of changing the ratios of
deposits other than investment deposits, to determine the
depositors' share in profit.
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Distribution of Profit in Tadamon
Islamic Bank (TIB) in 1987-89
TIB keeps all deposits in one pool. Thus it faces the same
difficulties as FIBS and IBWS in distributing profit. The
methods used by the bank in 1987-89 are illustrated by
numerical examples (a brief introduction to the bank is
given later).
Distribution of profit in 1987:
Table At 87 shows the different types of deposits in TIB.
Table At 87
LS million
Month Current Savings	 : Investment;	 Investment
deposits deposits: deposits	 :	 deposits	 ($)
1
1
1	 (LS)	 :converted	 (LS)1
September 86:	 797.9 /17.3	 / 0.13	 11 1.36
October'	 813.51
November'	 891.71
/18.3	 1
19.9	 /i
/0.23	 /
0.29	 /1
1.35
0.91
/August	 87	 '	 953.3	 :	 20.1	 /1 0.30	 '1 0.80
Total
	
6,997.0	 :	 233.0	 // 2.70	 /, 7.50
The financial year ends in August.
Capital =	 2,438 m
Investment deposits	 (LS) =	 582m
Investment deposits($) converted(LS) =	 4,023 m
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Current deposits	 = 40,401 m
Savings deposits
	 = 2,113 m
Capital is calculated as follows:
(Capital and reserve) - (Assets and investment):
(8,360 m + 340 m) - ( 2,892 m + 3,370 m) = 2,438 m
Distribution of profit:
In TIE many options for profit distribution are available
for management to choose among them.
The first option:
a) 60% of the current and savings deposits:
42,514 x 60%	 = LS 25,508 m
b) 82% of the investment deposits (local and foreign
currency converted to LS):
4,605 x 82%	 = LS 3,776 m
The total of (capital + 60% of current deposits and savings
deposits + 82% of investment deposits) =
2,438 + 25,508 + 3,776	 = 31,722 m
Investment deposits share in profit =
3,776
	
 x 9.1 = LS 1.1 m
31,722
Investors share in profit after deducting the bank's share=
1.1 x 70%	 = LS 0.8m
Investors (foreign currency) share in profit =
4,023
	
 x 0.8 = LS 0.70 m
4,605
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Investors (local currency) share in profit =
582
	  x 0.8	 = LS 0.10 m
4,605
The second option:
The second option is the same as the first, but it
suggests that the bank gives up its share as Mudarib to the
investors, so that investors share in profit is:
3,776
x 9.1 = LS 1.1 m
31,722
Share of investors (foreign currency) in profit:
4,023
x 1.1 = LS 0.96 m
4,605
Share of investors (local currency) in profit:
582
x 1.1 = LS 0.14 m
4,605
There are other options; however, these were intended
to give the administration a range of alternatives from
which to choose the most suitable.
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Table Bt87
Branches Share in Profit
LS	 (m)
Branch Investment Share 1 Investment Share
deposits	 (LS) in 1 deposits	 ($) in
profit: converted to
	 (LS) profit
A	 578.7	 0.139 4,018.0	 0.959
3.3	 0.001 5.0	 0.001
Total	 582.0
	 0.140 4,023.0	 0.960
Investors share in profit was LS 1.1 million as suggested by
the second option.
Branch A's share in profit (local currency):
578.7
x 0.14 = LS 0.139 m
582.0
Branch A's share in profit (foreign currency):
4,018
x 0.96 = LS 0.959 m
4,023
Two branches only in TIB in 1987 accepted investment
deposits.
Distribution of Profit in TIB in 1988:
Table At 88 shows the volume of each kind of deposit in TIB
on a monthly basis.
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Table At88
LS	 (m)
Month	 :Current Savings Investment Investment
:deposits
1
I
deposits deposits
(LS)
deposits	 ($)
converted	 (LS)
September87:	 954.7 20.3 0.27 1.4
October 1'	 992.2 20.5 0.28 1.4
November :1,002.1 23.3 0.27 1.3
August 88 11,215.0 45.1 0.28 0.8
Total 12,509.2 356.7 3.3 13.1
Calculation of capital:
Capital
+ reserve
Total
Minus
assets	 = 5,873.3
investment = 4,132.7
Profit distribution:
Capital
= 8,754.2 m
=	 480.0 m
= 9,234.2 m
= 10,006.0 m
(	 771.8) m
= - 771.8 m
Current & savings deposits = 77,744.4 m
Investment deposits
	 = 7,306.7 m
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The first option
In the first option for the distribution of profit, 60% of
the current & savings deposits and 80%. of the investment
deposits were taken; hence the suggested amount of profit
for distribution was as follows:
60% of the current & savings deposits:
77,744.4 x 60%	 = 46,646.6 m
80% of the investment deposits:
7,306.7 x 80%	 =	 5,845.4 m
Capital	 =	 ( 771.8)m
Total	 51,720.2 m
The profit realised and to be distributed in 1988 was LS
16.7 million.
Investment deposits share in profit:
5,845.4
x 16.7	 = LS 1.9 m
51,720.2
Investors share in profit after deducting the bank's share:
1.9 x 70%	 = LS 1.3 m
Investment deposits ($)
	
= 6,650.2 m
Investment deposits (LS)
	 =	 656.5 m
Therefore, investors' share in the profit ($):
6,650.2
	
 x 1.3	 = LS 1.18 m
7,306.7
Investors' share in profit (LS):
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656.5
x1.3	 = LS 0.12m
7,306.7
The second option
In the second option, profit was distributed on the basis of
55% of the current & savings deposits and 80% of the
investment deposits.
55% of current & savings deposits:
77,744.4 x 55%	 = 42,759.4 m
80% of investment deposits:
7,306.7 x 80%	 = 5,845.0 in
Capital
	 = ( 771.8) m
Total
	
= 47,833.0 m
Investment deposits share in profit:
5,845.4
x 16.7	 = LS 2.0 m
47,833.0
Investors share in profit after deducting the bank's share:
2.0 x 70%	 = LS 1.4m
Investors (foreign currency) share in profit:
6,650.2
	  x 1.4	 = LS 1.27 m
7,306.7
Investors (local currency) share in profit:
656.5
x 1.4	 = LS 0.13 m
7,306.7
In the third and forth options 50% and 40% of the
current and savings deposits respectively were taken as a
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basis for the distribution of profit. In both options the
investment deposits included was 80% of the total.
Table Bt88
Branches Share in the Profit (1988)
LS	 (m)
Branch Investment Share Investment Share
deposits in deposits	 ($) in
(LS) profit converted	 (LS) profit
A	 653.2	 0.119	 6,637.0	 1.178
3.3	 0.001	 13.2	 0.002
Total	 656.5	 0.120	 6,650.2	 1.180
If the second option was chosen, then branch A's share in
profit (local currency):
653.2
x 0.12	 = LS 0.119 m
656.5
Branch A's share in profit (foreign currency):
6,637
x 1.18	 = LS 1.178 m
6,650.2
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Distribution of Profit in TIB in 1989
Table At89
LS	 (m)
Month Current	 :	 Savings ; Investment 1	 Investment
deposits:deposits : deposits :	 deposits	 ($)
1	 1 (LS) :converted(LS)
September88	 1,250.0
	
47.4 0.27 1,888.8
October	 1,245.7	 54.1 0.28 1,343.4
November	 1,231.5	 52.5 0.27 1,300.0
August	 89	 1,860.5	 73.8 0.28 1,558.5
Total	 15,107.3	 714.5 3.29 16,614.7
Table At89 shows the current, savings and investment
deposits in TIB in September 1988 - August 1989.
Calculation of capital:
Capital	 = 8,082.3 m
plus: reserve = 1,247.8 m
others = 3,896.8 m
5,144.6 m
Total	 = 13,226.9 m
minus: investment = 4,273.0 m
assets	 = 14,312.9 m
= 18,585.9 m
Capital	 (5,359.0) m
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Current and savings deposits 	 = 190,020.0 m
Investment deposits (S) = 17,125 m
Investment deposits (LS) = 3,299 m
	
 = 20,424.0 m
. Capital	 - 5,359.2 m
The first option:
Considers that current & savings deposits participate in
actual investment by 40% and investment deposits by 82%.
Current and savings deposits = 190,020 x 40% = 76,008 m
Capital
Investment deposits =	 20,424 x 82%
= - 5,359 m
70,649 m
= 16,747 m
(foreign currency) = 17,125 x 82% =14,042.5
(local currency)	 =	 3,299 x 82% = 2,705.2
Total	 = 87,396 m
The profit to be distributed was LS 36.3 million.
Investment deposits share in the profit as percentage =
16,747.7
	
 x 100%	 = 23.7%
70,649.0
Investors percentage in profit after deducting the bank's
share =
23.7 x 70%	 = 16.6%
Investors share in the profit
	
= 16.6 x 36.3 = LS 6 m
Investors share in the profit (foreign currency) =
14,042.5
x6
	 = LS 5 m
16,747.7
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Investors share in the profit (local currency) =
2,705.2
x6	 = LS 1 m
16,747.7
It is observed that the investment deposits were
considered as a part of the current and savings deposits and
the capital. The total which should have been considered as
the denominator 'was 87,396.7 m. However, to increase the
investors share in the profit, 70,649 m was taken as the
denominator. The same method was used to calculate the
investors share in the profit in the other options, as will
be seen in the following paragraphs.
As observed, however, the method used in 1989 to
distribute profit in TIB differs from the method used in the
previous years, where the denominator was equal to the
total of the capital, current, savings, and investment
deposits.
The second option:
In the second option, 45% of current and savings
deposits and 82% of investment deposits were taken.
45% of the current and saving deposits:
190,020 x 45%
	
= 85,509.0 m
Capital	 = - 5,359.0 m
80,150,0 m
Investment deposits (82%)	 = 16,747.7 m
Investment deposits share in the profit as percentage:
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x 5.3 LS 4.4 m
16,747.7
x 100	 = 20.9%
80,150.0
Minus 30% (the bank's share)	 6.3%
. Investors share after deducting the bank's share = 14.6%
Investors' share in the profit = 36.3 x 14.6% = LS 5.3 m
Investors' share in the profit (foreign currency):
14,042.5
16,747.7
Investors , share in the profit (local currency):
2,705.2
16,747.7
x 5.3 LS 0.9 m
The third option:
In the third option, profit was distributed taking into
consideration" 50% of the current and savings deposits and
82% of the investment deposits.
Current and savings deposits:
190,020 x 50%
	
= 95,010.0 m
Capital	 = - 5,359.0 m
89,651.0 m
Investment deposits (82%)
	 = 16,747.7 m
Investment deposits share in profit as percentage:
16,747.7
	  x 100	 = 18.7%
89,651.0
The bank's share as Mudarib 30% x 18.7 =
	 5.6%
13.1%
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Investors share in profit = 36.3 x 13.1% = LS 4.8 m
Investors share in profit (foreign currency deposits):
14.042.5
x4.8	 = LS 4.0 m
•	 16,747.7
Investors share in profit (local currency deposits):
2,705.2
x4.8	 = LS 0.8 m
16,747.7
Table Bt 89
Distribution of Profit Among Branches
LS (m)
Branch Deposits	 Share in	 Deposits	 Share in
in ($)	 profit	 in (LS)	 profit
A	 10,883.0	 3.1	 2,028.9
	
0.6
	
2,457.4	 0.7	 676.3
	
0.2
	
702.1	 0.2
Total	 14,042.5	 4.0	 2,705.2	 0.8
Choosing the third option, the profit (as shown in
Table Bt 89) can be distributed among branches as follows:
Branch A's share in profit (deposits in foreign currency):
10,883.0
x4.0	 = LS 3.1 m
14,042.5
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Branch A's share in profit (deposits in local currency):
2,028.9
	  x 0.8	 = LS 0.6 m
2,705.2
Branch B's share in profit (deposits in foreign currency):
2.457.4
	  x 4.0	 = LS 0.7 m
14,042.5
Other branches' share in the profit can be calculated
in the same way.
It can be concluded that TIB, like FIBS and IBWS, uses
the amount of investment technique to calculate each party's
share in profit. In TIB, profit is calculated using
different methods and gives management various options from
which to choose. The main purpose of this policy is to give
the management a chance to make a compromise upon profit
realisation (e.g. to have a chance to increase the
depositors' share in the profit).
However, the bank policy on profit calculation is not
consistent, as in 1989 the investors' proportion was
increased by excluding their amount invested from the total,
which included only current and savings deposits and
capital, which was deducted as it was a negative figure.
Comparison
In all three banks, as observed, the profit share of current
and savings deposits goes to the shareholders. Although IBWS
and TIB calculate the weighted share of each deposit
differently, the methods used lead to the same result. Both
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banks distribute profit among the available deposits. If the
share of deposits (i.e. capital, current and savings)
transferred to the banks are large, then the ratios which
• participate in profit are decreased, either directly as is
the case in IBWS, or by having many options calculated in
different ratios, as happens in TIB.
However, it is believed that such a method is not fair,
as the main reason for determining in advance each party's
share in profit in the Mudarabah contract is to avoid
dispute and to realise fairness for both parties. Changing
the ratios of the deposits which participate in profit,
though the Mudarabah ratio does not change, would'have the
same effect as changing the Mudarabah ratio and affect the
volume of the distributed profit. As profit is distributed
among different deposits proportionately, then the ratio of
any of these deposits changes, this will directly affect
others. Therefore, the banks, instead of changing the ratio
of Mudarabah, change the ratios of participation of various
deposits to obtain the desired result. Any increase in the
deposits from which the banks benefit will lead to a
decrease in depositors' share in profit and vice versa,
particularly, when the profit is distributed proportionately
according to the availability of deposits and no specific
investment fund is found.
IBWS and TIB methods are also similar in the sense that
profit is distributed among different deposits and no
invested fund is found according to which to attribute
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different deposits' participation. Therefore, as there are
two groups of deposits (i.e. investment deposits and others)
each party's share in profit is determined according to the
volume of deposits. As current deposits are always large
compared to investment deposits, this affects investment
deposits' share in profit, even if a small part of current
and savings deposits are attributed to the distribution of
profit. To maintain fairness, it is recommended that the
participation of deposits should be attributed to the actual
invested fund. Moreover, investment deposits which
participate in profit should be determined first and fixed
according to actual reserve requirements. Either or both of
current and savings deposits should be computed as a
balancing figure, because neither is deposited mainly for
investment purposes. In addition, their share in profit goes
to the shareholders. In contrast, investment deposits are
deposited mainly to gain profit. However, if for any reason
the bank wants to increase the depositors' share in profit,
this should be done separately and mentioned in the annual
report.
In FIBS methods of distributing profit, both conditions
are maintained, i.e. participation is attributed to actual
investment and deposits other than investment deposits are
computed as a balancing figure. Thus fairness is maintained.
Furthermore, the bank's performance in respect to the
investment sector clearly shown.
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Conclusion
This explanation of profit distribution in FIBS, IBWS and
TIB shows that the amount invested is used by these banks
for the purpose of calculating and distributing profit. Each
party's share in the profit is determined by the proportion
which participates in the actual investment, as is the case
in FIBS, or on the total investment (deposits), as is the
case in IBWS and TIB. However, there are some differences
among these banks regarding the computing of the investment,
e.g. they are calculated on a monthly basis in some cases
and annually in others. However, these differences do not
affect the final results, provided each bank is consistent
in its policies and does not change them from one year to
another.
In FIBS, profit is distributed on the basis of the
actual investment, whereas in IBWS and TIB the profit is
distributed on the basis of each party's (investors and
shareholders) total deposits. This may explain the relative
consistency in FIBS policies regarding profit distribution,
as, when profit is distributed on the basis of total
investment (deposits), the depositors' share tends to be
small; in such cases, the managements increase the
investors' share by changing their methods of calculation.
However, the methods used by IBWS and TIB are not fair
and do not accurately reflect the performance of these banks
in the field of investment. Thus, it is recommended that
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both banks should attribute the participation of different
deposits to the actual invested fund and compute current
deposits as a balancing figure.
In IBWS the depositors' (investors') share as Rub ul
Mal is not consistent: while it was 75% in 1986 and 1987, it
was 85% in 1988. In a Mudarabah contract, the ratios of both
parties should be determined in advance. However, any party
can give up a part of its profit to the other party.
The main purpose of discussing and explaining in detail
the different methods of calculation and distribution of
profit used by these banks is to show the consequences of
using the Mudarabah contract as an alternative to interest-
based finance. However, such data and methods can also be
used for further study and comparisons in order to reach a
steady formula.
Having given numerical examples for the distribution of
profits between the holders of investment deposits (Rub ul
Mal) and the shareholders or the bank (Mudarib), the
research proceeds to consider the profiles of some Islamic banks.
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VIII
PROFTLES OF FIVE TSTAMIC RANKS
Profiles of Five Islamic Banks 
This chapter aims to provide data showing the profiles of
five Islamic banks, beginning with a detailed examination of
the profile of FIBS.
As the provision of finance represents the chief role
of any bank, FIBS's role in attracting resources and the
development of these resources is shown.
As the application of resources shows the efficiency of
the management and the methods of investment, the
application of resources in FIBS is also discussed.
Islamic banking, despite many difficulties, has proved
its worth. It has succeeded in addressing economic problems
from an Islamic point of view in a practical manner. The
methods of finance used by these banks, in a system which
prohibits dnterest, gambling and hoarding, among other
things, have proved to be efficient in allocating deposits
in Muslim countries. 1
FIBS stands as a good example of the performance of
Islamic banking. The special Act under which the bank was
established, along with the support of the public who did
not wish to deal with conventional banks, provided an
environment conducive to the bank's success. The performance
of the bank proved the viability and practicability of
Islamic financial tools, as reflected by the rapid growth in
its resources and investment operations 2 . Many later Islamic
banks learned from and referred to the experience of FIBS.
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Attraction of Resources3
FIBS was able to attract risk capital from local and foreign
participants. It started with a capital of two and a half
million Sudanese pounds, divided into 40% for local
shareholders and 60% for Muslims from other countries. After
a few years the capital was increased to LS 58 million,
while the shareholders grew from 3 thousand to about 12
thousand. Institutions, like Dar al Mal a/ Islami and Faisal
Islamic Bank of Egypt (FIBE) have become shareholders, and
FIBS has become the largest Sudanese bank in terms of
capital. Its capital in 1986 was about 8% of the paid up
capital of the conventional banks. The following table shows
capital, deposits and credit facilities in FIBS in
comparison to conventional Sudanese banks.
Table 1 aims to show the role of the bank in attracting
resources. Its capital in 1986 was high in comparison with
that of other commercial banks. In 1987 and 1988 the capital
and reserves of the bank were LS 133 m, while the capital
and reserves of other banks were LS 714m and 1,129m
respectively. However, more recent figures are given in
Table 10. Figures in the two Tables may differ, since they
represent the banks' position at different periods.
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d- FIBS
Contribution
b/a % 6.4%;
Table 1
Capital, Deposits and Credit Facilities of FIBS and
Conventional Banks in the Sudan as at
December 1986
(LS million)
Paid up : Total
	
: Total : 3/1 %; 3/2 %
1 Capital 1 deposits: Credits;	 11
Description 1 2 3 4 5
a- Conventional
Banks' 714.61	 :	 3,924	 12,480.3 1 347% 1 63.2%
b- FIBS '	 58.41 320	 :	 157.7 1 270% : 49.3%
c- Total	 : 773.0	 :	 4,244	 :2,638.0 : 341% : 62.2%
Source: 1- Annual Reports of the Bank of Sudan (Central Bank).
2- Annual Reports of FIBS.
Besides being the largest Sudanese bank in terms of
capital, FIBS in its fourth year was the bank which made the
most profit. By its seventh anniversary it was in the fourth
place by size of branch network. FIBS has also been
successful in attracting deposits, in local and foreign
currencies (see tables 2/3).
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Table 2
The Role of FIBS in the Inflows of Foreign Capital
to Sudanese Economy during 1980-87
(US Dollars m)
Year	 1980:1981:1982:198311984:1985:1986:1987
Description
Capital
and
reserves	 6	 10	 16	 59	 59	 59	 59	 59
Deposits	 38	 59	 72	 81	 63	 37	 21	 18
Credit
facilities
from foreign
correspondents	 16	 16	 16	 26	 26	 16	 16	 16
Exports
earnings
	 36	 66	 50	 50	 32	 16	 4	 5
Total
	
96 151	 154 216 180 128 100	 98
Source: FIBS (Foreign Exchange Department).
Table 2 shows the bank's contribution in attracting
foreign currency which is needed by the Sudanese economy for
development. Capital jumped from 16m in 1982 to 59m in 1983,
the bank increasing its paid up capital, as a result of
which it was able to embark on medium and long-term
schemes. However, since then no increase in capital has
taken place as the country's economic situation and credit
policy do not encourage this.
Deposits in foreign currency reached a peak in 1983,
then started to decrease as a result of withdrawals.
Moreover, the bank stopped accepting new investment deposits
in 1983 due to the ceiling imposed on the bank. In addition,
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due to the deterioration in the economic situation, the
bank's activities and profitability were adversely affected
and its profit declined sharply in 1984. Subsequently,
deposits decreased, reaching their lowest in 1987.
Correspondents' credit facilities reached their highest
level in 1983 and 1984. These funds depend on the volume of
transactions needed by correspondents. The decrease in the
bank's exports earnings in 1985 and the following years
might explain the decrease in correspondents' credit
facilities for the same period.
Earnings from exports were high in 1981-1983.. In 1984
they started to decrease for a number of reasons:
(a) The main area for the bank's exports is agricultural
crops. However, as a result of drought in 1983 and the
following years, crop production was low. Furthermore,
exports of some crops (e.g. maize) was stopped.
(b) In 1984 and 1985 the Central Bank's export policy was
not encouraging, as exporters had to pay 25%-40% of the
value of the commodity which they exported from their own
resources, before being granted the necessary facilities.
Moreover, the money generated from exports had to be
deposited in the Central Bank. As a result, commercial banks
were not able to generate foreign currency from the
operation and lost interest. The exporters also were unable
to generate foreign currency.
(c) Regional taxes were imposed on crops, which adversely
affected profit and discouraged trade.
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Table 3
FIBS Share of Exports Earnings Compared with Total
Sudanese Exports Earnings 1981-86
(Million of US Dollars)
Year	 1981	 11982	 :1983	 :1984	 11985	 11986	 :Total
Description
1- Sudan Exports
Earnings
(including cotton) 322 435 1,053 1,061 2,112 2,083 7,066
2- FIBS Share in
Exports Earnings 66 50 50 32 16 4 271
Ratio	 2/1 %	 20%	 11%	 50x,	 3%	 0.8%	 0.2%	 4%
Source:1- Annual Reports of the Bank of Sudan.
2- FIBS (Foreign Exchange department).
Table 3 shows FIBS's share in export as compared to the
total exports. The reasons for the decrease in FIBS's
participation in export from 1984 onwards was discussed
earlier. However, the overall average participation of the
bank throughout the period was 4% of total exports. If we
take into consideration that total exports including cotton,
the chief export, which was monopolized by the government,
the bank's participation could be considered reasonable.
262
Table 4
The Financial and Investment Profile of
FIBS: 1982-87
LS m
Year	 1982	 1	 1983	 :	 1984	 :	 1985	 : 1986	 : 1987: 1988
Description
Capital:
Authorised	 100	 100	 100	 100 100 100 100
Paid-up	 19.2	 57.6	 58.4	 58.4 58.4 58.5 58.5
Current
Accounts	 128.2	 165.8	 178.4	 194.4 231.0 307.4 391.0
Savings
Accounts	 7.8	 11.9	 15.1	 23.0 29.5 42.1 52.0
Investment
Deposits	 66.4	 79.3	 67.5	 59.2 48.3 40.7 48.0
Other
deposits	 15	 16 10 9 12
Funds
Allocated to
Investment	 91.5	 120.3	 121.0	 100 127.4 164.1 146
Investment
in Subsidiaries
and Sister firms	 .9	 1.6	 11.7	 18.2 17.3 19.9 23.5
Fixed Assets
(After
depreciation)	 15.6	 68.4	 80.4	 100.8 112.7 123.9 119.3
Dividends	 25%	 18%	 12%	 16% 3% 1% 3%
Return on
Investment
Deposits
	 16%	 10%	 6.7%	 9.2% 8% 8.5% 7%
Net	 Income	 20.5	 10.3	 0.83	 15.4 5.5 1.8 2.4
Retained
Profits	 .09	 0.52	 .07 .001 .02 .01
Source:	 - FIBS Annual Reports
2- Karim & Ali, JBFA, Spring 1989; Table 1.
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As pointed out earlier, the fiscal year in FIBS was
amended to the Hijri Calendar in 1405H corresponding to
1985. However, for convenience and matching purposes, some
tables are demonstrated in the Gregorian Calendar.
Current and savings deposits are shown in local
currency, but they include foreign currency deposits after
conversion.
Dividends distributed in 1984 were for 9 months only.
Net income is shown after deducting Zakah but before tax
was imposed on the bank in 1984.
Table 4 shows the consolidated balance sheets for the
bank and its subsidiary companies, excluding the Islamic
Insurance Co.
The Table depicts the financial and investment profile
of the bank, emphasising the role of the bank in attracting
resources, as shown by the development in capital and
deposits. The application ratio (long + short-term
investment/capital + deposits) = 38% for the whole period
(average). It was as high as 42% in 1982, and as low as 30%
in 1988 (a drop of 10% from 1987). The reason given by the
bank is that resources were directed to financing medium and
long-term investment. However, this is not convincing, as
different kinds of investments come into one category in the
equation. Furthermore, increase in long-term investment in
1988 was only LS 3.6 m over 1987, while the decrease in
short-term investment in 1988 was LS 18.1 m, less than in
1987.
The average ratio of long-term investment to short-term
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investment is very low, about 10% for the period. It was
only 1% in 1982 and 1983 as it was the bank's policy to
concentrate on short-term operations to obtain a quick
profit, to prove the success of Islamic banking. However,
this ratio reached 16% in 1988. The low ratio of long-term
to short-term investment in the bank is due to the fact that
most of investment resources (deposits) are of a short-term
nature. Moreover, the bank has no last resort from which to
borrow in bad times.
The ratio of capital to deposits is low. In 1982 it was
9%. It was 15% and 12% in 1987 and 1988 respectively.
Deposits, with the exception of investment deposits, do
not participate in profit, while most of the profit is
generated from their funds. Therefore, it would be fair for
these resources to be compensated.
Fixed assets development shows the secured situation of
the bank. The ratio of fixed assets to capital was very
high, 193%, 212% and 204% in 1986, 1987 and 1988
respectively. This shows the very strong position of the
bank. However, dividends were not comparable. They were high
in 1982 and 1983 but were very low in 1986, 1987 and 1988.
In 1984, dividend was supported from retained profit, as the
bank had been granted tax concessions before 1984, while
towards the end of 1983, a credit ceiling was imposed.
Furthermore, the new back-dated tax law which was imposed in
1986 levied a high tax on the bank (70% of the profit). In
addition, in 1987 one of the bank's subsidiary companies
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lost LS 3.3 m; in 1988 administrative expenses increased due
to the improvement in staff working conditions.
Thus, it is not surprising that relative profitability
(net income to revenue) of the bank was high in 1982, 1983
and 1985 while it was low in other years. The revenue of the
bank for 1982-1988 was as follows (LS m):
28.5, 31.7, 19.4, 30.8, 25.9, 31.9, 37.8 respectively. The
relative profitability for the same period was:
72%, 32%, 4%, 50%, 21%, 6%, 6% respectively. Thus it was in
line with dividends.
If relative profitability is computed for the net
income of the bank alone, without its subsidiary companies,
then it would be:
41%, 24%, 22%, 21%, 0.8%, 15%, (-7%) for the same period.
The bank's net income (excluding subsidiary companies) was
11.8, 7.5, 4.2, 6.6, 0.2, 4.7, (-2.6) for the same period
respectively. In 1984 the bank's net income was LS 4.2 m,
while its consolidated net income was only LS 0.83 m,
because the bank made donations of about LS 4.1 m (net
income is shown before donations). Moreover, the profit
generated from subsidiary companies was not high. The profit
shown in 1988 in the consolidated balance sheet includes
profit generated by subsidiary companies.
Application of Resources
During its early years FIBS took a very cautious attitude
towards investment. In its first two years, the bank adopted
a strategy of short-term 	 investments, and was able to
266
realise reasonable profits both for the shareholders and
deposit-holders. This was considered a measure of success
which helped the bank to float more shares to raise its
capital. The bank's investments were mainly in foreign and
domestic trade. The realisation of reasonable profits in its
first two years encouraged the bank to start expanding its
finance to medium and long-term operations.
In the late Seventies, the Sudanese economy began to
face difficulties, and the government imposed credit
restrictions to limit the supply of money. The decrease in
production led the country into the vicious circle of
shortage of exports and hence shortage of foreign exchange
which resulted in shortage of production inputs, in turn
leading to further decrease in production. This led the
country to . borrow from inside and outside to cover the
budget deficit and to revive development projects. Borrowing
from outside involved the IMF with its customary
prescriptions: devaluation of the currency, cuts in
government expenditure and restrictions in the	 supply of
money. 4
However, the relative success achieved in limiting the
total supply of money by imposing credit ceilings on
commercial banks, is always undermined by the Government
borrowing from the Central bank by issuing new currency.
In the Eighties, the Sudanese economy witnessed further
deterioration and the government credit ceilings on
commercial banks were tightened further
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in 1983. In addition, while state-owned banks were not
allowed to finance medium and long-term projects, Islamic
and foreign banks were instructed to direct 10 per cent of
their authorised lending funds towards medium and long-term
investment. 5
These new measures, in addition to the withdrawal of
the privileges and concessions granted to FIBS by its
special Act, put great pressure on the bank. The credit
ceilings resulted in decreased investment volume and a large
percentage of the investable funds remained idle.
Consequently the bank stopped accepting any new investment
deposits. These deposits started to decrease from 1984 and
have continued to decrease since then.
In spite of all these constraints and the uninviting
atmosphere FIBS has managed to achieve reasonable success.
In the period 1980-1987 the total number of operations
executed by the bank was 13,971 with a total finance of LS
1,215 m. The bank's share was LS 922 m, that is, about 76%.
(Table 5). The Table shows that the vital commodities for
economic development (i.e. petroleum, medicines, industrial
inputs, machines, transport, spare parts, construction
material and industrial and agricultural services)
represented a high percentage of the bank's contribution
which was 64%. Finance provided to these commodities, as
shown in Table 5, was increasing satisfactorily in 1980-82,
but decreased sharply in 1983, when it was only LS 82 m,
compared with LS 136 in in the previous year. This was due to
a drop in financing to petroleum, medicines and industrial
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inputs. In 1406 (1986) the total finance was LS 139m, while
its operations totalled 1,891. If this is compared to the
operations for the previous and following year, we find that
the average finance per operation was high, LS 74,000,
compared with LS 50,000 in 1405 (1985) and 57,000 in 1407
(1987). The average per operation for the whole period was
922m/13,971 = LS 66,000.
However, the bank's ability to offer finance to various
commodities was curbed by the ceiling policy which decreased
finance to trade to 10% of total finance in 1986. Moreover,
trade in some agricultural crops (e.g. sesame) was
monopolized by the public sector.
The total finance extended by FIBS, for the period
1980-87, was about 7.2% of the total finance extended by the
entire Sudanese banking system, as shown in Table 6.
At the end of December 1987 there were 23 commercial
banks operating in the Sudan; five of them were national
commercial banks (public sector) and the remainder were
private and joint-ownership banks; six of them were Islamic
banks including FIBS. Though FIBS finance is risk finance,
as the relationship between the bank and its clients is a
profit-sharing relationship, FIBS's finance as a proportion
of total finance was relatively high, reaching 14% in 1982.
However, the finance provided by FIBS compared to total
credit provided by other banks showed a decreasing trend. It
was as high as 11% - 14% in the first three years, but only
5% - 6% in the last three years. Although the credit ceiling
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might not be considered sufficient reason for this, as it
was applied to other banks also, its effect on curbing
finance in Islamic banks might be greater, as in profit-
sharing, liquidation of projects or even trade operations
might be delayed, especially in developing countries (the
ceilings do not include operations and may represent
turnover).
During 1980-87, FIBS extended total finance, of LS 549m
to strategic commodities and production inputs, almost 45%
of its total finance. 32% of the total finance, that is LS
388 m, was directed to financing productive sectors, while
the remaining 23% (LS 278 m) was directed to financing
external and internal trade, as shown in Table 7. Materials
in this Table are the same as in Table 5, but they are
classified in a different manner to emphasise the role of
the bank in financing different sectors.
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Table S
FIBS Total Finance Provided by Commodities
/980-14078
LS
I	 1980	 I	 1981	 1	 1912	 I	 1983	 1	 1984	 I	 1405	 I	 1406	 I	 1407	 1	 Total
Coseoditias
Petro/eue
1 T.F I D.0 I T.r 1 B.0 I TAP I B.0 I T.F I B.0 1 T.r I B.0 I T.r I B.0 I T.F I B.0 I T.F I 11.0 I T.F I B.0
I -1-12111/121 1 161-1-1711181
	 11	 II	 II	 1 1 -1-11151 47
Medicine
	 Chem/x.1813 1
	
31 7.21 121 27 I 24 I 10 lei	 412 I	 61	 21	 7 1 2 121	 4 1 74 f 64
Industrial Inputs	 1/5110 I 12181221221101 7 121417 I	 6142123141711211 97
Machinestfguipment1
	 21	 11	 61	 51	 81	 71	 61	 4 1 25 1 211/5 I 141	 81	 *1111 4111121101
Transport s Service	 1	 2 I	 2 / 17 1 12 1 25 / 16 /
	
S I	 6 I 11 1 10 1	 4 1	 3 1 12 1 11 I 18 I 15 I 97 I 75
Food Stuff
	 I	 212141312111211711512211811611411611611 8 11811171	 99
Agricultural Crops 	 I	 19 I	 15 I 12 I 10 I
	 7 I	 6 I 13 1	 11 I	 18 I 15 I 24 I 18 I 21 I 17 I 38 I 33 I 152 I 125
Spare Parts	 1	 10 1 	61	 51	 31	 61	 4 1 	61	 51	 9 1 	01	 71	 61	 51	 5116 I	 151	 641 52
Construction materials!	 11 I	 7 I	 6 I	 6 I 22 I
	 17 1	 14 I	 10 1	 6 I	 4 I 13 I	 11 I	 14 1	 11 I	 5 1	 4 I	 91 I	 70
Industrial &
Agricultural ServiceI41412121313121212121131131191191471391921 84
Testi/es	 I	 312 1	 21213 I	 21514127112 1	 31	 313 1	 2 1	 2123119
Others
	
1	 6 I	 4 1	 12 I	 10 1	 13 I	 7 1	 14 I	 10 I	 53 I	 23 I	 13 I	 12 I	 24 1	 10 I	 23 1	 13 I 156 1	 89
I	 78 I	 57 I 111 1	 84 I 178 I 136 1 105 1	 82 I 228 I 127 I 122 I 106 I 112 I 139 I 221 I 191 11215 1 922
No. of the Bank	 1
Operations per year 	 I	 779	 I	 1.471	 I	 1.831	 I	 1.151	 I	 1.366	 1	 2.118	 I	 1,891	 I 3.374	 I	 13,971
T.F : Total Finance.
B.0 : The Bank's Contribution.
Source: Investment Department (FIBS).
Table 6
FIBS Credit Compared with Conventional Banks
4
LS	 in
Description ; Commercial banks': FIBS	 : % : Total
'1 Credit	 : Finance: 11
Year 1	 11 : 3 : 1+2	 =
1980 536 57 11 593
1981 694 84 12 778
1982 1,007 136 14 1,143
1983 1,295 82 6 1,377
1984 1,482 127 9 1,609
1985 1,671 106 6 1,777
1986 2,499 139 6 2,638
1987 3,602 191 5 3,793
Total 12,786 922
Percentage 922/12,786% 7.2%
Source: 1- Bank of Sudan Annual Reports.
2- FIBS Annual Reports.
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Description
A) Strategic commodities
1- Petroleum
2- Medicine & chemicals
3- Foodstuffs
4- Agricultural crops
5- Construction materials
Sub-total
Ratio to total investment
B) Productive sector
1- Industrial inputs
2- Machines & equipment
3- Industrial & agricultural
service
4- Spare parts
Sub-total
Ratio to total investment
C) Trade & service sector
1- Transport & services
2- Textiles
3- Electronic & electric
appliances
4- Others
Sub-total
Ratio to total investment
Grand total
Table 7
FIBS Investment (By Commodity)
1980-1407H
(LS m)
:	 Total finance
	 FIBS
:Contribution
115 47
74 64
117 99
152 125
91 70
549 405
45% 44%
121 97
111 101
92 84
64 52
388 334
32% 36%
97 75
23 19
9 7
149 82
278 183
23% 20%
1,215 922
Source: Investment Department (FIBS), see table 5.
273
Development Finance
Development finance, which is characterised by medium and
long-term investments, was addressed by the bank in its
third year of establishment. In 1981 FIBS extended its
finance to the artisans' sector, being the first bank to
enter this field. The main beneficiaries of this programme
were owners of small businesses, farmers and artisans. In
1407H the finance contributed by the bank to artisans
amounted to LS 11 m, an increase of 64% over the previous
year. The contribution of the bank to this sector during the
period 1980-87 was LS 29 m.
In the agricultural sector, the bank's policy was
geared towards rehabilitating agricultural projects and
providing agricultural tools and equipment and working
capital. During 1982-87, the contribution of the bank to
this field amounted to about LS 70 m. During 1984 - 1987 the
bank participated by 73% (i.e. LS 23.9 m) of the total
capital of four agricultural projects in the country,
covering a total area of about 600 thousand acres. The total
finance of the bank to the agricultural sector since its
establishment reached over LS 140 m in 1989 (Table 9).
The bank also gives special support to the industrial
sector. Its contribution to this sector amounted to LS 71 m
in 1987, represented by inputs, spare parts, energy and
working capital. Table 8 shows that in 1987, FIBS provided
14% of the total finance of the industrial sector, while it
had provided only 0.5% in 1980. In 1985 and 1986, the bank
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provided 11% of finance to industry, representing more than
half of the total finance given by all commercial banks in
the Sudan to this sector (21.8% and 21.3% of the total
finance of the sector for the same years).
FIBS, during the early years of its growth, adopted a
strategy of short-term investment, but this strategy has
gradually changed. In 1986, 52% of the bank's total
investment was directed towards productive sectors, while
48% was directed to commodity trade. This represents a
significant alteration in the bank's investment policy. In
the early years, the trade sector alone absorbed 72% of the
total investment.
Table 8
Finance Introduced to Industrial Sector
by FIBS as Percentage of the Total Finance
Compared with Commercial banks
1980 - 1987
percentage
years	 FIBS finance as %
of the total finance
Commercial banks finance
as % of the total finance
(FIBS not included)
1980 0.5	 28.8
1981 0.4	 29.2
1982 2.2	 23.5
1983 5.0	 20.5
1984 9.0	 17.8
1985 11.0	 21.8
1986 11.0	 21.3
1987 14.0	 not available
Source: FIBS
275
Table 9
Finance in FIBS 1983 - 1409h
(Sector Basis)
LS m
Description	 11983 11984 11405 11406 11407 11408 1 1409
1) Local trade	 : 35.1 43.31 62	 70.2 95.1 107.3	 92.1
1/7 %	 : 47.4	 40	 1 62.11 50.4	 49.6	 44.5	 36.7
2) Foreign trade 30.61 37.3 12.7	 4.1 24	 32.1	 39
2/7 %	 41.31 34.5	 12.71
	
2.91 12.51 13.31 15.6
3) Industry	 3.71	 9.21 10.91 15	 1 26.31 35.21 37.0
3/7 %	 5	 1	 8.5	 10.9	 10.81 13.71 14.6	 14.8
4) Agriculture	 1	 0.71	 4.9	 6.4	 37.31 20.8	 33.3	 36.2
4/7 %	 1	 0.9 	 4.51	 6.4	 26.81 10.81 13.81 14.4
5) Artisans	 2.4	 2.3
	 4.11	 6.71 11	 1 11.9	 32
5/7 %
	 1	 3.2	 2.11	 4.11	 4.81	 5.71	 4.9	 12.8
6) Services &
transport
	 1.6 11.2
	
3.8	 6.0 14.6 21.2	 14.3
6/7 %	 2.2	 10.4	 3.8	 4.3	 7.6	 8.8	 5.7
7) Total	 74.1 108.2	 99.9 139.3 191.8 241.0 250.6
percentage	 1100	 1100	 1100	 1100	 1100	 1100	 1100
Source: FIBS
Note: Figures in this table may not agree with figures in
Table 5, due to variations in classification.
Table 9 shows the finance provided by the bank for
different economic sectors. Finance for the industrial and
agricultural sectors increased throughout the period,
reaching an average of about 15% to each of these sectors in
1409 h.
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Table 10
FIBS's Financial Statements Compared
with Commercial Banks in the Sudan
1983 - 1409
LS m
Year Bank ASSETS
cash	 :balance:balance:loans &:others:total
at BS	 :abroad	 :invest.
LIABILITIES
deposits:capital	 :others:total
:&reserve:	
1
1
1983 1-FIBS 9 59 102 125 146 441	 257 •	 58 126	 :	 441
2- CB 83 785 532 1377 710 3487	 1781 247 1459	 :	 3487
1/2 % 11% 8% 19% 9% 21% 13%	 14% 23% 9%;	 13%
1984 1-FIBS 12 81 87 133 134	 447 275 58 114	 :	 447
2- CB 109 870 553 1527 927	 3986 1881 326 1779	 :	 3986
1/2 % 11% 9% 16% 9% 14%
	 11% 15% 18% 6%;	 11%
1405	 :1-FIBS	 27	 49	 96	 120	 188	 480	 293	 58	 129	 :	 480
;2- CB	 85	 1478	 1369
	 1732	 1229	 5893
	 2711	 318	 2864	 :	 5893
;	 1/2 %
	 32%	 3%	 7%	 7%	 15%	 8%	 11%	 18%	 5%;	 8%
1406	 :1-FIBS	 15 89 42 158 214 518 319 133 66	 518
:2-	 CB	 118 .2527 1371 2480 690 7186 4290 1707 1189	 :	 7186
1/2 %	 13% 4% 3% 6% 31% 7% 7% 8% 6%;	 7%
1407 1-FIBS	 18 163 20	 184 225 610 399 133 78 610
2- CB	 230 3053 1595	 3793 1156 9827 5786 847 3194 9827
1/2 %	 8% 5% 1%	 5% 19% 6% 7% 16% 2% 6%
1408	 :1-FIBS	 30	 121	 61	 221 334 767 503 133 131	 1	 767
:2- CB
	 238
	 2663	 1723	 4349 1385 10358 6177 903 3278	 110358
:1/2 %	 1%	 5%	 4%	 5% 24% 7% 8% 15% 4%;	 7%
1409	 :1-FIBS	 74 98 31 293 355 851 643 134 75	 :	 851
;2-	 CB	 388 3824 2225 5550 2698 14685 9093 1407 4185	 :14685
1/2 %	 19% 3% 1% 5% 13% 6% 7% 10% 2%;	 6%
Source:	 FIBS,	 statistical department.
BS = Bank of Sudan.
CB = Commercial banks.
Note:	 capital and reserves	 for	 1983,	 1984	 and	 1405	 were	 LS
58 m for each year as shown	 in Table	 10,	 but	 according	 to
the bank's annual reports they were LS 137 m, LS 132 m and
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LS 132 m for these years respectively. It appears that
reserves were included in the 'others' item.
This Table shows that assets and liabilities of FIBS
grew steadily throughout 1983-1409h (1989). Total assets
throughout the period represented an average of 8% of the
total assets of commercial banks in the country.
FIBS's balance abroad represented a high percentage of
that of all banks, ' but it decreased to only 1% in 1409
(1989), which might be considered a good feature by the
Central Bank, as the country needed foreign currency. The
average balance of the bank at the Central Bank was
relatively high, about 7.4% of the total for all banks,
which again emphasises the ability of the bank to attract
resources, as reserves are kept as a percentage of deposits.
Total deposits of FIBS compared to total liabilities
were high in 1409 (1989), 75%, compared to 61% for other
banks. In 1983 they were 58% for FIBS and 51% for other
banks. This might indicate the trust of the depositors in
the bank and its good reputation and performance.
The authorised capital of the bank was LS 100 m, but as
a result of the credit policy, it was unable to increase its
capital. Nonetheless, the bank capital and reserves
represented a relatively a high percentage compared to other
banks. The ratio of capital to total assets/liabilities in
the bank was relatively low, ranging between 12%-13% in the
first three years, while it was 17% and 16% in 1408 (1988)
and 1409 (1989) respectively. However, this does not
indicate that the 'bank's positions was weaker, as fixed
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assets represented a high percentage of the total assets. As
shown earlier, the ratio of fixed assets to capital in the
bank was also high (Table 4).
Social Development
Table 11 shows donations and Zakah paid by FIBS during 1980-
87. Over eight years the bank distributed about LS 14.4 m.
The bank's social role is considered as complementary to
its role in economic development. In 1408 (1988), though,
the bank's net income (without subsidiary companies) was
negative (loss) its donations and Zakah was about LS 2.9 m.
It pays Zakah as a part of its religious obligation. In
certain areas and projects, FIBS gives special attention to
social factors when conducting an economic study. In famine-
stricken areas, certain commodities are made available at
cost. The provision of finance to artisans and small
investors on easy terms is another social service provided
by the bank.
In 1407h (1987) the bank employed 923 staff, 256 of
them are workers. A special centre was set up by the bank to
provide training for bank staff as well as staff from local
Islamic banks and a few from abroad.
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: Number of
' branches1
: Number of
: agenciesBanks
Table 11
FIBS Zakah & Donations 1980-87
(LS '000')
Year	 :1980:1981:1982:1983:1984:1405:1406:14071 Total
Description
Zakah .	170	 473 734 1941 1159 1129 715 398 6,719
Donations	 17	 280 428 730 4462 300 1000 500 7,717
Source: Annual Reports of FIBS
Table 12
Number of Branches in Some Conventional Banks & FIBS
as at December 1986
Khartoum bank	 37	 4
El-Nielein bank	 25	 4
Commercial bank	 14	 5
FIBS	 19	 1
Source: Annual Reports.
Table 12 shows that FIBS comes the fourth in terms of
number of branches. Since 1980, the bank has been extending
its banking facilities in rural areas, which include the
majority of the inhabitants in the subsistence sector. Of 19
branches of the bank, 10 are located outside Khartoum
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province. Even branches in the Khartoum area offer services
to inhabitants of rural areas. For instance, the artisans
branch, which is located in Khartoum province, draws a large
number of its customers from rural areas. The bank has
recently been licensed to open another four branches in
western Sudan.6
Cost/Income Ratio
Banking income stems directly from business volume.
Operating costs of FIBS, in 1407h (1987), amounted to LS 24
m. Although cost control is desirable and essential for any
company, it is recognised that operating costs have to grow
if new business is to be gained. 7 During 1407 (1987) FIBS
operating costs increased by 15% over 1406; they have
increased by 229% since 1982, that is, from LS 7.3 m in 1982
to LS 24 m in 1407 (1987).
Table 13
FIBS Cost/Income Ratio
1982-140711
	
1982	 1983	 1984	 1405	 1406	 1407
Operating
expenses (LS m)	 7.3	 13.1	 10.3	 16.6	 21.2	 24.0
Operating
income (LS m)	 28.5	 31.7	 19.4	 30.8	 26.0	 32.0
Cost/income
ratio (%)	 25.6	 42.3	 53.1	 53.9	 81.5	 75
Source: FIBS Annual Reports
Table 13 shows that the cost/income ratio in the bank
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increased throughout the period till 1406 (1986) and
decreased in 1407 (1987). This increase in the ratio could
be due to many factors, among them credit policy,
competition from other Islamic banks and structural
inflexibilities characteristic of the Sudan economy. The
increase of the ratio in 1406 was due to an increase in
administrative costs which was 37% more than in 1405 (1985).
This may be attributed to an expansion of services and the
opening of new branches. The high ratio in 1407 was due to
the fact that the bank paid its contribution to the Takafull
Fund (insurance) for 1407 and the previous years.
Table 14
FIBS Equity/Assets Ratio
1982-1407
1982 1983 1984 1405 1406 1407
Shareholders'
funds	 (LS m) 51.5 158.8 141.5 156.3 143.8 142.0
Total year-end
assets	 (LS m) 278 441 447. 480 518 610
Total equity to
total assets
ratio	 (%) 19 36 32 33 28 23
Source: FIBS Annual Reports
Note: shareholders' funds equal capital and different
reserves and the profit for the year.
The average equity/assets ratio for the bank was about
29% for the period from 1982-1407 (1987) as shown in Table
14. If we take into consideration the fixed assets which are
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reasonably high for the same period, as mentioned before,
then it can be concluded that the equity/assets ratio
reflects a strong and safe situation of the bank.
Table 15
FIBS Cost/Income Ratio Compared with
Other Banks 1984-1987
1984	 1985	 1986	 1987
(%)	 (%)	 (%)	 (%)
FIBS	 53.1	 53.9	 81.5	 75.0
Midland Bank plc	 74.8	 73.2	 72.4	 73.0
National Westminster
Bank plc	 74.1	 84.5
Source: 1- FIBS Annual Reports.
2-, Midland Bank plc., Annual Report & Accounts 8 .
3- National Westminster Bank plc., Annual Report &
Accounts.
Table 15 compares the cost/income ratio of the bank
with those of other well-established and reputable banks.
The comparison shows that FIBS's ratio, even when it was
high, as in 1986 and 1987, was almost equal to ratios of
these banks. The striking feature is that FIBS's ratio
jumped sharply from 50% + in 1984 and 1985 to 81% and 75% in
1986 and 1987 respectively. This was due to an increase in
cost components, as mentioned earlier.
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Table 16
FIBS Equity/Assets Ratio Compared with
Other Banks 1984-1987
1984
(%)
1985
(%)
1986
(%)
1987
(%)
FIBS 32 33 28	 . 23
Midland Bank plc., 3.5 3.6 4.0 5.5
National Westminster
Bank plc., 3.8 4.2 5.6 5.7
Source: 1- FIBS Annual Reports.
2- Midland Bank plc., Annual Reports.
3- National Westminster Bank plc., Annual Reports.
Table 16 compares equity/assets ratio of FIBS with the
same banks as in Table 15. The bank ratio is high and
represents a secured situation.
Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt (FIBE)
FIBE was established according to Act number 48, 1977; 11 it
was officially inaugurated and commenced operations on July
5th, 1979. The bank was established as a joint-stock public
limited company to work in accordance with Islamic Law with
headquarters in Cairo. The authorised capital is $500
million; the paid up capital in 1987 was $70 million. The
capital of the bank is divided into 51 per cent for Egyptian
participants and 49 per cent for Muslims from other part of
the world.
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The bank's main objective is to perform all banking,
financing, commercial and investment activities, and to
promote and participate in industrial, economic and
urbanisation development projects, locally and abroad within
the framework of Islamic Law. The bank has a Religious
Supervisory Board to ensure that its dealings and activities
are in accordance with Islamic principles.
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Table 17
Financial & Investment Profile of FIBE
1984-87
In US Dollars in
Description 1984 1985 1986 1987
Capital: Authorised 500 500 500 500
Paid up 40 40 70 70
Deposits 1,531 1,595 1,489 1,505
Funds allocated to )
investment operations 1,521 1,567 1,532 1,569
Net Fixed Assets 19 23 17 21
Dividends (after Zakah) 15% 14.4% 12% 12%
Net Income 124 124 107 92
Source: FIBE Annual Reports.
Table	 17	 presents	 a	 sample financial profile of	 FIBE
for a period of four years. The paid up capital is $ 70 m,
though the issued and subscribed capital is $ 100 m. If
capital is compared to total deposits in 1984-87, the
average ratio was 4%, which does not indicate a strong
position. The same is true of capital/investment ratio which
was 3%, 3%, 5%, 4% for the years sampled, with an average of
4%. Fixed assets/capital ratio gives a similar impression;
it ranged between 24% and 58%, with an average of 40%. As
mentioned earlier, this ratio was 212% in FIBS in 1987 while
it was only 30% in FIBE in the same year. This emphasises
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the secured position enjoyed by FIBS as compared to FIDE, as
far as this ratio is concerned.
Investment was almost equal to total deposits for some
years, and in others, e.g. 1986 and 1987, it was even
greater. This again emphasises the previous.point, but also
shows high efficiency in allocation of resources. The vast
total of deposits suggests that the bank has been very
efficient in mobilising public savings, though it must be
admitted that the religious motive will have accounted for
some of this success.
Dividends were fairly high and steady. However, this
steadiness is a general feature of the bank's performance:
as we have seen, the capital/deposits ratio and
capital/investment ratio varied little in this period.
Dividends were also fairly constant, ranging between 12% and
15% as shown in the Table. No sharp increase or decrease is
shown. Thus a general steadiness in the bank's performance
and the Egyptian economy can be inferred.
Table 18
FIBE Cost/Income Ratio
1984-87
	
1984	 1985	 1986	 1987
Operating expenses ($m)	 15	 25	 16	 16
Operating income ($m)	 140	 149	 123	 108
Cost/income ratio (%)	 10.7	 16.8	 13	 14.8
Source: FIBE Annual Reports.
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Table 18 shows the cost/income ratio in 1984-87. The
ratio was low and shows the bank's firm control over costs.
Again the steadiness in the development of this ratio is
observed as it ranged between 10.7% and 16.8%. Expenses
increased considerably in 1985 compared to the previous
year. This was due to an increase in provisions and
depreciation which amounted to $ 12.2 m, an increase of $
7.7 m over the previous year, as shown in the bank's annual
report (1985).
Table 19
FIBE Equity/Assets Ratio
1984-87
1984 1985 1986 1987
Shareholders'	 funds
	 ($m) 53 54 106 107
Total year-end assets	 ($m) 1,862 2,079 2,056 1,905
Total equity to total
assets ratio (%)
	
2.8	 2.6	 5.2	 5.6
Source: FIBE Annual Reports.
Table 19 shows the equity/assets ratio which was low
compared to that of FIBS as shown earlier. However, the
average ratio in the whole period, which was 4.1%, is almost
the same as those of the Midland and National Westminster
banks, as shown earlier, the average ratio in the same
period being 4.2% and 4.8% for the two banks respectively.
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This comparison, however, is not in favour of FIBE, as its
situation as a profit-sharing bank is more risky than that
of credit finance banks. The higher the equity/assets ratio,
the more secured a profit-sharing bank is, as capital can be
used as insurance for liabilities. Nonetheless, other
factors such as fixed assets should be taken into
consideration, as these also play an insurance role.
However, in the case of FIBE, as shown earlier (Table 17),
fixed assets amounts were not high.
Total assets in 1987 decreased as a result of a
decrease in cash in hand and in correspondents which
amounted to almost $ 104,000. However, the enormous
assets/liabilities total shows the rapid expansion of the
bank.
Tadamon Islamic Bank (Sudan)
Tadamon Islamic bank (TIB) was established in November 1981
as a joint-stock public limited company, operating according
to Islamic Law, and started operations in March 1982. The
authorised capital is $ 50 m; the paid up capital is $ 14.3
m. The headquarters of the bank is in Khartoum. TIB has 3
subsidiary companies and 12 branches spread over the urban
and rural areas of the Sudan; the bank also holds equity
shares in many Islamic institutions, for example the Islamic
Bank International (Luxemburg), and West Sudan Islamic Bank.
The bank has a department of Fatwa and Research
(Religious Supervisory Board), the main function of which is
to guarantee the conformity of all the bank's activities
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with Islamic principles. In order to achieve this goal, the
department of Fatwa and Research involves itself directly in
all activities of the bank and supervises and approves all
the bank's draft contracts.
Table 20
Financial and Investment profile:
Tadamon Islamic Bank
1985-88
1985 1986 1987 1988
Capital:	 authorised ($m) 50 50 50 50
called up	 ($m) 20 20 20 20
paid up ($m) 13.3 13.3 14.3 14.3
paid up (LSm) 21.4 21.4 24.0 24.0
Current accounts in
local&foreign currency
(LS m) 56 103 155 228
Savings accounts (LS m) 2.1 4.4 7.9 14
Investment deposits in
local & foreign currency
(LS m) 19.3 13 15 15.5
Direct investment (LSm) 22.6 24 32.9 61.8
Other investment (LSm) 4.1 5.3 5.3 5.3
Fixed assets	 (LSm) 5.4 6.2 9.9 20.5
Net profit- after tax &
Zakah	 (LS m) 1.4 1.5 1.5 2.4
Source: TIB Annual Reports.
Table 20 shows the financial situation of TIB in 1985-
88. A relatively high percentage of the called-up capital,
about 30%, was not paid in 1988. the capital/deposits ratio
was relatively low; it was 9% in 1988 (i.e. 24/258%).
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However, capital/risk deposits,	 • e • investment deposits,
was high at 110%, 165%, 160%, 155% for these years
respectively, maintaining a secured position for the bank.
Again the secured position of the bank is ojp served if
investment (direct and other) is compared to capital, at
least, in the first three years, as capital/investment ratio
was 80%, 73%, 50%. Even in 1988 where the ratio was low,
i.e. 36%; direct investment represented a high percentage
of the total investment (i.e. 92%), which enabled the bank
to benefit from the shares and assets of such an investment,
placing it in a stronger position to insure its deposits.
In 1988 fixed assets more than doubled over the
previous year, for the construction of the bank's buildings
(headquarters and warehouses) were near completion. Net
income was relatively low, due mainly to the economic
situation, competition from other Islamic banks and the
credit policy.
Table 21
TIB Cost/Income Ratio
1985-88
1985	 1986
	
1987	 1988
Operating expenses (LS m)	 3.4	 5.3	 6.8	 11.8
Operating income (LS m)	 7.6	 12.3	 12.6	 23.1
Cost/income ratio (%)	 45	 43	 54	 51
Source: TIB Annual Reports.
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Cost/income ratio, as shown in Table 21, ranged between
43% and 51%, a relatively high percentage, which suggests
weak control over costs. Income in 1988 was high, but it was
absorbed by a remarkable increase in expenses due to the
establishment of new branches, the increase in prices and
rent and the recruitment of more employees.
Table 22
TIB Equity/Assets Ratio
1985-88
1985 1986 1987 1988
Shareholders'
	 funds	 (LS m) 23.3 26.9 27.3 29
Total year-end assets (LS m) 137.9 181.0 247.8 387.4
Total equity to total assets
ratio	 (%) 17 15 11 7
Source: TIB Annual Reports,
Table 22 shows that the bank's equity/assets ratio was
low, because of its low paid-up capital and profits.
However, total assets increased rapidly, by 181% over the
period in question, which suggests the expansion of the
bank's activities and ability to mobilise deposits.
Table 23
Number of Workers in TIB
1983-88
Year 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
No.	 of workers 150 200 320 330 334 438
Source: TIB Annual Reports.
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The number of workers increased steadily throughout
1983-88, as shown in Table 23. Between 1987 and 1988, there
was an increase of 31%, due to the opening of new branches
and expansion of departments at headquarters.
TIB's contribution towards development investment
amounted to about LS 22 m in 1989, in addition to a
contribution of about LS 8 m in the capital of corporations
of a development nature.
In 1989, the bank's finance to the industrial and
agricultural sectors reached about 36% (i.e. LS 56 m) of the
total credit ceiling permitted by the central bank (Table
24). In the same year, participation (Musharakah) increased
to 66% of the bank's total operations, while Murabaha
accounted for 33% of the total investment.
Table 24
TIB Finance 1983 - 1989
(Sector Basis)
LS m
Description	 1983 :1984 :1985 :1986 :1987 :1988 :1989
1-Development
& services	 6.2	 20.9	 53.5 35	 53.4	 33	 22.2
2-Participation in
working capital	 3.1	 5.3 23.6 18.3 50	 64	 56
3- Export	 0.1	 1.3	 6.9	 3.6 35	 32	 22
4- Artisans	 1.3	 0.9	 2.9	 2.3	 -	 5	 5
5- Trade	 26.8	 37	 51.8 35.4 54	 50	 52
Total	 37.5 : 65.4138.7 :94.6192.4 :184 :157.2
Source: TIB (Investment department)
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Table 24 shows the finance provided by the bank for the main
economic sectors. The first four sectors are considered to
have priority; at least 80% of the credit ceiling should be
directed towards financing them, according to the Bank of
Sudan's instructions. At the beginning, trade represented a
high percentage of the total finance compared to other
sectors, though they are of special importance to the
economy, and financing of these is encouraged by the Central
Bank. It is assumed that the bank in its first years of
operation, relied on trade to realise a quick profit.
However, gradually it began to direct its finance to the
important sectors to reach 73% and 67% of the total finance
in 1987 and 1988 respectively, compared with only 29% and
43% of the total finance in 1983 and 1984 respectively.
Total finance shows fluctuations; while it increased to
reach LS 138.7 in 1985, it decreased sharply in 1986, and
increased remarkably again in 1987. A further decline took
place in 1988 and 1989. The reason for the fluctuations in
the volume of finance between 1986-89 was the desire of the
bank to increase finance to sectors other than trade, for
these operations were of long duration and their liquidation
involved many difficulties, compared with trade. In
addition, the economic situation of the country was
deteriorating. Furthermore, finance of export is connected
with agricultural production which fluctuates with rainfall,
and the bank has to allocate a part of its finance to this
sector.
294
Al-Baraka Bank (Sudan)
This bank was established in 1982 and began providing
services to the public in April, 1984. The headquarters of
the bank is in Khartoum. The authorised capital is $200 m;
the paid-up capital is LS 55 m. Al-Baraka for Investment &
Development (Jeddah) owns 50% of the bank's capital. The
remaining 50% is owned by Islamic banks and businessmen in
Saudi Arabia and the Sudan.
The bank engages in short, medium and ]ong-term
invesLment according to Islamic principles. The minimum sum
to be deposited in a current account is LS 10,000 for
individuals and LS 25,000 for companies.
The bank has a religious supervisor to ensure that its
work is carried out according to Islamic rules.
Table 25
Al-Baraka Bank (Sudan): Main Financial
Features 1985-86
1985 1986 1987 1988
Capital:	 authorised	 ($m) 200 200 200 200
:	 paid-up	 (LS m) 55 55 55 55
Total deposits	 (LS m) 75 85 101 193
Investment	 (LS m) 64 50 70 105
Fixed assets	 (LS m) N.A 5 20 42
Profit (pre-tax & Zakah) N.A 7 10 13
Total year-end assets (LS m) 170 174 281 410
Source: Financial Highlights (Al-Baraka Group), 1986.
AL-Baraka annual reports.
N.A. = not available.
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The bank started to issue annual reports in 1987.
The financial year in 1987 was 16 months, because the
bank changed its financial year from the Hijri to the
Gregorian Calendar. 1426 investment operations were executed
during 1987, compared to 737 operations in the previous
year. The total value of the investment operations in 1987
reached LS 170 in compared to LS 116 m in the previous year,
of which the bank's share was LS 70 m compared to LS 50 in in
the previous year. The bank's participation in investment in
1988 amounted to LS 105 m, an increase of 50% over the
previous year. This, however, suggests a reasonable
expansion in the bank's services. Comparison between 1986
and 1987 gives a misleading impression, as the financial
year in 1987 was longer. The same is true when 1987 is
compared with 1988. Nonetheless, the bank's investment in
1988 was high compared to 1987, because of expansion in the
financing of exports and medium-term projects.
The bank's participation in Al-Baraka group and its
sister companies amounted to about LS 15 m in 1988. The bank
has two subsidiary companies, Al-Baraka Export Production
Co., with a capital of LS 2.5 m, and Al-Baraka Insurance
Co., with a capital of LS 1 m. It also participated in the
capital of seven other companies, to a total of LS 11.5 m.
However, the bank's capital plus participation in other
companies suggests a secured position. Fixed assets which
reached LS 42 m in 1988 could also be considered as.
additional insurance.
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Total revenue of the bank in 1988 amounted to LS 19.8
m, compared to LS 16,8 m in 1987, an increase of 18%.
Profit generated from Murabaha & Musharakah operations
in 1988 was LS 12.9 m compared to LS 9.7 m in 1987. This
profit represented 65% and 58% of the total revenue for 1988
and 1987 successively.
Banking operations generated a profit of LS 5.9 in in
1988, compared to LS 4.2 m in the previous year. The
remaining revenue was generated by other operations.
Investment operations revenue is high compared to banking
services revenue. This suggests that the bank gives priority
to investment over banking services. As mentioned earlier,
it stipulates a high minimum sum of money to open current
accounts.
The total expenditure in 1988 amounted to LS 6.6 m
compared to LS 6.8 in in 1987, with a reduction of LS 0.2 m.
The reduction was due to the short financial year in 1988.
The average expenditure/revenue ratio was 36.5% for 1987-88,
which suggests reasonable efficiency in generating revenue,
with relatively low expenses, especially if we take into
consideration the general economic situation in the country.
TIB's average cost/income was 53% for the same period (Table
21).
Islamic Bank for Western Sudan (IBWS)
This bank was officially inaugurated in September 1984, with
headquarters in Khartoum. It is believed that the bank has a.
good chance of avoiding many of the	 difficulties and
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problems faced by other Islamic banks which were established
previously, as it will have been able to learn from their
experiences. Moreover, the bank has introduced computer
facilities, which obviate many difficulties, especially with
regard to calculation and distribution of profits. All
deposits in the bank are held in one pool. Thus
computerisation facilitates the determination of Lhe share
in profit for each type of deposits.
The authorised capiLal of the bank is LS 25 m; the
paid-up capital is LS 11.1 m.
The aim of the bank is to carry out banking services
and investment in accordance with Islamic law. The bank has
nine branches, three of which are located in the Capital,
five in the western part of the country and one in the east—
The bank also has a subsidiary company, the International
Fordan for Trade & Services Ltd., with capital of LS
250,000, increased to 1.5 m in 1987.
The bank has a Sharia'h Supervisory Board, consisting
of three scholars. The function of the Board is to ensure
the conformity of the bank's activities with Islamic law.
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Table 26
The Financial & Investment Profile of
IBWS 1985 - 1988
LS m
1985	 : 1986	 :	 1987	 : 1988
Capital:
authorised
	
25	 25	 25	 25
paid-up	 8	 9.5	 9.5	 11.1
reserves	 0.2	 0.3	 3.5	 3.7
Deposits
	 28.7	 47.6	 54.6	 91.7
Investment operations 	 17.7	 26.1	 32.8	 68.8
Long-term investment	 0.3	 1.0	 1.5	 2.1
Fixed assets	 1.1	 1.4	 2.3	 3.7
Dividends	 N.A	 3%	 6%	 8%
Return on investment deposits N.A	 5%	 4.4%	 6%
Net income (after tax) 	 0.5	 0.3	 0.6	 0.8
Total assets	 44.1	 74.8	 84.9 139.7
Source: IDWS annual reports.
Table 26 shows that the total assets of the bank increased
in 1988 by 65% over 1987, while deposits for the same period
increased by 68%. This suggests a rapid expansion though the
bank was established only recently, with small capital.
Banking services generated the bulk of the revenue, which
was LS 3.7 m and LS 5.6 m, while investment operations
generated LS 2 . 9 in and LS 3 . 9 in in 1987 and 1988
respectively (Annual Reports).
Comparison of capital with deposits shows the
vulnerable position of the bank with regard to insuring the
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deposits, especially in 1988, when the capital/deposits
ratio was 12%. Again, this vulnerable position is
highlighted when capital is compared to investment
operations; the ratio was 16% in 1988. If fixed assets,
which were low, are taken into consideration, this point is
more striking.
Net income and dividends showed an increasing trend,
suggesting efficient management; and performance, especially
if we take into consideration the fact that the bank is
recently established and working in a highly competitive
environment where five other Islamic banks are found.
Moreover, the country's economic situation has not been
favourable.
The number of workers in the bank increased from 240 in
1987 to 254 in 1988, showing an expansion in the bank's work
and branches, which were five in 1988. The bank has been
licensed to open another five branches.
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Table 27
IBWS's Investment 1987-88
(sector basis)
LS in
1987	 1988
1- Short-term investment	 46.5	 69.8
percentage= 1/4 %	 90%	 80%
2- Medium & long-term investment	 3.1	 14.5
percentage= 2/4 %	 6%	 17%
3- Subsidiary & other Co.	 2.1	 2.9
percentage 3/4 %	 4%	 3%
4- Total investment	 51.7	 87.2
a- Export	 5.6	 6.6
percentage= a/4 %	 11%	 8%
b- Working capital	 16.4	 30
percentage= b/4 %	 32%	 34%
c- Production sector	 5.7	 15
	
percentage= c/4 %	 11%	 17%
d- Trade	 21.9	 32
percentage= d/4 %	 42%	 37%
e- Other	 2.1	 3.6
percentage= e/4 %	 4%	 4%
Total investment	 51.7	 87.2
Source: IBWS Research Department.
Table 27 shows that total investment in IBWS in 1988 was
87.2 m, an increase of LS 35.5 m or 69% over the total
investment in 1987. However, trade absorbed a high
percentage of the bank's investment, representing 42% and.
37% of the total investment for 1987 and 1988 respectively.
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As a newly established bank it concentrated its activities
on short-term trade financing to realise profit with minimal
risk. However, it is a usual for Islamic banks at the start
to take a very cautious attitude towards investment. They
have attempted to adopt a strategy of short-term investment
in order to realise profit in the shortest possible time.
Medium and long-term investment increased in 1988 to LS
14.5 m from LS 3.1 in in 1987, an increase of LS 11.4 m (i.e.
more than three times), indicating the special consideration
given by the bank towards this kind of investment.
Nonetheless, it is observed that the bank generated more
revenue from banking services than from investment
operations, because of its recent establishment with small
paid-up capital, together with the existence of other
competitors within tight credit policy. Thus the bank's
ability to expand finance to medium and long-term investment
was not impressive.
Conclusions 
Islamic banks have shown the ability to compete and expand
in Muslim societies, even though they exist in a legal
framework set up in accordance with interest-based
institutions. This success is due to various factors such
as:
(a) the desire of Muslims to invest their savings in
accordance with Islamic principles;
(b) the viability of models of finance used by these banks;
(c) the efficiency of and trust in management of Islamic
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banks.
However, the performance of Islamic banks is affected
positively or negatively depending on the economic situation
of the country in which they are operating. In the case of
the Sudan, the deteriorating economic situation in the
eighties and the tight monetary policy this necessitated,
had their effects on Islamic banks. The relationship between
Islamic banks with central banks generally and in the Sudan
in particular should be reformulated, especially with regard
with credit policy. Islamic banks' models of finance require
them to have considerable knowledge of their projects;
hence, finance can be extended only to desired projects.
Finance to undesired schemes can easily be avoided. Thus
expansion of money supply by Islamic banks is not like that
of credit finance; furthermore, it can be easily measured.
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PROBLEM ASSESSMENT
CASE STUDY
Problem Assessment
The Case Studies
This chapter presents the results of discussions conducted
in Islamic banks, with the aim of assessing the problems
faced by them. The topics selected for discussion are of
special importance to Islamic banking, and are
representative of Islamic banking practices generally.
It was decided to discuss seven topics with five
Islamic banks: four of these are located in the Sudan and
the fifth in Egypt:
1- Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt (FIBE).
2- Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan (FIBS).
3- Tadamon Islamic Bank (TIB).
4- Al-Baraka Bank (BB).
5- Islamic bank for Western Sudan (IBWS).
FIBE was chosen as one of the sample in order to
broaden the range of Islamic banks being examined. An
introductory description and profile of each bank was given
in the previous chapter.
Problem Assessment
The topics discussed with each of the banks are now dealt
with under separate headings.
1) Structure and Organisation of the Bank
All of the banks in the sample were established as limited
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companies. Al-Baraka Bank's capital is shared among various
financial institutions and businessmen, while the other
banks in the sample were established as joint-stock public
limited companies with public participation. Decision-making
•
authority in these banks is divided between the General
Meeting and the Board of Directors, as is the case in
Western companies. However, control is also exercised by the
Religious Supervisory Board. Nevertheless, the Religious
Supervisory Board is not strictly an additional managing
body, as it derives its authority from the General Meeting.
Its responsibility is to ensure the conformity of the bank's
activities with Islamic Law.
Each of the Islamic banks in the study has religious
supervisors, but, whereas some of them have boards
consisting of many members (jurists), others have only one
jurist (Baraka bank, for example). The Board of Directors
nominates and appoints the religious supervisor(s), but the
appointments must be approved by the General Committee. The
Religious Supervisory Board's responsibility to ensure that
the activities of the bank are conducted according to
Islamic rules is fulfilled by monitoring the bank's
activities and designing contractual models for the bank's
basic activities. The Board also revises and approves all
the bank's contracts and issues legal opinions (Fataws) in
response to requests by the staff. It reviews all the
financial statements of the bank and confirms their
conformity with Islamic principles.
The degree of involvement of the Religious Supervisory
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Board in the bank's activities varies from one bank to
another. However, the bank's activities monitored
throughout the financial year. The legal opinions of the
Board on any subject, are final, and the bank must carry
them out. Any draft contract has to be seen and approved by
the Board before the bank can put it into effect.
In order to explain the procedures by which the
religious board answers staff questions and enquiries, the
procedures in FIBS are now outlined. The procedures in other
banks are very similar.
The FIBS Religious Supervisory Board applies the
following steps in answering questions put to it.
a) The board studies the subject under enquiry thoroughly. A
technical scrutiny is carried out with the help of technical
staff with special knowledge of the subject under
consideration.
b) The board seeks the legal precedent for the question in
the jurisprudence literature.
c) If a legal verdict has been established and agreed upon
by jurists for the matter under consideration, then the
board adopts that verdict. If, on the other hand,
conflicting legal opinions are found, then the board selects
from them the verdict it thinks is most reliable or
conducive to welfare. The board's prioritising (Tarjih)
depends on this criterion. If the matter under consideration
is a new transaction which has not been discussed before,
then the board will discuss the matter and submit its legal
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opinion, bearing in mind the juristic rule that,
"basically, all trade transactions, mutually agreed between
the parties concerned, are permitted in Islamic law, except
those specifically forbidden in the Qur'an or by Tradition
(Sunnah).
d) The board's policy is not to adapt Islamic principles to
conform with conventional banking, but rather to conduct
banking services in accordance with Islamic principles. It
accepts services compatible with Islam, modifies those which
conflict with Islam and creates alternatives to practices
which are incompatible with Islam.
el Every member of the board, individually, researches the
subject under consideration and notes his findings according
to the points mentioned above. In the board meeting all
opinions are discussed in order to reach a verdict.
f) Finally, the verdict is typed and signed by all members,
and sent to the department concerned through the
secretariat.
g) If any member does not agree with the general verdict,
his view is noted.
It might be argued that, as the Board is employed by
the bank, this might affect its neutrality and it might be
biased. However, it is believed that the employment of the
Board by the bank will not affect its major role as an
auditor of the bank's contracts from the Islamic point of
view. IBWS's Board, for example, in 1987 declared the
illegality of four of the bank's contracts, which were
immediately cancelled or revised in accordance with the
308
Board's recommendations. In TIB, the Religious Supervisory
Board in 1984 annulled or revised some of the bank's
contracts after the bank had given its commitment.
However, it is preferable to have a separate body or
religious board to monitor the activities carried out by
Islamic banks. This board could be attached to an audit
corporation organised by the government or by private
initiative.
It is thus clear that administrative organisation in
Islamic banking is similar to that of Western companies. In
fact, most Islamic banks are established as joint-stock
public limited companies, a concept which is borrowed from
Western society and reflects its cultural, economic and
political environment. This may limit its applicability in
other societies (e.g. Muslim societies). Although the
concept of a shareholders company does not directly
contradict Islamic principles, it may give rise to
principles and practices which may not conform with Muslim
norms and values.
The organisational structure of Islamic banks is
similar to that of Western companies. The bodies which are
responsible for managing and supervising the activities of
both kinds of company are the same, that is, the General
Committee and Board of Directors. Although an Islamic bank
has a religious supervisory board, this is not so much an
addition to the management as a consultative body, .a.
principle well established in the Western concept of
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companies.
The General Committee, which is the highest authority
in the company's organisation, makes and ratifies decisions
by voting at General or Extraordinary General Meetings. The
number of each shareholder's votes depends on the number of
his shares in the company. The Board of Directors which
manages the company is also elected in the General Meetings
by voting on the basis of number of shares. Thus it would be
reasonable to conclude that in a shareholders company,
wealth rules. This domination of money in joint-stock
companies is accepted in the West, but it may not have the
same acceptance in Muslim societies.
Banks as joint-stock companies mobilise, in addition to
their capital shares, vast resources through deposit
accounts. Thereby they can exercise a tremendous control
over these resources, which are far larger than their
capital. In 1987, the paid up capital in FIBE was $70 m,
while deposits were $1,505 m. In TIB, for the same year,
paid up capital was LS 24 m, while deposits were LS 178 m.
The paid up capital in FIBS in 1987 was LS 59 m, while
deposits were LS 390 m. This highlights the situation
described above, whereby, since participation in decision-
making depends on the number of shares (i.e. the amount of
money) which every shareholder has, the More wealthy
shareholders are in a better position to influence policy.
Moreover, in banks, some shareholders exercise vast control
over primary and derivative deposits.
To avoid this problem in Muslim countries it would be
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advisable to prescribe an upper limit for ownership of
shares in these companies; or to allow equal voting rights
to every shareholder, regardless of the number of shares
owned. Either of these	 suggestions, whichever is most
appropriate, should be put into effect after quantitative
and statistical study to determine an appropriate ceiling
for the number of shares owned by any one shareholder, in
order to determine the appropriate number of shares or votes
for each shareholder. Also it would be desirable to
disperse the controlling power of banks 	 by spreading their
shares over a larger and broader-based sector of societyl.
2) Avoidance of Interest
In the discussions, the interviewees stressed that they
avoid interest in their dealings. Any stipulated increment
over the principal loan is avoided; and activities are
based on profit and loss sharing, and interest-free loans
(Quard Hassan). The only credit finance operated by these
banks is Murabaha sale. It was argued that this kind of
activity is not prohibited in Islam; it is an accepted and
legitimate transaction. Murabaha is not a loan but a sale;
the commodity price in Murabaha is higher than its cash
price. This difference between cash and Murabaha price is
allowed to cover any additional expenses which may arise.
The commodity price is usually paid to the bank by its
client on a credit basis. In this case the difference
between cash and credit prices is to cover the additional
cost of administering credit sales.
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It is argued that the only cage in vhich
bank may consider dealing in interest is *ellen it dekil 11:4thl
a foreign conventional correspondent. The genewal ti/W1114 uir
Islamic jurisprudence is to classify ouch dexilin%!-$ .414;
"necessity"; in this case it is permissible for Me aWititC tOP
pay interest if there is no other alternative, on thce 0/.990114
that, "necessities justify committing prohibited 00014e..
However, Islamic banks try to avoid such deallnv
searching for a correspondent who will agree to tle
overdraft basis of treatment, whereby the Isla ic lask CAW
withdraw money from its account with the correspondent ewes
if the balance falls below zero, on the terms that tSe
correspondent has the same right. It is a mutual agreement
whereby both banks enjoy similar treatment.
Even this kind of agreement is not strictly permissIble
in Muslim jurisprudence, on the ground that it is considered
to have the semblance of interest; in Muslim jurisprudence,
any loan which bears benefits to the lender is considered
illegitimate. However, it is argued that the mutual
agreement between the Islamic bank and its correspondent in
a foreign country to lend to each other without interest is
not "a loan generating benefits", because the aim and
intention of the Islamic bank, in accepting this formula,
is to avoid usury. The Islamic bank's goal is not the
benefit generated by the loan, but the achievement of
"welfare" in conformity with Islamic principles, that is,
avoiding interest.
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3) Forms of investment
Islamic banks practice investment through different modes of
finance reflected in Musharakat 2 (Musharakah and Mudarabah),
Murabaha, diminishing partnership, Ijara (leasing) and
Salem, each of which was discussed earlier.
Investment volume in these banks is limited by a
ceiling policy imposed by the central banks. The poor
economic infra-structure in the Sudan, together with limited
investment resources, have resulted in low investment in
banks. When they were first established, they concentrated
on short-term investment, such as trade, mainly through
Murabaha and short-term Musharakat. The credit ceiling
policy played an important role in forcing the banks to
limit their finance to short-term operations only, because
they were excessively dependent on turnover to achieve
reasonable profits. The profits achieved from a small
fraction of their available investment resources were shared
among all investments; idle moneys were entitled to a share
of the realised profit.
However, after a few years of operation, the banks
started to extend their finance to medium and long-term
operations, introducing Ijara alongside Musharakah. A
special feature of Musharakah is that it can be used for
medium and long-term investment. Under the Ijara method of
finance, the bank retains the ownership of the asset while
the client possesses and uses it; the client has to pay
specified rentals over a specified period of time. Periodic
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checks are made by the bank to ensure that the asset is in
good condition.
The forms of investment practised by Islamic banks have
created many accounting difficulties, for many of the
clients do not keep accurate books of account. In
Musharakat, accounts are kept with clients; banks,
preferring to minimise their administrative expenses, do not
follow up these accounts in detail, instead relying on the
reputation of the client. Clients' financial abilities,
their business experience and their integrity are closely
investigated.
Another difficulty is that the nature of finance
extended by these banks leads their being directly involved
in the supervision of the projects concerned, which
increases their expenses. The banks have instituted the
function of follow-up to guide and monitor projects in which
they are involved, a policy which has proved its worth, as
the efficiency and the returns on these projects have
increased.
It is claimed that the banks carry out Murabaha
according to Islamic principles: the bank purchases the
commodity and retains responsibility for it until the client
receives it. The reason for this, it is argued, is to retain
the risk of the transaction with the bank until possession
has been transferred to the client. In MUrabaha, the price
paid by the bank for the commodity is called Murabaha's
capital. This figure should be clearly stated and known to
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both parties. The client agrees to re-purchase the commodity
with a pre-determined mark-up. Payment may be in cash or
deferred, the latter being either in lump sum or by
instalments. The bank signs two contracts, one with the
supplier and the other with the client. If the bank were
sign only one contract, with the purchaser, then the
transaction would be equivalent to interest-based finance.
We have seen that the bank is responsible for the
goods until they reach the client. Opinions differ as to
whether the client has an option (Khiyar), i.e., the right
to default and reject the goods. Although some scholars do
not consider it necessary, it is customary in the Sudan for
Tslamic banks to give their clients the option to buy or
reject the goods purchased by the bank at their request.
However before committing themselves to this kind of
transaction, the banks carefully study the market to avoid
goods in low demand. They also may refuse to deal again with
clients who have defaulted. FIBE gives the client the
option, but if he defaults, the bank has the right to
dispose of the goods by whatever means possible, and any
loss to the bank must be compensated by the client, the
compensation being taken by the bank from the advance
payment made by the client as part of the commodity price.
This practice is justified on the ground that the loss was
incurred because the goods were ordered at the client's
request. However, in the opinion of some scholars, this
practice renders Murabaha illegitimate, and it is the
.31.5
1 Musharakah	 Murabaha
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Other
:(including Mudarabah)
Year
subject of considerable debate among scholars. Murabaha will
be discussed in greater detail later in this study.
Mudarabah was stopped by the Bank of Sudan in 1986, on
the ground that it helps to increase the money supply and
hence increase inflation. Islamic banks in the Sudan have
been supposed not to engage in Mudarabah contracts since
1986.
Thus banks accept investment deposits from the public
on the Mudarabah contract basis but they cannot introduce
finance on the same basis. However, this policy is
temporary, linked with a specific economic situation.
In TIB, for example, the percentage of Islamic
financing methods in the bank's total investment were as
follows:
Table 1
Percentage of Activities in TIB
1983 - 1988
1983 37 61 2
1984 31 66 3
1985 36.5 59.2 4.3
1986 52.1 47.9 -
1987 64.5 35.5 -
1988 69.7 30 0.3
Source: TIB (Investment Department).
T n 1985 Murabaha represented 82% of the total
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investment in local currency in TAWS, Musharakah 17% and kW
Salem 1%. Musharakah represented 100% of the total
investment in foreign currency for the same year, PfiVr46/444*
continued to represent a high percentage of the total]
investment in TRWS for the following years.
In Al-Baraka Bank (BB) Musharakah and OfmrALUelbw
generated 65% and 58% of the total income of the haltk
1987 and 1988 respectively. Murabaha alone represented moroe
than 65% of the total finance of the bank.
4) Deposits
All deposits and a part of the bank's capital are he1I(11 iinn
one pool, which makes it difficult to determine each part"s
share in actual investment, and hence in profits. This
problem was considered earlier. Islamic banks which
liquidate every Mudarabah separately (such as Al- a aka
Bank) do not face these difficulties.
Profits on investment deposits are determined after
completing and liquidating projects. Returns on these
deposits are calculated on the basis of realised profits.
Investors are entitled to share in all profits from the
projects which their moneys have actually helped to
finance. Investors do not bear any of the administrative
expenses of the bank, which has to cover these expenses frou
its share as entrepreneur, which ranges between 25 - 30% of
the Mudarabah profits.
5) Valuation
Valuation is carried out using the straight line method of
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depreciation, with the taxation departments in each country
determining the rate of depreciation. Traditionally, the
Hijri Lunar year is used as the base for the financial year
in these banks, but some have changed their financial year
to the Gregorian year -Tadamon Islamic Rank is an example.
The valuation given by using the rate suggested by
taxation departments may be unrealistic, for given the
prevailing inflationary situation in these countries, it
would be more just to use replacement price or actual value
in valuation. Fortunately the banks do not pay Zakah on
fixed assets, so that the miscalculation is of minor
consequences. (The inclusion of fixed assets for Zakah
purposes is controversial among scholars; however the
Islamic banks selected in the sample do not add fixed assets
to the Zakah base).
in 1983 FIBS hired a specialist company to value its
premises; that valuation is considered as the actual value
of the premises, and depreciation is calculated on that
basis.
6) Relationship with Central Bank
Generally speaking, the Central Bank is responsible for
implementing monetary policy, which aims to achieve an
optimum rate of economic growth with full employment and
monetary stability. Central banks have general basic roles,
including issuing currency, organising credit, acting as
banker to the government and to the commercial banks and as
lender of last resort to commercial. banks and other
financial institutions.
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The Central Rank also acts as regulator, director and
supervisor of Islamic banks and other banks. It does this
through various control techniques, such as:
a) Reserve requirements: the central bank requires
commercial banks to deposit a certain percentage of their
total deposits with it.
In 1.987 it was required that at least 20% of total
deposits be kept with the Central Bank. In 1988 and 1989
this percentage was reduced to 18%. The minimum cash ratio
deposited by the commercial banks before 1987 was 12.5% of
total deposits.
b) Liquidity ratio: the central bank requires commercial
banks to retain a certain percentage of their resources in a
cash form.
c) Credit ceiling: a credit ceiling is fixed for each bank,
and this must not be exceeded.
d) Rate of interest: the central bank has a special rate of
interest for dealing with commercial banks. A decrease or
increase in this rate affects the structure of interest
rates in the credit market.
The first three of these techniques do not conflict
with Islamic principles; the only controversial element is
that they may have a negative effect on Islamic banks,
particularly the credit ceiling. However, the use of the
rate of interest by central banks to decrease or increase
the structure of interest rates, conflicts with Islamic
principles. Another contradiction with Islamic principles is
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the existence of interest-based financial fines and
penalties imposed on commercial banks by central banks. This
could be overcome by replacing interest-based fines with
fines which are not related to the volume or period by which
the credit ceiling is exceeded; the interest base could be
replaced by the general profit rate of Islamic banks
prevailing at the time.
Some of the difficulties facing Islamic banks are
caused by the introduction of laws which are mainly geared
to facilitate the work of interest-based institutions. The
central banks still use conventional methods for
controlling the money supply and use the same supervisory
techniques for Islamic banking. It is believed that the
central banks should change their control techniques in the
case of Islamic banks, on the ground that the activities
undertaken by Islamic banks have a limited effect on the
expansion of the money supply.
In FIBS, it is argued that the credit ceiling policy is
more harmful to Islamic banks than to conventional ones,
resulting in decreasing annual returns, because Islamic
banks generate their income from actual investment, while
that of conventional banks is generated merely by the number
of days that pass. Another disadvantage of the credit
ceiling to Islamic banks is that it discourages niedium and
long-term finance.
While conventional banks' interest-based borrowing and
lending expands the money supply, Islamic banks, in
contrast, provide finance through participation where they
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have good control on the velocity of money circulation,
which is tied to the liquidity of the operation. The methods
of finance used by Islamic banks, which link finance to
actual production of goods and services, help the central
bank to ensure that its policies are efficiently carried
out. They also lead to the flow and distribution of goods
and services; hence speculation can easily be traced and
controlled. Therefore, it can be concluded that the
effect of Islamic financing on the expansion of the money
supply is quite limited when compared to the effect of
lending by conventional banks.
The credit ceiling policy for 1986 obliged the
commercial banks in the country to utilise their specified
credit ceiling as follows:
i) 30% of each bank credit ceiling should be allocated to
finance exports.
ii) 25% of the credit ceiling was to finance working capital
for industry and agriculture.
iii) 35% of the credit ceiling was to finance medium and
long-term projects.
iv) The remaining 10% was to be allocated to financing local
trade.
This policy was amended in 1988, since when 80% of the
credit ceiling of every bank is to be allocated to financing
exports, working capital for industry and agriculture,
artisans and medium and long-term projects. Even if the
bank's finance for these sectors does not reach 80% of the
321
credit ceiling, the finance extended to other sectors must
not exceed 20%.
About 70% of TIB resources remain idle as a result of
the ceiling policy imposed by the Sudanese Central Bank. The
volatility of the policy makes it difficult for the
management in Islamic banks to plan in advance, and the same
situation is faced by other Islamic banks.
In 1988 the credit ceiling for IBWS was LS 68.9 m,
which was raised in 1989 to LS 94.6 m. 80% of the credit
ceiling in 1988 had to be allocated to priority sectors, as
required by the Central Bank, which was equal to a sum of LS
55 m.
However, in 1988 a sum of IS 51.6 in was allocated by
the bank to these sectors, less than the credit ceiling
assigned to it (as these sectors are of long-term nature it
is supposed that the bank did not have the chance to utilise
the entire credit ceiling assigned to them). Trade and other
short-term finance alone absorbed LS 35.6 m, causing the
total finance of the bank in this year to reach LS 87.2 m.
Trade and sectors other than those considered of priority by
the Central Bank were supposed to be allocated no more than
20% of the credit ceiling, i.e. LS 14 m. However, the bank
in 1988 exceeded this figure by 21.6 m, i.e. 154%, the
excess may be due to turnover, as funds generated from
liquidated projects are not included in the credit ceiling
(see Table 27 Chapter 8).
In 1988 and 1989, the total deposits, apart from the
bank's capital and reserves, were LS 92 m and LS 155 m
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respectively. This shows that LS 22 in and LS 60 in of the
total deposits in 1988 and 1989 respectively would have
remained idle, let alone other resources. If the 18% of the
total deposits which should be kept as a reserve is excluded
then the idle resources from the total deposits were LS 5.5
m and LS 32 in in 1988 and 1989 respectively.
The creation of huge amounts of idle resources as a
result of the credit ceiling policy is a situation common to
all Islamic banks in the country.
TIB, for example, suffered greatly from the credit
ceiling policy, as shown in Table 13.
Table 2
Credit Ceiling RE Total Deposits in TTB
1984 - 1.988
LS m
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
1- Credit ceiling	 24	 32	 45	 52	 118
2- Total deposits	 43	 77	 120	 178	 258
3- 12.5% of total deposits	 5	 10	 -	 -	 -
4- 20% of total deposits	 -	 -	 24	 36	 -
5- 18% of total deposits	 -	 -	 -	 -	 46
Source: TIB annual reports.
TIB (Investment Department).
In 1988, the credit ceiling allowed to the bank was LS 118
m, while the total deposits less the required reserves were
LS 212 m. In other words, a sum of LS 94in would have
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remained idle if the bank had honoured the credit ceiling.
In 1987 the idle resources of the deposits would have been
IS 90 m, and LS 51 m, LS 35 m and IS 14 in in 1986, 1985 and
1984 respectively.
However, the ceilings assigned to these banks are not
inflexible: the banks can bargain with the Central Bank to
increase their ceiling. In October 1985, the credit ceiling
decided by the Central Bank for TTB, for example, was LS
28.5 m, but in November 1985, it was raised to LS 31.8 m. In
January 1988, the ceiling for the bank was LS 64 m, but
after only three months it had been raised to LS 69 in and at
the end of the year it reached LS 118 m.
This flexibility, indeed, might explain why some banks
exceeded the ceiling allowed to them.
Some of the problem areas where central banks need to
provide support for Islamic banks as suggested by FIBS 3 are:
a) They should act as lender of last resort to ensure
adequate liquidity and to sustain Islamic banks in the
event of liquidity and solvency crises. The lack of a
lender of last resort jeopardises Islamic banks' access
to money markets, nationally and internationally. This
is because they lack confidence, due to the probability
of lack of liquidity. However, solvency crises may tend
to create less pressure in the Islamic system because
the equity base of Islamic banking is relatively
larger, and there is a substantial volume of ANdarabah
deposits. 4
324
b) With regard to central bank regulations, Islamic
banks do not like to deal with conventional interest-
bearing instruments. Therefore central banks should
look into ways and means of developing financial
instruments which are interest-free. This would enable
Islamic banks to benefit from their funds placed with
the central bank to meet statutory liquidity
requirements.
To overcome these problems it is suggested that a
special department be created in central banks to monitor
and support Islamic banks. This would be a good step towards
the scrutiny of existing laws regulating commercial banks in
Muslim countries, in order to ease the working of Islamic
banks. Suitable instruments to regulate the relationship
between central banks and Islamic banks might be explored.
However, mutual understanding between central banks and
Islamic banks is needed to exchange views and experience in
order to develop a relationship which would prove acceptable
and practicable. In order to assist Islamic banks and make
them more able to play a positive role in development, it
would be advisable to review all existing laws related to
interest-based financial institutions and amend them to
' conform with Islamic teachings.
7) Other Difficulties
Accounting difficulties in Islamic banks are due to the
fact that a pre-determined rate of interest is replaced with
a profit and loss sharing system. The relationship between
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an Islamic hank and its agent or between the bank and its
depositors (Rub ul Mal) is no longer based on a pre-
determined rate of interest. Accounting principles are
required to record financial transactions for two kinds of
financing, i.e., a financier who is a partner or a creditor.
In the first case a financier will be entitled to profit and
loss while in the latter a creditor will be entitled to a
fixed rate of interest in addition to the principal. A
special situation arises in the case of a third party who is
not a shareholder hut a creditor, but yet is entitled to
profits, not to a fixed, pre-determined rate of interest. 5
Existing accounting principles may not meet this situation
satisfactorily.
It is argued that investment depositors should not be
treated as shareholders, because shareholders are permanent
partners while investment depositors participate for a
temporary period. Other arguments, however, equate them with
shareholders, implying that they be represented in the
company's general meetings 6 , on the ground that they are
actual financiers and that they face the same risks as
shareholders.
Investment depositors in FIBS, are entitled to returns
generated by their funds which participate in actual
investment, as explained earlier. All other banks in the
sample, except Al Raraka hank, use a similar method of
investment (i.e. all different funds are held in one pool).
BB invests depositors' funds (Mudarabah certificates) in
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special projects and operations; the bank can invest in
these projects if it wishes, but profits, along with
investors' funds, will be distributed after liquidation and
completion of the projects. Direct - expenses, in all the
hanks sampled, are borne by investors (depositors), but
indirect expenses, e.g. the bank's administrative expenses,
are borne by the banks.
Reserves are deducted from profits after distributing
the depositors' (investors') share. This means that reserves
are retained from shareholders' profits only. Article No.62,
in the FIBS Memorandum, states clearly that reserves must be
retained after distributing the depositors' share of
profits. In 1981 and 82, FIBE retained reserves from
profits before distributing the depositors' share, but this
was changed in January, 1984. The general reserve is to be
10% of shareholders' profits after distribution of
depositors' shares in profits.
The banks used to fix a limited life for each
partnership (Kisharakah), to minimise the possibility of
disputes between the bank and its clients. Both the bank and
the client have a right to manage the venture, but the banks
prefer not to exercise this right. The client takes this
responsibility on the terms that he will be entitled to a
certain percentage of the future profit. Also the situation
whereby the client is to be responsible for loss is clearly
stated in the contract.
Conclusions
A number of problems arise as a result of the attempts of
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Islamic banking to satisfy Muslims' desire to avoid
interest. Some of these problems relate to the legal
framework, such as structure of the bank, relationship with
Central Banks and application of accounting principles.
Others are concerned with the use of special models of
finance to achieve the elimination of interest.
Islamic banking hopes to benefit the information and
experience of other developed nations, though there may be a
conflict of norms and standards. Thus practical difficulties
arise, as Islamic banks in some cases may want to use a
specific technique without its essence. The nature of banks
as intermediary financial institutions is normally so bound
up with the use of the interest, that the removal of this
basic feature changes the nature of the institution. This in
turn raises the question of the choice between radical and
gradual change.
As Muslim countries are not well developed in the
fields of finance and economics, it is believed that they
must learn from other nations' achievements. It is to be
expected that many difficulties arise, but Islamic banks
must learn to live with these and try to solve them, for
radical change is practically impossible, especially in the
prevailing weak and undeveloped economic climate.
However, apart from the above, it is recommended that
Islamic banks, till they develop a technique for deposits
insurance, should maintain a high capital/deposits ratio. To
be more practical, capital/risk deposits (investment
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deposits) ratio should be reasonably high. Furthermore, the
banks need to accumulate a reasonable level of fixed assets,
as the investment of Islamic banks, compared to the credit
operations of conventional banks, theoretically, involves
high risk.
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X
PROBLEMS: ACCOUNTING
Problems: 
Accounting
The following two chapters discuss the problems facing
Islamic banking. Some of these problems arise from the
matters discussed in the previous chapter. Others are raised
as misgivings related to the viability of Islamic banking.
These problems and difficulties are classified into
accounting and economic problems. Other difficulties related
to the legal framework, administration etc, are also
discussed, though they are classified into one of the
previous categories. Because of the interrelation between
accountancy and economics, a problem may be discussed under
one of these headings, while containing many features
relating to the other. For example, short-term loans will be
discussed under accounting difficulties although they have
many economic aspects. However, because the 'solution
suggested to this problem is connected with the accounting
system, which refers to computing the rate of profit, it is
preferable to classify this problem under accounting
problems.
Accounting problems will be discussed first,
illustrated by cases from Islamic banks. Economic problems
and difficulties will follow; any other difficulties, such
as legal or administrative problems, will be discussed as
they arise, in whichever category seems appropriate.
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Accounting Problems
Before discussing accounting problems it is desirable to
examine briefly the legal framework which controls the
economic system in Muslim countries. This is because the
legal framework has a direct impact on economics and
accounting. It is well known that many economic and
accounting implications arise from legal regulations.
Therefore the legal framework also has a direct impact on an
Islamic bank, which has to be established and conduct its
business according to these laws and regulations.
Muslim countries have inherited the Western legal
framework. After political independence, many Muslim
countries found themselves facing a critical situation. They
had to run their countries, economically and politically,
according to values and norms prevailing throughout the
world: the inherited Western legal framework which
originally evolved to meet the needs of the developed
countries. The interest-based economic system which is part
of this framework was also inherited by Muslim countries.
Although an interest-based economic system conflicts with
Islamic teaching, at first Muslim countries were unable to
change it, as they did not have a practicable alternative
to play the role of the rate of interest.
Islamic banking came into existence facing this problem
of an inherited legal and economic "package" which was
interest-based. For this reason, Islamic banking in the
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Muslim world has normally had to be established by special
acts, and has been exempted from several existing laws and
regulations related to the rate of interest.
Some of the legal difficulties facing Islamic banking
are related to the formulation of banking system, which
necessitates the imposition of many regulations related to
services introduced by banks, in order to facilitate their
work. These laws and regulations are meant to regulate the
relationship between the bank and their clients, so
protecting both parties. Such regulations may create
difficulties in the case of Islamic banking. These areas
are:1
1) To protect deposits it is forbidden by law for banks to
indulge in investment which involves uncertainty or risk. It
is believed that such investments may jeopardise these
deposits. Hence laws are set out to regulate and enforce a
specified percentage for such investments. Such laws
sometimes stipulate that this percentage should not exceed
shareholders' funds, to protect deposits from risks and
uncertainties. This is why most banks' activities are
undertaken through interest-based guaranteed loans. An
interest-based loan, however low the rate of interest,
provides a guarantee that the money will be repaid.
2) There are other laws which decide a minimum limit for the
interest rate given by banks. This is to guarantee a minimum
return to depositors on their deposits. The imposition of
such laws would contradict with Islamic banking only when
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the rates of profit in these banks were less than the
stipulated minimum rate of interest.
In order to bypass these and other difficulties,
Muslim countries have set out special acts and exemptions to
establish Islamic banking.
The first difficulty, whereby banks are forbidden to
undertake direct investment by using clients' deposits, is
not applicable to Islamic banking, at least so far as
investment deposits are concerned. Islamic banking has three
kinds of deposit, (i.e. investment, current and saving
deposits). Investment deposits are deposited on a Mudarabah
basis. Investors share in profit or loss as it occurs. They
place deposits in the bank on the understanding that they
may lose. Thus there is no need to protect them against
uncertainty. In fact, they are seeking this uncertainty.
The deposits which actually need to be protected
against investment uncertainty are current and savings
deposits. The use of these deposits in investment conflicts
with the law. However, Islamic banks can find arrangements
by which they can use these funds in investment without
jeopardising them. One of these arrangements is the
protection of deposits from shareholders' funds, in other
words, to use in investment a proportion of these deposits
which is equivalent to the amount of shareholders' funds. If
any losses occur, they will be compensated from
shareholders' funds. Another suggested arrangement to
protect these deposits is to insure them. In order to use
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these deposits in investment, it is advisable to be fully
insured by a co-operative insurance company. It has been
pointed out that a scheme for deposits insurance is an
integral part of the Islamic banking system. 2 However, the
difficulty of protecting demand and saving deposits has been
solved by adopting a co-operative company and holding and
subsidiary companies, 3 whereby a holding company finances
subsidiaries to engage in direct investment.
Regarding the second difficulty, whereby a minimum
rate of interest is imposed: as pointed out earlier, Islamic
banks face this problem only when their rates of profit are
less than the minimum interest rate prescribed.
Nevertheless, the principle of enforcing a fixed rate of
profit or interest clearly contradicts Islamic principles.
Islamic banks working in Muslim countries need not face this
problem for these regulations are imposed in Western
countries.
Having explained the legal framework in Muslim
countries, the research now turns to the consideration of
accounting problems. As mentioned before, difficulties arise
in Islamic banking due to the fact that interest-based
activities are replaced by a profit and loss-sharing system.
Accounting problems and difficulties in Islamic banks can be
classified as follows.
Depositors' Share in Profit
The definition of depositors and their rights needs to be
clearly laid down. However, the views of Muslim economists
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on this subject differ widely. Some writers 4
 view
depositors equally to shareholders and argue that it is
unfair that they are not represented in the company's
administrative bodies; others, 5
 on the other hand, argue
that to equate depositors with shareholders is to ignore the
distinct difference between them. A shareholder, it is
argued, is a permanent partner in the company, whereas a
depositor is only a transitional investor. This fact, it is
pointed out, has many legal and economic implications.
Therefore it has been suggested that a depositor's share in
profit should not be as the same as a shareholder's.
To avoid this conflict, it is desirable to define
clearly investment depositors and to describe their relation
with the bank. Therefore it will be helpful to prescribe
clearly the relationship between depositors and banks in the
following areas:
1-	 Retaining of reserves must be clearly stated. Do
depositors have to participate in them or not? If they
have to participate then this should give them some
rights in the entity. Thus they are permanent partners
rather than transitional ones. However, it is believed
that, because these deposits are of a short-term
nature, it would be better to retain reserves after
distribution of the depositors' share in profit. This
will limit depositors' rights to those investments in
which their money has actually participated. As stated
before, interviews in Islamic banks revealed that some
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of them retain reserves after distribution of
depositors' profit, while others retain them before
such distribution.
2- The depositors' percentage of the profit should be
prescribed in advance. This will minimise the
possibility of disputes.
3- The rights of depositors as participants also needs
prescription. Are they similar to shareholders in
rights and duties or are they of a second class? The
answer to this question, however, depends on the
extent to which they participate in the reserves
retained. If they receive their profit before
reserves are retained, then they are participants of a
different category to shareholders.
4- Profits have to be computed on the basis of the volume
of money participated in investment and on the duration
of time that the money is deposited. Expenses,
disbursements, provisions and depreciation related to
depositors' investment should be actual, and not
exaggerated, in order to reflect the depositors' real
profits.
However, it would be preferable to consider depositors
as a different group, and not to equate them with the
shareholders. This is mainly because investment deposits are
of a short-term nature. Hence, reserves should be retained
after distribution of depositors' profit. Projects in
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which these deposits are invested should be completed or
liquidated before the depositors withdraw their investment,
or at least a fair valuation should be made to protect their
rights. Placing depositors in a distinct category avoids
many accounting difficulties and other legal and economic
implications.
As mentioned before, all of the Sudanese banks surveyed
in the previous chapter retain reserves after distribution
of depositors' profit. The credit ceiling policy adopted in
the Sudan, has impeded the growth of investment deposits in
Islamic banks, as the profit to he distributed tends to be
low; for example, FIBS in 1983 stopped accepting or adding
to these accounts.
Rank's Share in Mudarib's Profit 6
Islamic banking extends finance to entrepreneurs on the
terms of Musharakat. As pointed out earlier, many
difficulties arise in that Islamic banking monitor these
projects to a minimal extent in order to minimise expenses.
Therefore it would be helpful to prescribe in contracts
between the banks and their clients the following:
Musharakat fund: clients combine their own money with
that given by the banks on a Musharakat basis. This
leads in many cases to disputes, so it is desirable to
prescribe clearly in contracts the Musharakat fund.
2-	 Disbursement: another area which needs a clear
prescription in contracts between Islamic banks and .
their clients is disbursement. Which expenses that
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should be borne by the Mudarabah fund and which by the
client himself?
3- The period of time during which the operation should be
liquidated must also be prescribed. However, the money
realised from operations, in certain cases, should be
transferred to the bank at once and not used by the
client in private operations.
4- if the client is to manage the operation, his share as
an entrepreneur should be clearly stated in the
contract.
5- Situations whereby the client remains fully
responsible for loss should also be clearly defined and
prescribed.
These points should be agreed and clearly prescribed in
the contract, so that accounting can be established on that
basis. Other banks' contracts related to other activities
such. as Murabaha, Ijara etc. should also be carefully
written, specifying each party's rights and duties. Hence
each party would know his responsibilities, which would help
to avoid disputes over the distribution of profit.
Case 1
The following cases were chosen from three different
Islamic banks in the Sudan (FIBS, TIB and IBWS), with the
aim of illustrating accounting difficulties facing Islamic
banks. The monitoring and follow up of projects and
operations in which Islamic banks participate, creates
difficulties and increases their expenses.
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Nonetheless, these expenses can be absorbed by
increased return. For example, when FIBS used to provide
working capital for industries without supervision over
related projects, the rate of return was quite low: about 5%
to 6%. However, when the bank started to supervise its
investments, sending staff to follow up the performance of
the relevant projects, the rate of return increased to 15%
to 18%, compared with supervision costs of only 1.5%.
Supervision is sometimes exercised by appointing one of the
bank's staff to the project, in which case such expenses
would be borne by the project. In other cases, monitoring is
practised by periodic check up. However, both kinds of
supervision will be shown in the case study.
The figures given in discussing these cases are not the
actual figures, as the aim is to show the difficulties
facing these banks rather than the figures themselves.
In Musharakat, applications from clients are usually
accompanied by a feasibility study; after approval, a
contract will be signed by both parties. An account for the
operation will be opened wherein every party's share in
capital and revenues will be deposited.
The following case is a partnership conducted in TIB in
1988, for milk production. Its capital was LS 140,000 shared
as follows:
the bank's share (first party)	 = LS 105,000
the partner's share (second party)	 = LS	 35,000
It was agreed that 40% of the profit would be granted to the
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value of cows (valuation)
value of cows (cost)
loss
= LS 104,000
= LS 140,000
= LS (36,000)
partner for his entrepreneurship, the remainder to be
distributed in proportion to each party's share in the
capital. The duration of the project would be two years. As
suggested in the application, the aim of the operation was
to buy 20 cows with their calves, in order to produce and
sell milk. The bank supervised the project by checking up
from time to time. It was agreed that a monthly report would
be provided by the second party.
After one year an evaluation of the project was made
whereby:
total revenue (sale of milk)
total expenditure
profit
= LS 104,000
= LS 70,000
= LS 34,000
However, as the project was continuing, the valuation
of the cows was not considered and the profit resulting from
milk production was distributed as follows:
partner's share as entrepreneur = 34,000x40% = LS 13,600
profit to be distributed = 34,000 - 13,600
	
= LS 20,400
105,000
bank's' share = 	  x 20,400
	
= LS 15,300
140,000
35,000
partner's share - 
	
 x 20,400
140,000
= LS 5,100
partner's total share of the profit 	 = LS 18,700
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The partner used to prepare and send a monthly report
to the bank. The report of April 1988 can be summarised as
follows: The cattle were in good health. One of the cows had
delivered a healthy calf (female) on the 28th. There were
eight animals in total: 2 cows producing milk; 4 cows not
producing milk, and due to give birth; and 2 calves.
However, it is observed that imported, rather than
local cattle were bought. The value of these was higher than
that of local animals, as their milk-yield is high.
Expenditure:
food for the cattle	 = LS 3,800
grass	 = LS 2,000
maize plant	 = LS 1,000
others	 = LS	 800
medicine for the cattle 	 =LS	 250
wages	 =LS	 300
total expenditure	 = LS 4,350
total revenue from selling milk
lb 1500 x LS 1.5	 = LS 2,250
Revenue in this month was low compared to total
expenditure, because only two cows were producing milk. The
remaining four were due to calve.
Bank Agent's Report:
On 23rd of May 1988, the bank's agent visited the cow-
shed and reported to the bank. The workers had been
interviewed and the general situation of the farm and the
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health of the cows were also reported. It was stated that
five cows out of six were producing milk. Three calves were
alive while the other two had died.
The daily average production of the milk was about
lb 174. That means the monthly revenue would have been about
lb 174 x 30 x LS 1.5 = LS 7,830.
The report did not mention anything about expenses. It
recommended that maintenance be carried out to the cow-shed
and cows' drinking pool. It was also recommended that a
detailed report of the farm's expenditure, accompanied by
bills and receipts, should be prepared by the partner and
submitted to the bank. The partner should also deposit all
revenue in the operation's account kept at the bank, as
suggested in the contract.
Liquidation:
The bank withdraw from the project by selling its share
to the partner in March 1990. The withdrawal of the bank
was completed on the following terms and basis:
a) The calves were individually valued at current prices.
40% of their value went to the partner as recompense for his
management, the remaining 60% was distributed between the
parties in proportion to their share in capital.
b) The value of the cows plus revenue minus expenses minus
capital was considered to be profit which should be
distributed in proportion to the capital invested.
c) The bank sold its share to the partner; the partner paid
a third of the money at once, the remainder to be paid in
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equal instalments within four months.
It is apparent that the terms of liquidation violated
the terms of the contract. Moreover, these terms were in
favour of the partner, as the value of the calves was higher
than that of the cows. It also appears that the bank
preferred to withdraw from the project as its supervision
over it was minimal, and therefore revenues and profit were
not satisfactory.
In projects with low capital, banks prefer not to
appoint an employee from their staff to monitor the project,
as expenses tend to be high. Therefore they depend on the
partner's integrity, and simply send an employee to inspect
the project periodically. As integrity is the main criterion
on which the bank chooses its clients, this introduces an
element of subjectivity into the bank's decision.
The bank's clients are drawn from a broad spectrum
covering a wide range of businesses including industry,
agriculture and trade. Therefore, the bank needs staff
whose training gives them an understanding of these
different kinds of businesses.
It is not always practical to apply all the terms of the
contract. As pointed out in the above case, the bank had to
change • the terms of the contract in order to withdraw from
the operation.
The management ratio, which was 40% in the above case,
varies from 15% - 45% of the profit in these banks.
Generally, the greater the difficulty of marketing of the
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product, the greater the management ratio. In trade, the
ratio ranges between 20% - 25% of the profit.
An account for the operation should always be opened,
in which all revenues should be deposited immediately. Any
money withdrawn should be used only in the operation, and
documents should be presented.
Case 2
The following case is similar to the previous one;
therefore, it will not be described in detail. The aim of
quoting it is only to widen the range of the sample by
choosing a case from a different bank.
IFIWS agreed in 1989 to participate in a project for
producing milk. The total cost of the operation was 150,000,
shared by the bank and its partner. The bank's share was LS
90,000 (i.e. 60%); the partner's share was LS 60,000 (i.e.
40%). The bank agreed to participate for- five years, the
partner to buy 20% of the bank's share every year. 25% of
the profit would go to the partner for his management, the
remainder to be distributed in proportion to the partners'
shares in capita]. Also it was agreed that revenues should
be deposited in the operation account at once. The partner
should report periodically to the bank, which would send
staff to check up and report the situation of the project.
However, in thiS case, as in the previous one, the
partner is the direct manager of the operation. Therefore,
again the bank is too dependent on the integrity of its
partner. Nonetheless, other measures to reduce risk and
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fraud are also taken by the bank, such as sending agents to
follow up and report on the project, requiring invoices and
receipts for expenses and depositing at once any revenue
realised in the account in which all funds for the operation
are kept.
To conclude, Islamic banks, when using MUsharakat, have
to rely to a great extent on their partners. Monitoring of
operations put an excess pressure on these banks. They also
have to employ a relatively large number of employees who
need a variety of experiences and know-how. In some cases,
as will be shown later, Islamic banks appoint some of their
staff to monitor a project in which they participate until
its liquidation.
It is observed that the management ratio in the above
case was only 25% while it was 40% in the previous case,
although the nature of the two operations was the same. This
suggests that every bank applies whatever conditions it
likes. It would be preferable if a third party, the Central
Bank, for example, were to determine a range for management
ratios for every kind of business.
Valuation of Profit at the End of the Financial Year
Islamic banks, where investment is carried out without
separation of investment deposits, face difficulties in
relation to profit realisation. The profit which is
distributed at the end of the financial year is computed for
completed projects only. Those projects which are not yet
completed or liquidated will be deferred to the next year or
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when they are due for liquidation. Conventional accounting
recognises revenue only when realised; thus revenue will not
be recognised with respect to a transaction that is
uncompleted at the close of an accounting period 7 . This
principle, however, affects participants who withdraw from
investment whereas their moneys or part of them have
actually participated in financing the projects concerned.
This means that such depositors will lose some of their
profits.
To avoid this problem there are two alternatives:
either to adopt a form of investment where investment
deposits are invested in prescribed projects for a limited
period of time, or to abandon the realisation principle. The
first alternative, as pointed out earlier, will have an
adverse affect on the efficiency of Islamic banking in
mobilising savings. Nevertheless, there are some Islamic
banks which adopt that form of investment. However, if all
Islamic banks were to adopt that system, then their
efficiency in mobilising deposits would be jeopardised.
Therefore it is believed that this alternative is not
desirable, as it would adversely affect the whole system of
Islamic banking.
The second alternative, that is, changing the
realisation principle is worthy of consideration only in
the case of projects where investment deposits are
participating. The realisation convention is used to protect
ownership, so that unrealised profits are not distributed.
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It is argued that, as such profits can be distributed in the
future upon their realisation, there is no need to bring
the distribution forward. This principle is acceptable in
the case of a shareholder or a permanent owner; even if he
wishes to withdraw, the financial situation of the company
will be reflected, to some extent, in its share price.
However, application of this principle may harm some
investors whose deposits are of a short-term nature.
Therefore, it is strongly argued that it would be better to
introduce a valuation, especially for projects in which
investment deposits are participated. This valuation should
take place at the end of the financial year when profits are
usually distributed. Ultimately the bank and the depositors
will have to agree any difference which may arise when
revenues are realised.
However, profit computed on a valuation basis should
not be distributed at once. it is advisable to retain it as
a reserve to be distributed upon its realisation. This
suggestion will be explained in detail later, when the
conservatism principle is discussed.
in any case, the realisation convention does not enjoy
overwhelming acceptance. Many writers and accountants have
suggested that it be altered or abandoned; valuation has
been suggested instead. Moreover, in practice, there are
many departures from this convention. Realisation is
recognised, for example, when deferred sale takes place and
in the case of long-term contracts. The American Institute
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of Certified Public Accountants recognises 8 the
acceptability of stating inventories at net realisable value
if those inventories consist of "precious metals having a
fixed monetary value with no substantial cost of marketing"
or "other exceptions" characterised by inability to
determine appropriate approximate costs and immediate
marketability at quoted market price.
Consequently, it is believed that the introduction of
valuation of investment depositors' projects in Islamic
banking, would be both acceptable and practicable. It would
help to determine each party's share in profit clearly and
fairly. As valuation must be judged primarily on the basis
of its usefulness, as noted earlier, this usefulness is
realised in the case of investment depositors' projects, in
that it is conducive to the realisation of justice.
Short Term Loans
Another difficulty facing Islamic banking is that of finding
a formula by which to deal in short-term loans, and to
remunerate banks for short-term loans or overdrafts to
industry and commerce. Short-term loans are usually granted
for a period of three months or less. Other short-term
loans, such as overnight loans, day loans and call loans are
for periods less than a day. In an interest-based economy,
these loans bear interest. If a short loan is needed, a
conventional bank will approach the central bank or any
other financial institution and take out an interest-based
loan. The rate of interest at which the loan is given is the
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rate prevailing at that moment.
In Islamic banking this problem may be tackled through
two alternatives; either through a mutual agreement whereby
Islamic banks lend to each other without interest, or by .
lending to each other on the basis of the rate of profit to
the borrower prevailing at the time of the loan.
As noted earlier, the first alternative has also been
suggested to facilitate the provision of overdrafts with
regard to a correspondent of Islamic bank. The objection to
this treatment as "a loan which generates benefits" has also
been pointed out. Nevertheless, it is argued that the aim of
the bank is not the benefit, but is to avoid an interest-
based transaction. However, a "similar treatment" formula is
suggested 9
	
	jdepending on the opinion of a Muslim urist10
who rejects the "any loan which generates benefits is usury"
rule. He argues that it is very natural and of
the essence of any loan to generate benefit. A loan
generates benefits for the lender, who guarantees his money
against uncertainty, on the assumption that the borrower
will return the loan in all cases. It also generates
benefit to the borrower who has the use of the money for a
period of time.
The second alternative (i.e. participation on the basis
of the rate of profit) suggests that, if an Islamic bank is
in need of a short-term loan, then it can approach any
financial institution and borrow from it. The return on that
loan should be computed on the basis of the rate of profit
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generated from the project(s) in which the loan is used. If
the loan is not used in distinct project(s) then the general
rate of profit for the borrower is to be used to determine
the return on the short-term loan.
The second alternative looks practicable in the case of
short-term loans which are granted for a period of a month
or more. Even then it is applicable only in the case of
enterprises that draw up quarterly or monthly accounts for
internal purposes. in such cases it is possible to attribute
to short-term loans a certain percentage of the quarterly or
monthly profit corresponding to the share of short-term
finance in overall funds. This arrangement, it may be
mentioned, needs an efficient bookkeeping system (e.g. a
computerised accounting system) that can quickly provide
statements on the profit-and-loss situation for periods of
less than a financial year.11
A particular problem is the remuneration of short-term
loans with maturities of less than a month. These loans are
usually provided in the form of credit lines or overdrafts
for short-term liquidity requirements. The application of a
participation system in such cases seems impracticable,
since loans are not attributable to specific projects.12
However, if a rate of profit is to be generated for such
short periods, it will depend to a considerable extent on
estimates, which makes them resemble interest. Therefore it
is believed that such loans should be provided freely (Qurud
Hassana) with a service charge. The service charge can be
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computed on the basis of administrative expenses. A second
suggestion for solving this problem is the use of the
"mutual agreement lending" method, whereby banks borrow from
each other on an equal basis. As pointed out earlier, this
kind of agreement is not permissible according to the
majority of jurists, as it is considered "a loan generating
benefits". Nevertheless others accept such agreements.
However, this method, although controversial, is preferable
to an estimated rate of profit, which may appear, to some
extent, to be in the nature of interest.
Others tackle this problem from a different point of
view, namely under a complete Islamic banking system. It is
argued 13 that, under an equity financing system, the overall
financing needs for undertaking a given volume of a specific
type of business, are determined. The business then has to
manage its total cash flow within this framework. Financial
institutions, which make financing available to a given
business, share in the profit and loss within the framework
of the financial package made available to the business,
including short-term finance, and not on advances provided
for a day. Temporary liquidity squeezes faced by a pro erly-
run business may be relieved by the financial institution in
conformity with the package and the terms of the overall
agreement. The business must operate through this packase.
Therefore most financing of a very short-term nature would
have to be made part of the overall Musharakat agreenent h to
the mutual satisfaction of the borrower and the lende.r..
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However in genuine cases, the financial institution can
always consider providing additional assistance as its
profit-and-loss sharing will depend on the overall financing
provided on a daily average basis.
To conclude, there are two alternatives suggested to
remunerate short-term loans provided for short-term
financing. The first is "mutual agreement lending", the
second is the rate or profit of the borrower for the period
concerned. Although the second alternative is applicable in
the case of short-term loans with maturities of more than 30
days, it appears impracticable in the case of loans with
maturities of less than 30 days. in the latter cases, the
"mutual agreement lending" method is suggested, though the
controversy of this method from a juristic point of view is
noted.
Conservatism
The application of this principle will lead to a reduction
in the Zakah base and investors' profit. it has thus been
argued 14 that the valuation of capital items for the purpose
of calculating Zakah should be done on the basis of current
cost accounting. Such valuation is accepted for inventory
for traders, which is calculated on the basis of the market
price for which the goods are offered.15
The conservatism principle may be acceptable for the
determination and distribution of shareholders' profit where
the company is a going concern, because accounting
techniques which have an unfavourable impact on the
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stockholders' equity would not harm the permanent
shareholders. However, this is not the case in Islamic
banking, where there are investors who wish to withdraw
their actual profit. Moreover, these banks must have an
accurate basis for calculation of Zakah as a religious levy.
However, any suggestions to solve this problem should
not ignore the importance of the conservatism principle,
which helps to protect the company's assets. According to
this principle, assets and revenues are recorded at the
lowest value, while liabilities and expenses are recorded at
the highest. This ensures that the profit distributed does
not contain any part of the capital. The use of any
valuation basis, other than the lower of cost or market
price, results in the recognition of unrealised gains. Hence
the principle helps the continuity of the business.
Two conflicting approaches to this principle may be
taken by Islamic banking. It may be accepted, and values
recorded accordingly or it may be abandoned, which may
jeopardise the existence of the Islamic bank. It would be a
case of prioritising between the benefits to public welfare
of accepting conservatism to ensure the continuity of
Islamic banking (at least from the standpoint of protecting
their capital), and the achievement of fairness by adopting
current cost accounting. It is thus necessary to choose
between two Islamic values, that is, public welfare and
fairness.
Therefore, it is believed that the best way to approach
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this problem is by having two kinds of financial statements.
Tt would be advisable to report both current and historical
costs and to establish a reserve for profits to be
distributed in the future as they occur. This reserve would
be equal to the difference between the profit figures given
in the current and historical cost statements. Zakah would
be calculated in accordance with current cost. If the sum
paid as Zakah were proved in the following year to be
greater than the actual sum due, then the excess would be
considered as Zakah paid in advance. It has been reported 16
that it is permissible in Islam to pay Zakah in advance.
Assume, for example, that an Islamic bank's current
cost financial statements show the following figures for
7akah and net profit (in Sudanese pounds):
Zakah = 50,000 , net profit	 = 500,000
On the other hand, assume that according to the historical
cost statements, Zakah and net profit appear as follows:
Zakah = 30,000 , net profit	 = 300,000
According to the previous suggestion Zakah for the
current year will be paid at 50,000. If, in the next year
and according to the actual values of assets, it is found
that this sum is correct, then no problem arises. If on the other
hand it is found that the actual Zakah should have been
only 45,000 then the difference of 5,000 would be deducted
from the Zakah for this year, and considered as Zakah paid
in advance.
Regarding profit, a reserve of 200,000 (500,000-
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300,000) would be retained and distributed in the following
year if it actually occurs.
However, it should be pointed out that, in practice,
the procedure would not be as easy as shown in the example,
as many practical difficulties would arise. The values of
many assets may not be realised in the following year as
valued. Moreover valuation, in many cases, is not attributed
to specific items of inventories, hence values are combined.
Even so, it is very important that Islamic banking should
seriously consider reporting both historical and current
costs. Such reporting is well-recognised in developed
countries, and many Accounting Associations have adopted it.
Moreover inflation accounting 17
 has been introduced in
practice since the mid-1970's, though it is much more
complicated than the suggested proposal of reporting both
historical and current costs with a retained profit reserve.
Actual Cost basis
As money is the common denominator which enables diverse
types of activity to be compared and combined, it is used to
express accounting information. 'In practice, the concept of
value which is accepted and used in the great majority of
situations, is original or historical cost. 18
 Cost is
measured by the amount of the immediate cash consideration
in the case of cash transactions, while in credit
transactions it is measured by the amount of money which
would be required to effect immediate settlement of the
1obligation incurred. 9
 Assets are valued at acquisition
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cost, and, once they have been so stated they are accounted
for on that basis. These values do not change except when
they have lost the utility to the company which they had at
the time of acquisition.20
Although the use of the actual cost basis is the
conventional practice, it has been subject to much criticism
as it leads to misleading information, particularly in the
case of assets valuation. It thus has an adverse effect on
the Zakah base and the investor's share in profit, and it
misleads decision-makers. Therefore the alternative is to
use current cost accounting with a profit reserve as
suggested above. It was pointed out earlier, when the unit-
of-measure postulate was discussed, that the use of money as
a base of measurement is acceptable under a stable monetary
system, where stability in the value of money is maintained,
but it is questionable when price levels are changeable.
Therefore it is argued that, under a stable monetary system,
actual cost is acceptable as a unit-of-measure for
preparation of the primary financial statements and as a
basis for valuation and preparation of financial statements
at the end of the financial year. Under inflation, actual
cost can still be used for preparation of the primary
financial statements, but for valuation and preparation of
the financial statements at the end of the financial year,
it is advisable to use current cost to determine the Zakah
base and investors' share in profit.
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Tandeed (Full Liquidation)
This difficulty is a juristic rather than an accounting
problem. Tandeed, or realisation of the goods of Mudarabah,
is an essential condition in Islamic jurisprudence for the
distribution of profit. The logic behind it is to first
guarantee the realisation of capital, and then to distribute
profit, as profit is a protection for capital. Such a
condition would be reasonable in the case of simple
Mudarabah, where only two parties are involved.
in the case of Islamic banking the situation is
different. in simple Mudarabah the owner needs to protect
his money which is given to the agent. Therefore any
condition which provides that protection is reasonable.
However, in the case of Islamic banking, the bank has a dual
role. it is an agent when it receives Mudarabah money from
depositors, and an owner when it provides the money for
investment. This condition can be applied when the bank is
working as an owner, hence in the contracts with
•Mudaribeen21 it can be stipulated that Mudarabah profit will
not be distributed unless Mudarabah is fully liquidated.
However, in the case of the relationship between the bank
and its depositors, the owner in this case is the
depositors; the bank is working on their behalf. Although
the relationship between the bank and the depositors is
based on Mudarabah, where the bank is the agent, in fact the
bank is not involved in work, but provides Mudarabah funds
to other agents. Hence the bank is an owner on behalf of the
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depositors. As Tandeed is stipulated to protect capital,
this protection is fulfilled if Tandeed is stipulated
between the bank and its agents. Therefore Mudarabah profit
can be distributed annually. Mudarabah revenue can be
determined through valuation using current cost. In order
not to jeopardise capital, a reserve should be retained to
be distributed in the future.
To conclude, as Tandeed is stipulated to protect
capital, this condition can be stated between the bank
(which is working on behalf of the depositors) and its
agents, MUdaribeen. As far as the relationship between the
bank and the depositors is concerned, such a condition is
not necessary. Nevertheless a valuation on current
cost accounting basis should be made to determine Mudarabah
revenue, along with a reserve for profit. -
Administration
The administrative difficulties which face Islamic Banking
are, in many ways, similar to those facing traditional
banks, but there are particular difficulties facing the
former because of the introduction of a profit and loss
sharing system.
The Islamic bank, before committing itself to any
project, needs to study it carefully. The preparation of a
detailed feasibility study for the project(s) under
consideration is essential, and the bank agrees or refuses
to finance the project(s) in the light of the study.
Therefore the bank needs to employ a number of specialists
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in different fields. This, however, increases the
administrative expenses of these banks.
The role of the Islamic bank .does not end with its
agreement to finance the project. As a partner it has to
monitor the project to ensure its success. The weak
administration and accounting environment which is a feature
of the Third World places a considerable burden on Islamic
banking, for these banks have both to monitor and to develop
their clients' accounting and administrative performance. As
pointed out earlier, many of Islamic banks' clients have not
proper accounts. Hence Islamic banks incur additional
expenses in monitoring the projects in which they
participate.
The special nature of the activities of Islamic banks
needs a suitably-trained employee. The employment market
does not provide such employees, as Islamic banks have only
recently come into being. Therefore Islamic banking needs to
spend more on training. Moreover, Islamic banking employees
should be committed to the objectives of the bank as an
important requirement for the success of the system.
Murabaha makes Islamic banks work as wholesalers. They
need to purchase goods, which involves the complex and
lengthy procedure of ordering, tracing, receiving and
storing these goods. Consequently banks may be involved in
inventory management, with all its complexities. Again, this
means that the burden on Islamic banks is greater than that
facing traditional ones.
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In view of the above, Islamic banks' administrative
expenses tend to be greater than those of other commercial
banks. However, expenditure on feasibility studies and
training should not be considered as waste. Feasibility
studies and the development of clients' accounting and
administrative systems by Islamic banks might well result in
increased efficiency and economic growth, while training
provision benefits the community as a whole, by making it
possible to provide a better, more efficient service.
Case 3
A partnership between FIBS and Sweet Production Factory was
created in January, 1988. It was agreed that the bank's
participation in the working capita] would be 90% (i.e. LS
1.8 m), while the partners, who owned the factory, would
provide the remaining 10%. The purpose of-the operation was
to produce and sell sweets. The bank's partners hired out
their factory for this purpose. They agreed that the hire
terms should be per unit of production (i.e. 6.5 piastres
per 1 kg for type A, and 4 piastres per 1 kg for types B and
C; the factory produces three types of sweet). it was also
agreed that the bank's partners would have 45% of the profit
for management and marketing, the remaining profit to be
shared in proportion with each party's share in capital. The
bank appointed a member of staff to monitor the operation
and provide monthly reports of its progress. He was also to
state periodically the financial position of the operation.
The bank also sent committees to check and report the
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general situation of the project and the agent's
performance.
The project generated a profit of LS 0.8 m.
The bank's actual participation was only LS 1 m, while
the partners actual finance was LS 50,000. Therefore, the
actual total finance introduced was IS 1.05 m. The actual
finance was less than that proposed as revenues were used to
refinance the operation. Therefore,
45
the partners' share as entrepreneur = 0.8 x
	 = LS 0.36 m
100
The remaining profit = LS 0.8 m - 0.36 m
	 = LS 0.44 m
1
The bank's share	
	  x 0.44 in	 = LS 0.42 m
1.05
0.05
The partners' share 	
	  x 0.44-m	 = LS 0.02 m
1.05
Total partners' share	 = 0.36 in + 0.02 m	 = LS 0.38 m
The bank's profit as a percentage of its actual
participation =
0.42
x 100 = 42%
1.00
The project was liquidated after 13 months therefore, the
annual profit percentage =
42
x 12 = 38.8 % which was satisfactory.
13
Liquidation
The operation was liquidated after 13 months in January
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1989. The following procedures were taken to perform the
liquidation:
1- An audit was carried out of the purchase of raw-material
and stock, and the final balance shown;
2- An inventory count was made;
3- Cash books were checked and cash counted, comparing it
with the balances shown in the books;
4- Cash in bank was audited, compared with bank statement
balances, and necessary adjustments made;
5- A three months sample of the accounting hooks was
audited;
6- Working capital was audited , by comparing both parties'
share with the partnership account in the bank;
7- Balances carried forward in different accounting books
were checked and compared;
8- Trial balance and final accounts were prepared;
9- Profit was distributed.
In the light of the above, financial statements were
prepared in the above case. Some of these accounts were as
follows:
•363
Table 1
Balance Sheet as at 31.1.1989
LS '000'
Liabilities
Capital
bank's share	 1,000
partners' share	 50
(-) withdrawals
	
(450)
	  600
(+) Profit	 800
Creditors	 150
Unpaid expenses	 25
Assets
Cash in hand
	 8
Cash at bank 395
403
Inventory	 690
Closing stock 20
710
Debtors	 428
Expenses paid in advance 14
Others	 20
1,575 :	 1,575
Table 2
Trading and Profit & Loss Account for
the Period Ended January 31, 1989
LS '000'
Sales
cost of production
(-) closing stock
1,980
(20)
2,900
Cost of goods sold	 1,960
Gross Profit	 940
less:
general expenses	 130
bonus	 10
140
Net profit	 800
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Capital
Cash	 8
Bank	 395
Debtors	 428
Creditors
Inventory	 690
Cost of production	 1,980
General expenses	 130
Others (tax, loans receivable)	 20
Expenses paid in advance 	 14
Unpaid expenses
Sales
Withdrawals	 450
Bonus	 10
1,050
150
25
2,900
Table 3
Trial Balance at January 31, 1989
LS '000'
1 Dr.	 1 Cr.
4,125	 4,125
In addition to these accounts other accounts and
statements were also prepared. Costs were classified into
direct and indirect costs. For analytical purposes, each
item was shown separately. Direct costs included: sesame,
sugar, lemon, colours, spirits, salt, wages, maintenance
expenses, etc. Indirect costs included: fuels, water and
electricity, general maintenance, etc. General expenses were
also classified by item and analysed. These included:
salaries and wages, stationary, vehicle maintenance, bank
charges, transportation, storage expenses, auditor's
honorarium, factory hire, etc.
Factory hire expenses were LS 22,100, calculated as
follows:
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LS '000
sweet type A, hire expenses =kg 300,000 x 6.5 piastres=19.5
sweet type B, hire expenses =kg 30,000 x 4 piastres	 = 1.2
sweet type C, hire expenses =kg 35,0 .00 x 4 piastres	 = 1.4
22,1
Statements for debtors and creditors were also
prepared. Raw-materials movements were also show. For
example, production and sale for sweet type B, and other
raw-material tables were as follows:
Table 4
Sweet Type B Production
: Quantity (boxes)	 Value '000'
Stock at first	 -
Production	 4,200
Sales	 4,200	 66
Raw Materials
Table 5
Sesame
: Quantity (cases) I Value '000'
Stock at first	 55	 7
Purchase	 3,500	 620
Used for production	 2,700
	 .	 475
Stock at end	 855	 151
Sesame prices increased, stock at end was a part of the
newly purchased sesame.
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Table 6
Sugar
: Quantity (cases) : Value '000'
Stock at first
	 1,300	 117
Purchase	 3,000	 270
Used for production	 2,900	 261
Stock at end	 1,400	 126
Table 7	 Salt
: Quantity (cases) I Value '000'
Stock at first	 500	 20
Purchase	 1,410	 63.5
Used for production	 1,350	 58.3
Stock at end	 560	 25.2
Salt prices increased from LS 40 for a case to LS 45.
It is assumed that the first quantity (stock at first) was
consumed completely. Stock at end, therefore, represented
the quantity remaining from the newly purchased salt.
Moreover, the bank's agent has to prepare a general
report about the progress in the operation and attached it
with the liquidation report. Any difficulties or problems
impeding the operation are included.
In the above case, it was reported that there were
three lines in the factory for producing three different
kinds of sweets. However, the work was started in January,
1988 by only two lines. After one month, one of these two
lines was stopped as a result of shortage of raw materials;
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meanwhile maintenance were carried out in this line. In
March, 1988, work in the factory was halted completely for a
safety check up by the Ministry of Industry. The work was
resumed in April, 1988, but only one line was working, due
to shortage of raw materials. In May, 1988 the raw materials
difficulties were solved and all three lines were working
satisfactorily throughout the period until July, 1988. In
August, production was aga,in halted, this time because of
rain and flooding. Working resumed in September, 1988.
Sweet type A prices were high as demand was also high.
Most of the revenue and profit were generated from this
sweet.
It was also reported that the storehouses were small
and they needed maintenance.
This example shows that when the bank appoints its
staff to a partnership, the return is higher than for
projects managed solely by the partner(s). This is
attributable, not only to the integrity of the bank's
partner, but also to increased co-operation between the bank
and its clients, which helps to sort out difficulties and
obstacles and increases efficiency, which in return results
in better performance and profit.
As pointed out earlier, the use of Husharakat makes
these banks engage directly in businesses, with all their
difficulties and complexities, and more staff with
diversified experience are needed. As a result,
administrative expenses tend to be higher. Nevertheless,
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these expenses, in many cases, are absorbed by relatively
high return.
Case 4
The following case illustrates the same difficulties
mentioned above, except that it touches on a different area
of business, namely food oil production. Hence, the case
will not be described in full detail.
PIPS participated in 1988 in a partnership for
producing oil. The bank's share was 90% (LS 2.7 m), while
the partner's participation was 10% (LS 0.3 m). It was
agreed that the partner, who owned the factory (press),
would hire it to the partnership. The term of hiring was LS
10 for each ton of sesame or nuts pressed.
The partnership lasted for 11 months, from 1.10. 1988
to 31.8.1989. Auditing and necessary adjustments were made
to prepare final accounts. The bank appointed one of its
staff to this operation.
The profit realised was LS 1.2 m.
Partner's share as an entrepreneur = 1.2m x 45% = LS 0.54m
Partner's share (participation) = 1.2m-0.54mx10% = LS 0.07m
Bank's share (participation) = 1.2m-0.54m x 90% = LS 0.59m
Partner's total share	 = 0.54m + 0.07m
	 = LS 0.61m
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Table 8
Trial Balance at August 31, 1989
,	 Dr.	 1
LS	 '000'
Cr.
Cash at bank 671
Cash in hand 39
Debtors 6
insurance Co.,
Loans	 (receivable)
35
1
Oil Press Co.,
Purchase
31
7,689
Direct expenses 398
General	 expenses 154
Working capital 3,000
Bank's share (return) 2,700
Partner's share (return) 300
Sales 8,969
Compensation 35
Unpaid expenses 20
12,024 12,024
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Table 9
Trading and Profit & Loss Account for
the Period Ended August 31,1989
LS '000'
Sales	 8,969
Compensation	 35
9,004
(-) General expenses	 154
8,850
Purchase	 7,689
(+) Direct expenses 	 398
(-) Stock at end (raw-material)	 80
(-) Stock at end (final product)	 395
Cost of goods sold 	 7,612
Net profit	 1,238
Raw Materials Tables:
A sample of tables prepared for liquidation purposes
will be shown.
Table 10
Peanuts
Quantity (ton) : Value IS '000'
Stock at first'
Purchase	 1,600
	 3,200
Used for production	 1,600	 3,200
Stock at end
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Table 11
Fuel and Wood
Value LS '000
Stock at first
Purchase	 14.5
Used for production 	 14.0
Stock at end	 0.5
Table 12	 Barrels
Quantity (unit) : Value LS '000'
Stock at first
Purchase	 52,000	 1,300
Used	 49,000	 1,225
Stock at end	 3,000	 75
Production
Table 13	 Sesame Oil
Quantity (barrel) : Value LS '000'
Production	 7,200
Sales	 7,200
	
1,150
Table 14	 Peanuts Oil
Quantity (barrel) : Value LS '000'
Production	 41,200
Sales	 40,800
	
6,120 •
Stock at end
	
400
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Table 15
Peanuts (by-product)
Quantity (ton) : Value LS '000'
Production	 940
Sales	 630	 693
Stock at end	 310
Press Expenses
As mentioned earlier, the partnership hired the Press
to press crops at LS 10 per ton.
Sesame	 410 ton x LS 10 = LS 4,100
Peanuts	 = 1,600 ton x LS 10 = LS 16,000
Total	 LS 20,100
It was reported that profit realised, although
adequate, should have been higher. Relatively low profit
resulted from the pricing policy enforced by the responsible
authority. Much of the final product was 'sold at lower than
market price as a result of this pricing policy.
Stock at end (final product) was valued at a lower
price, as demand was low and transportation expenses were
high as a result of rain (car transport is used).
Stock at end was considered as a part of the bank's
share (this shows clearfy that the bank also acts as a
merchant).
A fire occurred, as a result of which a part of peanuts
by-product was lost. Insurance of LS 35,000 had to be paid
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to the partnership.
There were three presses in the factory; these were in
good condition and very efficient. It was recommended that
the bank should renew the partnership and increase its
share. If it decided to do so, approval should be given as
soon as possible to enable the partner with the bank's agent
to purchase crops (sesame and peanuts) in season when they
are in good supply and prices are low.
Accounting Standards for Islamic Ranking
Accounting standards are important for the preparation of
financial information. They make information relevant,
reliable and comparable. They also help to compare the
performance of different companies in similar businesses as
well as the performance of one company from one period to
another. Islamic banks, as special financial institutions
using special kinds of activities, need to use unified and
standardised accounting terminologies. As a response to this
need, the Islamic Development Bank (TDB) held a workshop
on the subject on 7-8th September, 1987 at its headquarters
in Jeddah, with the aim of eventually establishing
accounting standards for Islamic banks.
The participants invited to the workshop included
bankers, accountants and auditors, academicians,
representatives of Government regulatory institutions and
experts in Sharia'h. Two papers 22 and two comments 23 were
presented at the workshop, which stressed the importance and
need of accounting standards for Islamic banks within the
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Sharia'h framework. A steering committee were formed to
suggest a framework for promulgating accounting standards
for Islamic banks. Stressing the importance of relevant,
reliable and comparable financial statements in Islamic
banks, the workshop passed urgent resolutions for the
development of accounting standards.
The workshop's resolutions were:
1- An independent body should be created and developed,
consisting of representatives from Islamic banks,
professional accounting bodies, academicians, experts
in Sharia'h (Fuqaha), capital market organisation, and
Government regulatory institutions. The authority of
this body must be recognised by those who will have to
comply with the promulgated standards. (The role of the
body was not made clear in the resolution but it may be
conceived that it is intended to be like the Standards
Setting Bodies in the USA and the U.K.).
2- A conceptual framework for financial accounting and
promulgation of standards should be adopted in
compliance with Shari a 'h. Hence Islamic  banking
financial statements objectives should be clearly
defined to establish the basic features of financial
accounting for Islamic banks.
3- A steering committee should be formed to prepare the
required instruments for the suggested body to set up
accounting standards for Islamic banks. The membership
of the steering committee should represent Sharia'h
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scholars, bankers, professional accountants and
academicians.
It is recognised that the special nature of Islamic banking
activities necessitates accounting standards for measuring,
analysing, interpreting and communicating economic data.
Moreover, since Islamic hanks have been established on an
individual basis, different concepts and practices may have
been adopted, arising from the different views of the
Sharia'h Supervisory Boards in these hanks. Therefore any
establishment of accounting standards will harmonise
activities in different Islamic hanks, ultimately leading to
greater co-operation among Islamic banks. Hence a better
future and development can he realised.
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X
ECONOMIC PROBEMS
Economic Problems
It is argued that a non-interest monetary system, based on
profit and loss-sharing, would tend to realise socio-
economic justice and equitable distribution of income and
wealth, and exert a favourable influence on allocation of
resources, economic growth and stability. On the other hand,
however, it is feared that practical difficulties may arise
as to how to equate the supply of money with its demand in
the absence of interest as a regulating mechanism. How can
monetary policy play its role in achieving economic goals?"
It is argued 2 that a positive rate of interest is
needed to offset a positive time preference and marginal
disutility of saving and to compensate for depreciation of
real volumes of saving and investment in an inflationary
environment; hence, if interest is abolished, to what
alternative institutional arrangements and variables can a
non-interest-based economy resort, to play the role of the
rate of interest?
This chapter discusses the impact of the abolition of
interest On the economic system. The effects of the
suggested profit-sharing system on savers and investors also
discussed. The problems and difficulties are classified, and
the suggested ways of solving them are also considered.
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In discussing economic problems, especially those
connected with profit and loss-sharing as an alternative to
an interest-based system, the research aims to provide a
more complete picture of Islamic banking. Some of these
problems are highlighted as objections which may be raised
against interest-free banking, by those who fear that it
will be faced by difficulties and will not be practicable.
The evaluation of the nature and significance of these
misgivings and the suggested ways of solving these problems
and difficulties, is a contribution of many Muslim
economists. The research role lies in reviewing these
arguments and, if it is found that they are justified, to
present further recommendations on the subject.
However, this chapter is theoretical, rather than
empirical in nature; since no completely interest-free
system exists as yet, the misgivings and objections raised
are hypothetical, rather than the result of experience.
There are countries, such as Iran and Pakistan, where
Islamic banking is more widely utilised, but these are
outside the scope of the present study, and knowledge of
their experiences, though useful, would need further
research.
Saving and Investment 
It has been argued 3 that at zero-interest-rate, gross
savings would be zero and net saving would be negative
(because of depreciation). 4
 As interest is the return
received by savers for abstinence or waiting, then it
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measures the rate at which people exchange the use of goods
today for their use at some future time. It is argued 5 that
the rate of interest influences savings and investment
decisions of individuals over time, for two reasons. First,
people have a positive time preference as they would rather
consume goods now than wait to consume them in the future.
Second, resources can be used productively and can be turned
into future goods at a profit; therefore the investor is
willing to pay a positive interest rate to the supplier of
resources.
Justification of a positive rate of interest is thus
based on two grounds: first, positive time preference, from
the saver's point of view; second, positive profit generated
by using these resources, from the investor's point of view.
However, niether ground should be taken for granted. As
far as time preference is concerned, it has been generally
argued that a rational consumer may have a positive, zero or
negative time preference. 8 The positive time preference
assumption is not widely accepted among economists. 7
 Some
economists like Graaff, 8 for example, have doubted its
existence. Nevertheless, even if this assumption stands
true, this does not mean that in an interest-free economy
the marginal disutility of savings tends to increase,
because in an Islamic economy the rate of profit will
replace the rate of interest. Therefore the rate of profit
would offset the marginal disutility of savings as the
sacrifice of present consumption tends to decline with the
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passage of time.
To turn to the second assumption, i.e. that present
resources can be turned into future goods at a profit, so
that investors are willing to pay a positive interest rate
to the supplier of resources; this assumes that application
of resources always generates profit. However, this is not
always the case, for sometimes losses are also expected. It
might well be argued that according to the rule of
diversification of risks, the overall expected result will
be positive. If this stands true for the rate of interest,
which is dependent on the rate of profit, then it could be
argued that it should stand more true for the rate of
profit. In other words, the rate of interest is positive
because the rate of profit is positive. Moreover the rate of
profit should be more than the rate of interest to
.compensate the entrepreneur (profit or return, in a profit-
sharing system, will be equal to what it is in capitalism in
the form of profit plus interest).
To summarise, as the rate of interest offsets the
marginal disutility of savings, in other words, offsets the
positive time preference of the people, this role can well
be replaced by the rate of profit in a profit and loss-
sharing system. However, it may be argued that the rate of
profit fluctuates and is not always positive. This argument
might be invalid because if the overall rate of profit is
negative, the rate of interest in return should be negative
and less than the rate of profit. Therefore, as far as
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savings are concerned, the rate of profit will be a
satisfactory motive to generate a tendency towards saving.
Moreover, the tendency to save would be further strengthened
in Muslim society by Islamic values and morals which urge
the economical use of resources and spurn conspicuous and
extravagant consumption. 8
If individuals save, then it is natural for them to
look for profitable avenues in which to invest. People
generally invest for various reasons, such as to offset any
time preference they may have, to compensate for the rate of
inflation and to offset any future uncertainties. In Muslim
society, individuals have an additional incentive to invest
to compensate themselves for Zakah, which they should pay as
a religious levy. Zakah penalises idle resources, and
therefore discourages hoarding and stimulates investment. 9
The channel through which people invest in the absence
of interest is profit-sharing institutions. Various methods
of investment are available in an interest-free economy, for
sleeping and active investors. These are Musharakat,
Hurabaha and Ijara. Moreover, it is believed that, in Muslim
society, savings attracted into a banking system based on
profit and loss-sharing, will be greater than those
attracted into interest-based banking; because such a system
will attract the savings of individuals who have a religious
inhibition concerning the use of the traditional banking
system.
In previous chapters (7,8) it was shown that Islamic
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banks have acpuired considerable resources and public
savings, represented in capital and current, investment and
saving deposits. In FIBS, for example, saving deposits in
1988 reached LS 52 m, even though owners were not eligible
for any return.
Economic Growth
It has been argued that the prospects for growth will be
bleak in an interest-free economy. 10 However, this criticism
is based on the assumption that saving and investment tend
to decrease in an interest-free economy. The positive
influence of Islamic teaching and moral code on saving has
already been pointed out.
Nevertheless, it is indicated that the basic
ingredients for sustained growth are saving, investment,
hard work, technological progress and creative management.
All these ingredients, it is argued, are positively
1encouraged by Islam. 1 Savings, as well as moderation in
consumption, are encouraged by Islamic teaching; the desire
to save is regarded as a natural drive. 12 Moreover, hoarding
is discouraged through the moral code and the imposition of
Zakah. Investment, on the other hand, may be promoted
through Musharakat, equity-based business and limited
liability large-scale companies.
• The claim that the Islamic economy is inimical to
growth is based on the assumption that private sector saving
and capital formation will be low as the motive to save
would be erased, given that people have positive time
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preference, and investment would decline because savings
will decrease leading to a fall in investment, which in turn
would decrease economic growth. Such an assumption is
misfounded, as the expected rate of profit will still act as
an incentive for saving. Propensity to save will still be
high, for the expected rate of profit will work as an
incentive to offset any positive time preference.
A profit-sharing system is believed to be more
conducive to investment and growth, as certainty and
fairness are expected to prevail as long as the relationship
between the financier and the entrepreneur is based on a
fair ratio. The entrepreneur, being a major force behind
investment decisions, will be favoured by the removal of the
burden of a fixed rate of interest which must be paid in all
cases. Hence his investment decision would be more likely to
be directed towards innovation and productive investment.
Moreover, as financiers share in profit, they will actively
involve themselves in the entrepreneur's business to ensure
its success. Greater expertise, therefore , may become
available to the entrepreneurs, leading to improvement in
information, skills, efficiency and profitability, 13
 (as
shown in case 3 and 4; the previous chapter). More
productive entrepreneurship will lead to increased
investment. Moreover, banks in a profit-sharing system can
have a positive influence on business decisions; 14
 they can
function as an absorber of shocks stemming from the real
sector (venture) and can thereby reduce the cost of
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adjustment.
Islam emphasises hard work and acquisition of
knowledge. Esteem for work, along with the urge to improve
one's living conditions, would be conducive to growth
provided that an appropriate environment is available.
Technological innovation and increase in efficiency would
tend to be at least the same as under an interest-based
system, if not more, as decreasing of unfair and dishonest
practices would urge individuals to resort to efficiency and
technological progress for higher production and income. 15
In addition to the above, a relatively longer period of
finance is provided under profit-sharing, as expectation of
rolling over credit will decrease; a continued and stable
investment might therefore be established. In interest-based
finance, the financier tends to wait if the rate is low
compared with his future expectations and the,entrepreneur
tends to wait if the rate is high compared with future
expectations. Commitments are therefore made for short
periods. In profit-sharing finance, where there is no rate
of interest to worry about, the entrepreneur is mainly
interested in the total return on the investment. This might
encourage him to engage in investment so long as his reward
will be a percentage of the total return. 16 Moreover, in
profit-sharing, the price society has to pay for changing
valuations and imperfections of human foresight is shared by
providers of capital, financial intermediaries and
entrepreneurs. It does not give a privileged position to
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providers of capital by insulating them from all risks;
neither does it single out entrepreneurs to pay that
price.17
The fact that Muslim countries have experienced slow
growth rates over the last decades, is argued 18 to be due to
a number of institutional, political, social and economic
factors which have nothing to do with Islamic values.
Seemingly, the ingredients of sustained growth in an
interest-free economy, as reviewed above, tend to be
positively encouraged. Fulfilment of economic needs along
with the moral code encourages individuals in Muslim society
to save, invest, work hard and innovate, hence to grow.
Uncertainty
It has been argued 19
 that, under profit and loss sharing,
savers face more uncertainty than that faced by savers in a
traditional banking system. This argument is based on the
fact that nominal rates of interest given by banks are fixed
and pre-determined, while in the case of Islamic banking the
rate of profit is unknown.
However, such an argument ignores the clear fact that
the rate of interest depends on the rate of profit. It is
not conceivable that a positive rate of interest could exist
without a positive rate of profit. Moreover, the rate of
profit should be equal to, or greater than the rate of
interest.
The assumption of a positive nominal rate of interest
regardless of the rate of profit is a theoretical assumption
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or legal commitment. Any certainty or a guarantee for savers
established on the basis of that assumption would be a legal
guarantee rather than an economic one. However, the legal
guarantee is not always granted, especially if risk
jeopardises the investments.
For further emphasis on this point, let us assume an
economic system wherein there are only two sectors, namely
investor and entrepreneur, without any previous accumulation
of capital. If the saver deposits all his savings of 100
units with the entrepreneur at a 10% rate of interest, as
far as investment is concerned, three possibilities are
expected; the entrepreneur may have a rate of profit which
is greater than, equal to or less than the rate of interest.
In the first case the entrepreneur would give the depositor
the agreed rate of interest and retain the remainder. In the
second case the entrepreneur would give the depositor the
whole profit, which equals the interest and retain nothing
for himself. In the third case, the difference would be
borne by the saver because the entrepreneur has no previous
capital accumulation to compensate him. If it is assumed,
further, that the ultimate investment result is negative,
the saver in this case must bear the loss alone, since the
entrepreneur has no other resources to compensate the saver.
To conclude, the certainty or guarantee which is given
to savers by granting them a positive rate of interest is
not independent of the rate of profit; hence, if the rate of
profit is jeopardised it would also be adversely affected.
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Therefore savers in a profit-sharing system do not face more
uncertainty than that facing savers in an interest-based
system. Nevertheless, they share in the risks involved in
investment willingly. The expected rate of profit, in this
case, might be more, as variability and risks are greater.
Moreover, profit-sharing financial institutions might be
likely to direct their resources to more profitable
investments, since they have to share profit with their
depositors.
Allocation of Resources
It has been argued that an interest-free economy will not be
able to bring about an optimum allocation of resources,
because interest balances the demand for and supply of
loanable funds, hence bringing about an optimum allocation
of resources. 20
This objection, it is believed, is unrealiStic because,
in the absence of interest, loanable funds will not be
extended free to borrowers. In an interest-free economy,
funds would be available at a cost, which would be the share
in profit. Therefore the rate of profit would become a
criterion for allocation of resources as well as the
mechanism for equating demand with supply. 21
In addition, it is argued that the rate of profit is
more efficient in allocating resources than the rate of
interest, because in an interest-based system, loans are
extended to businesses with a high "credit-rating".
Therefore big business is always able to get more loans
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funds at a lower price. In contrast, medium and small
businesses, even if they are more productive per unit of
finance, may be able to secure only small amounts at
substantially higher rates of interest. Therefore, it may be
concluded that the rate of interest reflects the criterion
of "credit-rating" which does not always combine the
objective of productivity. 22 According to Moffitt, 23 large
companies are obtaining credit at significantly lower
interest rates than everybody else.
It has been argued 24 that, in a profit-sharing system,
since the financial institutions share in the profits and
losses of investors, they would be more likely to seek to
finance more productive and profitable projects. Reasonable
safety of the funds provided is obviously required, although
such a requirement will work as a constraint for extending
funds within the productive and profitable projects
framework. Nevertheless the collateral required tends to be
less than that required by traditional lenders because
profit-sharing institutions monitor, though to the minimum,
extended funds more closely than do traditional lenders.
This reduced requirement could favour new entrepreneurs
whose credit-worthiness is not yet established but who might
be very innovative. Therefore, it is likely that a profit-
sharing system would promote greater allocative efficiency.
Stability-2.5
It has been pointed out that replacement of interest by
profit-sharing will make the economic system highly
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unstable, as disturbances originating in one part of economy
would be transferred to the rest of the economy. However,
such apprehension is believed to be misfounded. On the
contrary, it is argued, interest is an important
destabilising factor in capitalist economies, as the rate of
interest creates a revolving shift in financial resources
between users, causing irregular movements in loan-based
investments, commodity and stock prices and exchange rates.
In an equity-based system the distribution of the total
return between the entrepreneur and the financier would be
determined by merely economic considerations, unlike
interest which must paid in any circumstances. Moreover, in
a profit-sharing system, as dividends can be reduced in bad
times, a company can secure its position by insuring itself
against difficult conditions, by means of an increased
payment in conditions when it is easy to meet it.
It is argued that under profit-sharing, uncertainty
would be distributed among all parties participating in a
business, for funds would be committed for a longer period
of time. As profit-sharing institutions are prepared to
share in losses, the severity of business recession would be
reduced. In an interest-based system, loans may be recalled
as soon as . the business concerned faces the slightest sign
of trouble; hence many bankruptcies may occur. Therefore, it
may be concluded that profit-sharing might be regarded as a
promoter of stability rather than a source of instability.
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26Loss in Deposits--
The fear that savers might be discouraged from depositing
their savings in profit-sharing financial institutions
(Islamic banking) has been expressed. It is argued that in
profit-sharing, deposits sometimes incur losses which must
be borne solely by depositors; therefore, to secure their
savings, depositors might not channel them through the
banking system. However, two suggestions may be made to by-
pass this problem. The first is diversification of risks: if
banks suffer losses in some of their investments, the losses
would be offset by profits on others and the final result
would be net profit. Second, a system of deposit insurance
would provide a secure environment for demand deposits.
Furthermore, as pointed out earlier, a fixed rate of
interest, although a security to savers still depends on the
rate of profit in the long run.
To avoid losses, banks study carefully the feasibility
of the projects in which they may engage. More information
about the business activities to be financed is required.
I
The experience, efficiency and integrity of the entrepreneur
should be scrutinised. In addition, collateral to secure a
breach of the agreement, may be required, though less than
that required by traditional banks, as pointed out earlier.
Profit-sharing institutions could resort to specialists in
project evaluation and the area concerned, seeking their
advice. They also need to develop their own expertise. They
need to recruit a large technical staff to assess the
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profitability of their projects. This however, substantially
increases their expenses. 27
However, as Islamic banks would presumably be willing
to bear greater risks, their rates of return would tend to
be higher. Moreover, as the expected risks would be borne by
the depositors, Islamic banks might accept investments with
greater variability and with more productive and profitable
investment opportunities, 28
 which in return result in a
higher expected rate of return. High expenses borne by
Islamic banks might be absorbed by such high expected
returns. Moreover, as Islamic banking provides information
and expertise, this could bring about an improvement in the
skills of investors; thus the enhanced role of the banks
could increase the profitability of investments.29
Nevertheless, the above does not totally remove from
Islamic banking the uncertainty involved in trade and
business. It faces two kinds of uncertainty: (i) integrity
risk, which arises from the-entrepreneur showing lower
profit than that actually made, (ii) business uncertainty,
which arises from variability in the market forces.
The first problem, i.e. integrity risk, might face
Islamic banks in the beginning of their existence, as
entrepreneurs' finance in the future will depend on how much
profit they have realised. Since an entrepreneur who cheats
may lose the chance to be financed by Islamic banking again,
this problem tends to be solved automatically. Moreover an
efficient audit system, if adopted by Islamic banking, could
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minimise such a risk. In addition, the likelihood of
dishonest entrepreneurs being financed by Islamic banking
should be minimal, as the banks examine thoroughly the
integrity of their entrepreneurs.
•
So far as the second problem, i.e. business
uncertainty, is concerned, Islamic banking could confine
this risk to only rare circumstances, as has already been
indicated, by preparation of feasibility studies and
diversification of risks. Examination of the business to be
financed to ensure its viability, along with proper
diversification of projects and portfolios, could prevent
net loss in all but rare circumstances.
To by-pass this problem, it has been suggested that
Islamic banks could build a "loss-offsetting" reserve from
their annual profits. 30 It is argued that a part of the
higher profits in boom years could be retained to offset
lower profits, or losses, in lean years. Therefore, deposits
could be assured and the question of loss of confidence
would not arise.
The above suggestion, although unfair for depositors,
has been defended on the ground that it benefits public
welfare. Such a reserve, it is argued, would be necessary to
strengthen Islamic banks and to boost the public's
confidence in their viability. Since the success and
continuity of the equity-based system would be in the larger
interest of Islam, the small sacrifice that the depositors
would be required to make should be acceptable.
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As far as the second suggestion, i.e. deposit
insurance, is concerned; as pointed out earlier, it is
necessary to establish a deposit insurance body to insure
demand deposits at the commercial banks, as an integral part
of a profit-sharing system. Deposit insurance for demand
deposits along with diversification of business risks could
help to a large extent in preventing profit-sharing
financial institutions incurring losses in Mudarabah
deposits.
Government Borrowing Needs31
A major criticism of an interest-free economy is that
government could not finance its budgetary deficit by
borrowing on an interest basis from the private sector.
Government budgetary deficit, it is indicated, is an
important means of generating growth and improving living
standards.
Admittedly, such borrowings would not be provided, as
many practical difficulties arise in applying the principle
of profit-sharing to government borrowing needs. It has been
indicated 32 that this area needs further research and study
as to how the borrowing needs of the government may best be
met. Nevertheless, arrangements other than interest-based
finance are suggested to absorb the negative impact of
government needs for interest-based borrowing. These are:
increasing taxation to offset government needs; using
Musharakat in appropriate projects; borrowing from central
and commercial banks on a non-interest basis; emergency
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borrowing from wealthy people on an interest-free basis
(Qurud Hassana); avoiding wasteful expenditure and keeping
administrative expenditure to the minimum.
Increase in tax should be kept within reasonable limits
as it might cause undesirable economic repercussions.
However, opinions regarding to what extent taxation should
be imposed in an Islamic economy differ widely. Some
writers 33 favour a wide discretion for the state in
determining the limits of taxation. They argue for an active
use of tax policy to achieve the goals of an Islamic society
which, include acceleration of economic growth and
maintenance of monetary stability.
Others, 34 on the other hand, favour a low level of
taxation, as it is believed taxes over and above Zakah are
justified only to meet defence needs, assurance of
subsistence living for the poor and the indispensable
expenses that safeguard the collective interest of Muslims,
thus giving wide scope to private effort and enterprise so
that economic activity proceeds without being inhibited by
high levels of taxation.
However, even according to the latter opinion, which
favours a low level of taxation, an increase in tax to meet
government needs is also acceptable, as it may be
categorised as "collective interest of Muslims".
It is also suggested 35 that government revenue be
increased to meet essential and productive expenditure by
reforming the entire tax structure. A rational tax system
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with balanced tax for different sectors is required to
eliminate differences between overtaxed and undertaxed
sectors. If inequities in the tax system are removed, tax
revenues could be substantially increased with a better
economic impact on incentives, output and distribution.
Imposition of a special tax to finance non-profit-
producing government projects is also suggested 36
 in order
to minimise the government burden.
Another way to meet government needs is through profit-
sharing. The government can procure funds through Mudarabah
certificates. Admittedly, this kind of finance is confined
to projects where Musharakat are applicable, because not all
government projects are amenable to profit-sharing. However,
it is difficult to meet government borrowing needs using
this method except by substituting funds. Nevertheless, the
government could finance all its projects where Musharakat
are applicable by using profit-sharing in order to save
their funds to meet needs which could not be financed
through profit-sharing.
Borrowing from central and commercial banks on an
interest-free basis to meet government needs has also been
suggested 37
 as a solution to interest-based borrowing.
However, borrowing from the central bank has to be kept
within reasonable limits to safeguard monetary stability. In
other words, it should not exceed the limits dictated by the
goal of price stability. Commercial banks, on the other
hand, can provide interest-free loans to the government in
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some proportion to the interest-free demand deposits held by
them. However, different modes of borrowing will have
different economic effects. The economic effects of
borrowing from the commercial banks will be different in
several respects from those of borrowing from the central
bank. 38 In the latter case, if borrowing exceeds a certain
limit, economic stability ma y be adversely affected. Hence,
it is believed, borrowing from central bank should come as a
last resort, if commercial banks are unable to provide the
required loans. Moreover, commercial banks are required to
divert a certain proportion of their demand deposits to the
government to enable it to finance socially-beneficial
projects in which profit-sharing is either not feasible or
desirable. 39
In national emergencies it might be possible for the
government to obtain compulsory interest-free- loans. Such
loans could be compensated by the higher income wealthy
people might earn during emergencies, or possibly by
exemption from income and wealth taxes of loans lent to the
government.
It is necessary that every effort be made to minimise
wasteful spending, eliminate conspicuous expenditure and use
limited resources efficiently, to minimise government needs
for borrowing. Government subsidies to the rich or those who
can afford to pay should be eliminated, as administrative
difficulties associated with price-discrimination may not
allow subsidised commodities for the poor; however, various
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methods to help the poor other than a general subsidy might
be considered. These may include economic support,
scholarships, donations etc., as wealthy people enjoy more
benefits from a general subsidy than do the poor for whom
the subsidy is originally designed. Moreover, such a policy
would help to minimise wasteful use of goods and services.
In other words, great emphasis should be placed on
evaluation of government expenditures in order to eliminate
all unnecessary and wasteful spending. More efficient and
equitable use of resources would help a great deal to
minimise government expenditures.
It is also argued that interest-based borrowing
encourages wasteful spending as the easy availability of
credit to governments from abroad may lead to loose
financing by governments, as lenders pay a little attention
to how the economy of the borrower and loans are managed.
Such loans in most cases may be used to meet current
expenditure rather than being invested in real assets, so
that more loans are needed with a rise in the debt-service
burden. Hence more borrowing is needed to maintain the
economy and to continue the debt-service payments.
On the other hand, government internal borrowing is
also inadvisable as it leads to decrease the supply of
loanable funds for the private sector. Borrowing from the
central bank is acceptable within certain limits. Exceeding
these limits leads to a rise in inflationary expectations
and economic instability.
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In the light of the above, it seems the remedy lies in
the removal of domestic imbalances in both public and
private sectors. The state is therefore recommended to
design carefully its expenditure policy; to make the best
use of available resources; to avoid unnecessary and
wasteful spending.
To conclude, if, after these policies along with
austerity, deficits arise it has been suggested that they
could be met by the following: profit-sharing financing of
government projects, if applicable; borrowing from central
and commercial banks or the public on free-interest basis;
and the imposition of a special tax.
Fighting Inflation
It has been argued 40 that a positive rate of interest
performs the function of safeguarding the real value of
savings. How can this function be maintained if interest is
abolished? Another problem facing an interest-free economy
is that imposition of high interest rates can be used to
curb inflation; how can inflation be brought down in an
interest-free economy?
The first difficulty, i.e. the function of the rate of
interest as a compensation for inflation, incurs two
drawbacks: i) sometimes the rate of inflation is far higher
than the rate of interest; ii) even if the rate of inflation
is less than the rate of interest, interest rate is a cost.
It is not a free compensation, as somebody else, usually the
entrepreneur, incurs this cost. Therefore, as suggested
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earlier, the rate of profit could function as a safeguard
against inflation and an incentive to mobilise savings.
Regarding the second problem, i.e. to curb inflation
using high interest rates, admittedly, in an interest-free
economy no institutional instrument like it would be found.
Nevertheless other economic methods, for example, credit
control and increasing taxation can be used along with the
moral code. Moreover using high interest rates to bring
inflation down has its own economic disadvantages.
Inflation is defined 41
 as a persistent and appreciable
rise in the general level of prices. In other words
inflation means a general rise in prices of goods and
factors of production. Inflation, therefore, tends to favour
debtors and profit receivers at the expense of creditors and
fixed-income receivers. 42 Money under inflation does not
serve as a just and honest unit of account. Moreover,
inflation disturbs the economic situation, discourages
capital formation, intensifies inequalities of income,
raises consumption and reduces savings. Islam stresses
fairness and justice; as inflation creates a disequilibrium
environment where some people unfair others, it is believed
hence that inflation is not compatible with Islamic
values. 43
Nonetheless, high interest rates to bring inflation
down could not be used in an interest-free economy, though
other methods can be used. However, before considering such
methods, the disadvantages of the high interest rate
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mechanism will be briefly discussed.
Reliance on high interest rates to curb inflation
results in increasing the cost of living, harming
investment, causing hardship to home ownersand small
businesses. Moreover as imports increase and exports
decrease, deficits in the balance of payment grow bigger, a
situation which might lead to economic recessions.
The United Kingdom's current experience of using high
interest rates to bring down inflation indicates that such a
policy may harm other economic sectors, while its benefits
are not realised as quickly as desired.
It has been asserted that interest rates in the U.K.
will remain as high as necessary for as long as necessary.
In 1988, monetary policy in the U.K. began to tighten. 44 In
the fourth quarter of 1988, domestic demand had been growing
even more rapidly than had been recognised when interest
rates were raised in the summer. Therefore a further
increase of 1% in the rate of interest was made. 45 British
bank base rates continued to increase ever since to reach
15% in October 5, 1989. 46 Nevertheless growth in demand
soared to 17.50% in the three years following 1985, the
fastest burst for decades. 47 Manufacturing output slowed
from a rise of over 7% in 1988 to an annual rate of only 3%
in the first seven months of 1989. The financial deficit was
expected to be bigger than in 1974 or 1979 as a percentage
of GDP (gross domestic product), and both of those deficits
heralded economic recessions. 48 Moreover, it was expected
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that the effect on the economy, as a result of this policy,
would take time to emerge in full. 49
As high interest rates have their own difficulties,
other methods beside the moral code can be used to bring
down inflation, in an interest-free economy. As pointed out
earlier, Islamic values encourage economic use of resources
and saving; on the other hand they condemn extravagance and
conspicuous consumption. This will lead to decreased
domestic demand.
Curbing inflation in an interest-free economy could be
carried out through the central bank by controlling the
economy's supply of money and credit. Controlling the supply
of money can be done by the following means:
legal reserves; legal reserve ratios could be used for
purposes of controlling the behaviour of commercial
banks. Hence changes in legal reserve requirements
decrease or increase the supply of money.
Musharakat ratios; the central bank can intervene to
decrease or increase the Musharakat ratios between
banks and their clients.
Mudarabah certificates; the central bank can issue
Mudarabah certificates to absorb money from the public.
However, such a tool is applicable only to specific
investment. Nevertheless the central bank might appeal
for free-interest loans (Qurud Rossano) from commercial
banks as well as from the public. However, open-market
operations, in an interest free economy, do not
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effectively control the supply of money as under an
interest-based economy.
iv- direct credit ceilings; the central bank, by using
credit ceilings, can control private spending. The
ceiling policy depresses spending as funds extended to
the public decrease.
The term "credit" is not given its full meaning in an
equity-based economy as funds are extended on profit-sharing
basis; hence investment can be used instead.
Direct controls over banks lending have their own
disadvantages, for it is difficult to administer them; they
reduce competition and efficiency within the banking system;
and they lead to slowdown in the economy, as do high
50interest rates.
However, it is felt that these disadvantages might not
be applicable in the case of profit-sharing, or at least not
have such severe impact as they have in an interest-based
economy. The first problem, i.e. administering credit, may
not arise in profit-sharing as operations themselves work as
administering tools. In an interest-based economy, it is
important, in order to control consumption credit, to
differentiate between investment and consumption credit. The
nature of the system makes loans to the public without
discrimination between different types of credit. Therefore,
because it is difficult to differentiate between investment
and consumption credit, many administrative costs and
difficulties arise in order to direct credit to the desired
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application. However, it is argued that such a problem does
not arise in profit-sharing, as the nature of the finance
necessitates knowing the type of investment. Even under
Hurabaha which has, to some extent, the nature of credit
finance, it is easy to avoid financing undesirable goods
without overhead costs.
Therefore under profit-sharing it can be guaranteed to
a large extent that banks will extend funds to desirable
financing or investment. Hence private consumption, along
with undesirable investments, can easily be checked. In
return, slowdown in the economy can easily be controlled;
furthermore, slowdown in the economy should be less than
that in an interest-based economy as loans may be extended
to finance consumption in the latter, whereas they can be
channelled to finance real investment, in profit-sharing.
As far as reduction in competition and efficiency
within the banking system is concerned, it is believed that
the reduction would not tend to occur as it does under an
interest-based system, as in profit-sharing most of the
credit, if not all, would be directed to real investment,
therefore the competition between banks would be within
these limits, which would be larger than in an interest-
based economy. A bigger sum of funds would be available for
real investment, as no funds are diverted to finance
consumption goods. For further emphasise on this point,
assume two economies with the same economic facilities and
investment chances, but different economic systems, i.e. (1)
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interest-based and; (2) profit-sharing. Let us further
assume that the comp osition of credit ceilings and
investment are as follows:
Cl = Si + V1
I1	 = Si	 + V1
V1 = Cl - Si
C2 = S2 + V2
C2 = V2
Cl = V2
V2 = Si + V1 = Ii
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
= V2
as S2 approaches zero then
as	 C1 = C2	 then
=	 12	 (7).
Therefore, a bigger sum of funds is available in (2)
which increases competition between banks, and hence
increases efficiency. However, even if efficiency is
relatively decreased, such an impact would be tolerated as
it would be temporary; furthermore the aim is to curb
inflation.
To conclude, it seems that better chances are available
for an interest-based economy to bring down inflation using
high interest rates along with other tools such as open-
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market operations. However, it may be argued that such an
advantage is due, not to the nature of the interest rates,
but to the economic system which is set out accordingly. If
finance, in an economic system, is organised in a "credit"
manner using interest rate tools then such instruments
comply with such a system, having a better chance to play an
important role in organising the economy.
In addition, profit-sharing as an alternative method of
payment, as experienced in the West, gives a strong
indication that the rates of inflation in a profit-sharing
system would tend to be very low.
To illustrate this point, it may be helpful to
consider profit-sharing as experienced in the West.
Profit-Sharing in the West
Although Western industrial profit-sharing differs in
many respects from an interest-free profit-sharing system,
nonetheless it may shed useful light on the operation and
effects of such a system.
It is argued51 that if the payment system in a firm is
tied to a share of its revenue or profit, this will tend
automatically to restrain unemployment and inflation,
because such payment assures compatibility of reasonable
price stability with reasonable full employment. Therefore
the expansion of a profit-sharing system ends when there is
no more unemployment; in other words, when the share firm
wishes to expand further, but cannot because there is no
more unemployed labour to be found. Hence full employment is
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ensured without inflation, as the value of money can be
stabilised without having to worry about the adverse
consequences for employment.
One reason for the attention attracted by profit-
sharing is that it is held to be a cure for stagflation. For
this reason, the U.K. government encouraged the spread of
profit-sharing in the 1987 Budget. It is believed that
profit-sharing provides greater stability of employment than
does a wage economy. Moreover, it might result in higher
productivity as workers' attitudes improve.52
It is also argued 53 that under such a system, the
average worker, as well as the economy as a whole, would be
better off, because the system increases workers'
participation, improves labour management, fosters a sense
of partnership and raises productivity. Moreover, when wages
are automatically made more sensitive to economic conditions
then self-correcting forces are contributed to the economy,
as recession caused by inflation would bring down wages,
which in return would curb inflation. Another advantage of
the share system, it is argued, is that it has excess demand
for labour.
Nonetheless, the claims that have been made about
profit-sharing have been doubted by others; 54 in particular
that it may help cure stagflation. Superiority of financial
performance under profit-sharing has also been doubted. The
promotion of profit-sharing in firms by granting them tax
concessions, it is believed, should be viewed cautiously, as
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many firms might be encouraged to change to profit-sharing
to gain tax relief, while they are not fully ready for the
change. 55 The argument that profit-sharing will make any
significant difference to unemployment has also been
doubted; hence, it is argued, there is no 	 case for tax
concessions to encourage profit-sharing. 56
Although the empirical results of Cable and Wilson
(1989) suggested that the statistical significance of
reported profit-sharing effects may have been exaggerated in
FitzRoy and Kraft's (1987) study, nonetheless it concluded
that there is evidently a profit-sharing effect of some kind
at work, though of little significance, as it might be due
to other factors. 57 However, FitzRoy and Kraft's (1987)
empirical results were obtained from 65 firms in the West
German metalworking industry, while Cable and Wilson's
(1989) results were obtained from 52 firms .in the U.K.
engineering industry.
On the other hand, profit-sharing economy, it is
argued, 58 could maintain both short and long-run equilibrium
in the economy. The short-run price level becomes a direct
function of aggregate fiscal and monetary variables and does
not depend on short-term considerations. Government spending
crowds out private spending, and the aggregate effects show
up only on the price level. Therefore, monetary policy can
be used powerfully and directly to determine the price level
without affecting real economic activity. If spending
increases, causing an inflationary shock, monetary
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authorities can hold the price level stable, without causing
unemployment, merely by contracting the money supply.
Moreover, it is argued 69 that a profit-sharing economy
has natural tendencies toward sustained, non-inflationary,
market-oriented full employment. The argument that profit-
sharing may help with the cure of stagflation and
maintaining full employment is also made by Meade. 60
However, results of empirical studies 61 have shown that
profit-sharing and capital-sharing have strong effects on
productivity and on measured profitability.
Thus, the Western experience of profit-sharing would
seem on the whole to indicate that it can be a viable and
useful economic tool.
Conclusions
An Islamic society prohibits interest on religious and
ethical grounds. Therefore it is important to construe this
religious principle into a viable economic system. However,
even though difficulties may arise in accomplishing this
role, this would not be a justification for rejecting an
interest-free system as long as these difficulties would
not lead to the collapse of the system, and so long as
society's belief does not change. It is possible, however,
to learn to live with such difficulties.
If interest is bad from the point of view of Muslim
society, this does not necessarily mean that a profit-
sharing system is good from an economic point of view,
especially when it works within an interest-based
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environment. Moreover, elimination of interest alone is not
a sufficient condition for a viable economic system, though
it is a necessary condition.
It is important to note that in the -absence of a fully-
developed Islamic economy, many of these difficulties are
not discussed as having actually arise; rather they are
useful hypotheses by which to explore the possible results
of a change to such a system. Similarly, the solutions
suggested to these potential difficulties are necessarily
based on theory, rather than empirical evidence.
Moreover, because there exists, as yet, no completely
interest-free economy, theorists inevitably view such a
possibility from the standpoint of the current (interest-
based) system with which they are familiar. However,
concepts and theories formed in the light of experience of a
traditional, interest-based economy, may not hold true, in
an economic system which is fundamentally different in
nature and might have very different components and economic
tools.
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XII
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
to the above, this
a coherent
analyses,
Conclusions and Recommendations
About the Research
Islamic banking is a recently established institution
performing differently from traditional banking, with the
claim that it satisfies Muslim belief and maintains Islamic
teaching by eliminating interest. A need was felt to study
and research this institution to find out the models of
finance used, to point out their difficulties and to help to
find solutions for them. In relation
research contributes the following:
1) It collects various and scattered topics into
body of information and discusses, explains,
compares and reaches conclusions. This is represented by
chapters VI and VII, where different methods of distributing
profit by different banks are reviewed and compared. The
collection and integration of scattered topics is also
exemplified by chapter II. Chapter II reviews the historical
background of Islamic banks and the phases of their
establishment, bringing together information from scattered
sources. Methods of investment used in Islamic banks and how
these banks are operating in the absence of interest are
illustrated in this chapter and chapters V and IX.
2) A theoretical framework for accounting for Islamic
financial institutions is developed and scrutinized.
Chapters III & IV discuss accounting postulates from the
Islamic perspective and conclude that these postulates can
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stand as principles on which to establish an accounting
system for Islamic institutions, realising fairness as an
ultimate goal. The fact that these postulates are well
established in traditional accounting does not lessen the
importance of these findings, for they are reached after
analysing and scrutinizing them from an Islamic perspective.
A rule for prioritizing between fairness and welfare (public
interest) is discussed in chapter X. Payment of Zakah on the
basis of current cost accounting is also discussed and
suggested in this chapter.
3) Accounting for Islamic banking should be based on justice
and fairness. Thus fairness accounting is suggested, whereby
accounting principles and procedures which realise fairness
are most acceptable and desireable. Principles which provide
unrealistic information should be abandoned. It is also
suggested that information be reported based on both
historical cost and current cost, to overcome the problem of
unrealistic and unfair information.
4- The concept of Riba in Islam is shown in chapter II; as
it is equivalent to interest, the alternative is discussed
in the same chapter. In chapter V, the operation of the
alternative in practice is illustrated. An analysis of the
efficiency of the alternative in mobilising and applying
resources for investment is the contribution of chapter
VIII.
5) A major contribution of the research has been to collect .
together, analyse and discuss problems facing Islamic banks
419
and suggest ways of solving them, as shown in chapters IX, X
and XI. Accounting difficulties arising from the
introduction of a profit-sharing system have been depicted,
discussed and illustrated by cases from Islamic banks
(chapter X).
6) Recommendations are made which address diverse problems.
Conclusions
As we have seen, Islamic banking as practised now in the
world has so far been quite successful. Islamic banks are
now spreading throughout the Muslim world and, in some
instances, branches have been established in the West (e.g.
al-Baraka International Ltd., London; the Islamic Bank
International of Denmark, Luxemburg).
Models of finance used in these banks prove relatively
viable and practicable. These banks satisfy to a reasonable
extent the needs of various businesses 'for finance.
Moreover, these banks have succeeded in mobilising
considerable resources of funds.
However, the existence and survival of these banks is
not assured, as many obstacles impede their success. A
variety of difficulties and problems, face these banks,
though these are not so great as to force the experiment to
be discontinued, and are not insoluble.
Islamic banking is a concerted attempt to apply
normative economics on a micro-economic level. It is an
attempt to find ways and means to execute modern banking
transactions so that they do not contradict the basic values
and convictions of devout Muslims. Some of the problems this
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entails can be summarised as follows:
1- Islamic banks are generally located in an
unwelcoming environment, dominated by a tradition of
interest-based institutions and with a legal framework
designed to facilitate interest-based dealings. Thus these
banks are individual institutions working in isolation from
the general banking system around them. This isolation has
created a tendency for such banks to look for projects with
quick returns, especially at the beginning of their
existence.
Central banks exercise authority over Islamic banks
under laws and regulations directed to control and supervise
traditional banks whose goals and functions are different
from those of Islamic banks. Thus it is necessary to enact
separate regulations to supervise Islamic banks. Moreover,
the credit ceiling policy imposed, in some cases, on Islamic
banks, has proved to impede investment, while the
realisation of the aims behind the imposition of such a
policy is open to question. However, the possibility that
investment by Islamic banks does not lead to expansion in
money supply and accelerate inflation; or at least that the
role of these banks in accelerating inflation is far less
than that of conventional banks, is a promising area which
needs further exploration and study.
2- These banks were established following the
experience of conventional banks; using the same tools and
transactions where these do not conflict with Islamic law,
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and adapting others, by removing interest. Hence Islamic
models are not completely in harmony with their environment.
Thus many practical difficulties arise. Conventional banks
are based on interest; thus all their dealings are related
to it and each party's share in any loan transaction is
well stated and computed. However, this is not the case in
profit-sharing finance; hence many accounting and practical
difficulties are likely. Thus the fear that a back-door
might be opened for interest is not unfounded. The operation
of Murabaha as a form of credit finance carried out in
financial institutions affected in their establishment by
interest-based institutions, and staffed with employees
mainly trained in traditional banks, might well support that
fear.
3- The determination and distribution of profit
generated from investment deposits is also an area full of
difficulties. However, these banks have succeeded, to some
extent, in finding a suitable formula to determine each
party's share in profit.
4- Some conventional accounting principles, e.g.
conservatism, historical cost, do not conform with the
Islamic principle of fairness, though they maintain welfare,
and they are adopted for objective reasons. Hence, which
principle (fairness or conservatism, for example) should be
applied would depend on the priority of the welfare to be
realised. If the welfare which can be realised by adopting
fairness is greater than that achieved by conservatism or
historical cost, the latter should be abandoned and vice
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versa. Thus a situation of inconsistency is created.
5- Islamic banks have to bear extra management costs.
They have to supervise and in some cases to monitor the
operation of the project that they are financing. Most of
these banks are located in developing countries where
business enterprises, generally, do not maintain proper
accounts or keep different account books for different
purposes, and the level of expertise is relatively low. Thus
these banks face addition difficulties in selecting their
clients. However, as shown, these extra costs could be
absorbed by high returns.
6- Most Islamic banks generally invest in short-term
operations with quick returns, in order, perhaps, to pay
profit every year on their investment deposits and shares;
they may also fear that long-term investment may create
liquidity problems, with no last resort to rel y on.
Recommendations
The research has shown that Islamic banking is an attempt to
apply Islamic teaching, including the prohibition of
interest, in the economic life of Muslim countries. However,
as shown, this is not an easy task. In view of the many
difficulties and problems faced by Islamic banks, the
following recommendations may be useful:
1- Establishment of a Research Unit financed jointly by
Islamic banks to research, document, and suggest solutions
to problems facing these banks. Information and experience
could be exchanged among these banks through the proposed
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Research Unit. The experience and development of
conventional banks could also be studied, so that useful
knowledge might be transferred from one system to another.
2- Central banks, being the focus And spearhead of the
banking system in their respective countries, have a
responsibility to promote Islamic banking. They should set
up adequate guidelines for regulation and promotion of
Islamic banks and take any necessary measures. It is
necessary to ensure that Islamic banks have sound
management, adopt healthy practices and do not indulge in
speculation in real estate or commodity and stock markets.
Islamic banks should be subject to regular inspection by the
central banks and their final accounts should be carefully
examined by duly appointed auditors. However, the role of
the central banks should not remain confined merely to the
regulation and inspection of the Islamic banks. They should
also support these institutions and help them solve their
problems and overcome their difficulties.
3- Islamic banks offer finance on a participation
basis, which means sharing the risk of loss or benefit of
profit. Thus these institutions should have more involvement
in the projects they finance to ensure good results. There
is a need for staff with expertise in project analysis and
appraisal. Moreover, the necessity of monitoring projects
financed by these institutions creates a need for a well
qualified staff to serve, deal with, and advise different
types of people and businesses. Thus a recruitment and
training department or institution is urgently needed. Every
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bank should have such a training centre. The establishment
of a national or international training institution financed
by all Islamic banks and governments which benefit from its
service is also recommended.
4- Islamic banks must act as development institutions
by promoting medium and long-term finance; the provision of
finance for long-gestation and infra-structural projects
would benefit the communities to which they belong. However,
this is possible only if these institutions find some form
of reserve or guarantee (last resort) to secure their
position, as the bulk of funds received by these banks is of
a short-term nature.
5- Establishment of an independent Sharia'h
Supervisory Board to ensure the conformity of the Islamic
banks' activities with Islamic law is also needed. Such an
independent Board would eliminate the fear that the Boards
employed by Islamic banks would be biased towards their
employers. It is suggested that such a Board could be
financed by an annual subscription of Islamic banks in each
country, administered by the government which could also
participate in its finance. The role of the Board would be
not only to audit the conformity with Islamic law, but also
to promote and devise legitimate ways and forms of finance
for Islamic banks, which are universal or multi-purpose
banks and not only commercial banks. They have to carry out
the various functions of commercial and investment banks, .
investment trusts and investment-management banks offering a
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wide range of services to their customers, with whom they
will have to have a long-term bank-client relationship. Such
a system, no doubt, needs a Board with wider expertise and
authority than can be provided by separate small committees
operating in each bank, as happens at present.
6- Use of media; Islamic banks need to make effective
use of the media to publicise their activities internally
and abroad. Muslims must be informed about Islamic banking
and their models of finance, which in turn will help to
promote Islamic banking.
7- Use of methods other than Musharakat should be kept
to a minimum, and not be used as general techniques of
finance. The ultimate goal of Islamic banking should be to
rely mainly on Musharakat and shares. Other methods and
types of transaction have been the focus of considerable
controversy and doubts as to their acceptability within the
framework of Islamic values. Only the least controversial of
these should be adopted, and even then their use should be
restricted. Nevertheless, at first greater resort to
alternative techniques, such as credit finance, may be
necessary to facilitate smooth transition, especially, if we
consider the relationship of Islamic banking with
conventional banking. However, there is always the danger
that once banks adopted alternative techniques, they may
become accustomed to them and may not make a serious effort
to move away from them. Hence, the challenge faced by these
banks will be how to reduce the difficulties of transition
and yet ensure that the movement towards the goal is not
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halted.
Islamic banks can gradually transfer the operation of
Murabaha to specialized subsidiary trading companies.
8- It would be advisable to encourage investments
whereby Mudarabah funds are kept and invested separately
from other funds (i.e. limited Mudarabah). This would avoid
many difficulties connected with determination and
distribution of profit. The savings of low income groups
could he mobilised by offering Mudarabah certificates of
reasonable values for different periods, to enable low
income class participation. In this way, Tandeed, as a
condition stipulated by Fiqh for distribution of profit,
would be maintained. Moreover, long period Mudarabah
certificates could help these banks to engage in medium and
long-term investment and maintain the necessary security for
them to avoid liquidity problems.
9- In cases where all funds are pooled for investment,
it is recommended that a reserve (i.e. deferred profit)
should be retained. All assets should be valued at current
prices, without regard to the principle of conservatism. The
difference between current price and historical price would
equal the retained reserve to be distributed in the future
when it is earned. Zakah should be paid on current price
valuation. If valuation should proved to be higher than the
actual value earned, then the difference between the due
Zakah and that actually paid, would be considered part of .
the following year's Zakah.
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10- Current and savings deposits holders should be paid
part of the profit. As shown, their deposits participate to
a great extent in generating these profits. However, this
should be paid without any pre-determined ratio or
agreement. This proposed share should be deducted from
shareholders' profit.
11- Disclosure needs to be more detailed and useful.
This may include:
(i) Classifying assets and liabilities in the balance
sheet by grouping them according to their nature and in
order of their liquidity, equating broadly to their
maturities.
(ii) Classifying investment into short, medium and long-
term categories; and showing credit and participation
finance separately.
(iii) Provisions; how they are made and for what
purposes; their movements; whether they have been used and
for what purposes.
(iv) Zakah; how it is computed and distributed.
More disclosure is needed to help the public at large,
and shareholders and depositors in particular, to understand
the nature of Islamic banking. Moreover, it would help to
enrich debate and research.
12- Establishment of accounting standards; the unique
nature of Islamic banking activities and finance
necessitates the establishment of guidelines to reflect the
effects of transactions, events and circumstances on the
financial positions of Islamic banks and the result of their
428
operations. The many interest groups concerned with the
financial position of Islamic banks includes: investors,
depositors, auditors and the public at large. Thus, the
responsibility for establishing accounting standards for
Islamic banks should rest with an independent body.
Nonetheless, it should be financed jointly by Islamic banks
and the governments concerned and must be perceived as
independent from those who supply the funds for its
operations. In the initial phase, with the aim of
realisation of the ultimate goal, the following steps might
be useful.
(a) Each bank, in co-operation with its auditors, should
identify areas which need accounting standards; a list of
these standards should be drafted.
(b) All Islamic banks in each country may co-operate
through a conference or seminar for the purpose of
discussing the proposed standards, in order to draw up a
final list.
(c) The central bank in each country should participate
either by being represented at the proposed conference or by
having the final list submitting to it for its
consideration.
(d) Eventually, a permanent Board for accounting
standards could be established by all Muslim countries. The
Organisation of the Islamic Conference could be the
appropriate organisation to inaugurate this Board.
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Appendices
Appendix 1
Glossary of Arabic Terms
Ahadeeth: Plural of Hadith: A report on the saying, deed or
tacit approval of the Prophet, peace be on him.
Ayah: A verse of the Qur'an. See also Surah.
Bai: Stands for sale and has been used in the research as a
prefix in referring to different types of sales;
Muajjal, Murabaha, Tawliyah, Wadia'ah, Amanah and
Musawamah.
Bai al-Amanah: A sale whereby the buyer should state
faithfully the actual cost of the goods to the seller.
It is of three types, Tawliyah, Wadia'ah and Murabaha.
See chapter XI.
Bai al-Gherer: A sale which involves fraud or unfair
exchange.
Bai Muajjal: Sale against deferred payment, either in lump
sum or instalments.
Bai Salem: A deferred sale of goods, the price being paid in
advance. The delivery date and weight or volume of the
goods should be stated in the contract.
Baitul Mal: Treasury.
Fatwa (plural Fatawa): A .legal opinion given by a jurist.
Fiqh: Muslim jurisprudence; it covers all aspects of life,
religious, political, social or economic. In addition .
to prayer, fasting, Zakah, and pilgrimage, it covers
430
family law, inheritance, social obligations, commerce,
criminal law, constitutional law and international
relations. The whole corpus of Figh is based primarily
on the Qur'an and the Sunnah and secondarily on Ijmal
and Ijtihad.
Fugaha (singular, Fagih): Jurists who give opinions on
various issues in the light of the Qur'an.
Halal: Anything permitted by the Sharia'h.
Haram: Anything prohibited by the Sharia'h.
Hijni Calendar: Lunar Calendar, dating from the immigration
of the Prophet, peace be on him, from Makkah to
Medina.
Ijma': Consensus of jurists on any issue of Figh after the
death of the Prophet, peace be on him. See also Figh.
Ijara: A contract whereby one party provides an asset for
hire by another on a payment of specified rentals over
a period. In some other arrangements the ownership of
the asset transfers to the party who hires the asset.
Imam: The word is used in many different senses, its most
common being a leader of the congregational prayer; it
is also used to denote the founders of different
schools of Muslim Jurisprudence or other eminent
jurists and also for the prominent descendants of 'Ali
ibn Abi Talib and distinguished Shia'h theologians. In
the Sunnah it has also been used to refer to the
ruler.
Istis'hab: Retaining; to retain any event or verdict
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experienced in the past, until evidence is found that
the event or verdict has changed.
Istisnaa': A Mudarabah contract that requires the
manufacture of goods and the sharing of the
production.
Jahiliyah: The period in Arabia before the advent of the
Prophet Muhammad, peace be on him.
Khiyar: Option, the right of the client in a Murabaha
contract to default and reject the goods bought for
him.
Masalih (singular Maslaha): The public interest or welfare.
Meth'ahib (singular, Meth'hab): Islamic schools of thought.
There are four main schools, Maliki, Hanafi, Shafia'i
and Hanbali. See also, al-Meth'hab al Maliki, al-
Hanafi, al-Shafia'i and al-Hanbali.
al-Meth'hab al-Hanafi: A school of Islamic thought, named
after Abu Hanifa who was one of the Muslim jurists,
who interpreted Islamic teaching and Prophet's, peace
on him, Tradition.
al-Meth'hab al-Hanbali: A school of Islamic thought, named
after its founder, Ahmed Ibn Hanbal.
al-Meth'hab al-Maliki: A school of Islamic thought.
al-Meth'hab al-Shafia'i: A school of Islamic thought, and
named after its founder.
Mudarabah: An agreement between two or more persons whereby
one or more of them provide finance, while the others
provide entrepreneurship and management to carry on
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any business venture, whether trade industry or
service, with the objective of earning profits. The
profit is shared by them in an agreed proportion. The
loss is borne only by the financiers in proportion to
their share in total capital. The word Mudarabah is
derived from the Arabic word Daraba, meaning to hit
the road, denoting the action by the Mudarib who works
as an innovator for profit. It is also called Qirad
and Mugaradah. See also Rub ul Mal.
Mudarib: (Plural Mudaribeen). The partner (labourer) who
provides entrepreneurship and management in a
Mudarabah contract as distinct from the Rub ul Mal who
provides the finance. Called also A'mii. See also
Mudarabah and Rub ul Mal.
Murabaha: Sale at a specified profit margin. The term is,
however, now used to refer to a sale agreement whereby
the seller purchases the goods desired by the buyer
and sells them at an agreedmarked-up price, the
payment being settled within an agreed time frame,
either in instalments or as a lump sum. The seller
undertakes all the management needed for the purchase
and also bears the risk for the goods until they have
been delivered to the buyer. See Chapter XI and Bai
Muajjal.
Musawamah: Sale with bargaining; whereby a seller and a
buyer agree on a price for the commodity, regardless
of its purchase price or its cost of production.
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Musharakah: Partnership between two or more persons whereby,
unlike Mudarabah, each of them has a share (not
necessarily equal) in finance as well as
entrepreneurship and management.
Musharakah Mutanaquisa: A partnership whereby one party has
the right to buy the other party's share and acquire
the whole asset of the partnership.
Musharakat: Refers in the research to Musharakah and
Mudarabah as both of them are forms of partnership
between various partners.
Nisab: The specified minimum wealth which makes its owner
eligible for paying Zakah.
Quard Hassan: A loan extended without interest or profit-
sharing (plural, Qurud Hassana).
Qur'an: The Holy Book of the Muslims consisting of the
revelations made by God to the Prophet Muhammad, peace
be on him, during his Prophethood of about 23 years.
The Qur'an lays down the fundamentals of the Islamic
faith, including beliefs and all aspects of the Muslim
way of life. These are supplemented or further
elaborated by the Sunnah. The Qur'an consists of 30
parts, 114 chapters (Surah), and 6,666 verses (Ayah).
There are a number of translations of the Qur'an by
both Muslims and non-Muslims. The translations by
Abdullah Yusuf Ali and Muhammad Marmaduke Pickthall,
both Muslims, and by A.J.Arberry are the most popular.
In all references to the Qur'an in the research (e.g.,
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2: 276), the first number refers to the Surah and the
second to the Ayah.
Riba: Literally means increase or addition and refers to the
premium that must be paid by the borrower to the
lender, along with the principal amount, as a
condition of the loan or an extension in its maturity.
It is thus equivalent to interest. It is used in the
Sharia'h in two senses: Riba al Nasi'ah and Riba al
Fadl.
Riba al Fadl: An extension of Riba in trade, because while
trade is allowed, not everything is permitted in
trade. The prohibition of Riba al Fadl closes all
back-doors to Riba through trade. It covers all income
realised in trade through dishonesty, fraud or unfair
exchanges. Called also Riba al Khafi or Riba al Buyu'.
See also Chapter II.
Riba al Nasi sah: Refers to the addition of the premium which
is paid to the lender'in return for his waiting as a
condition for the loan and is technically the same as
interest. Called also Riba al Jali or Riba al Duyvil.
See also Chapter II.
Ribah: Is from Rayb which literally means "doubt" or
"suspicion" and refers to income which has the
semblance of Riba or which raises doubts in the mind
about its rightfulness. It covers all income derived
from injustice to, or exploitation of, others.
Rub ul Mal: The financier; in the Mudarabah form of
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partnership agreement, the Rub ul Mal (also, Sahib ul
Mal, A'mil) provides the finance while the Mudarib
provides the entrepreneurship and management. There
can be many financiers and labourers in a given
Mudarabah contract. See also Mudarabah, Mudarib and
Chapter II.
Sharia'h: Islamic Law; refers to the divine guidance as
given by the Qur'an and the Sunnah and embodies all
aspects of the Islamic faith, including beliefs and
practices.
Shihadat al-Istithmar: Investment certificates.
Shirkat el Anan: A partnership whereby two or more persons
participate in an enterprise with a fixed amount of
capital on the agreement that they will work jointly
and share in profit or loss proportionately.
Sunnah: After the Qur'an, the Sunnah is the most important
source of the Islamic faith and refers essentially to
the Prophet's example as indicated by his practise of
the faith. The only way to know the Sunnah is through
the collection of Ahadeeth.
Sarah: A chapter of the Qur'an. There are 114 Surahs of
varying lengths in the Qur'an. In all reference to the
Qur'an in the research, the first number refers to the
Sarah and the second to the Aysh.
Tarjih: Prioritising, e.g. between different legal opinions
concerning the same topic in order to choose the
most appropriate.
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Tawliyah: Sale at cost without any profit for the seller.
Vthmah: Refers to the whole Muslim community, irrespective of
colour, race, language or nationality, which carry no
weight in Islam.
Ushr: Ten per cent of agricultural produce payable by a
Muslim as a part of his religious obligations, like
Zakah, mainly for the benefit of the poor and needy.
Wadia'ah: Selling a commodity at its purchase price, without
profit or loss. See also chapter XI.
Waqf: An endowment.
Zakah: The amount payable by a Muslim on his wealth as a
part of his religious obligations, mainly for the
benefit of the needy and the poor. See also Ushr and
Chapter III.
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Appendix 2
Murabaha
The definition of Murabaha and how it is operated in Islamic
banking have been mentioned earlier. However, the topic
merits deeper consideration, because of the controversy
attached to this type of contract and its popularity amongst
Islamic banks. Murabaha represents a large percentage of the
Islamic banks' activities, sometimes accounting for 65% of
the total finance introduced by these banks, as in the case
of FIBE and Al Baraka bank.
Murabaha is regarded as representing the negative side
of Islamic banking, and the fear that it might become a
cover for continuing the present interest-based system and
open a back door for interest has been expressed. '
Sale in Islam
Sale in Islamic jurisprudence is of two kinds: 2 (i)
bargaining (Musawamah); (ii) sale with trust (Amanah). Under
Musawamah, the two parties (the seller and the buyer) agree
on a price for the commodity, regardless of its purchase
price or its cost of production. Amanah is of three types:
a) Tawliyah; selling a commodity at its purchase price,
without profit or loss.
b) Wadia'ah; selling a commodity at less than its purchase
price.
c) Murabaha (sale with profit or mark-up); selling a
commodity at its purchase price with a pre-determined profit
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or mark-up. The mark-up can be a lump sum or a percentage of
the total cost of the commodity.
The types of sale permitted in Islamic jurisprudence
can be shown in the following diagram.
Diagram 1
Sale
1)
Musawamah
1
1
1
1
(2)
Amanah
1
1
1
1
1
1
(a)
Tawliyah
(sP = PP)
1
1
1
1
(b)
Wadia'ah
(sp = pp - S)
(c)
Murabaha
( sP = PP + B)
Where sp = sale price. pp = purchase price. B = mark-
up. S = a sum of money given up by the seller.
Murabaha sale is a legal contract and one of the
permissible contracts in Islamic jurisprudence. However, it
is important for the buyer and the seller to know the actual
cost of the commodity and the profit. That is to say, the
seller states clearly that the purchase price or the cost of
the commodity is for example LS 100, and he is prepared to
sell it at LS 110 with a mark-up (gain) of LS 10 or 10%
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(capital means here the original price of the commodity or
the cost of the commodity when the seller first bought it).
If it is proved that the seller has overstated the cost,
whether intentionally or by mistake, then the buyer has the
right to cancel the transaction or to be paid back the
excess. 3
It is generally argued 4 that Musawamah is preferable to
Murabaha, as the latter requires both parties to have
accurate knowledge of the total cost of the commodity,
which may not always be the case. Moreover, such a condition
might put the seller in a critical position as he might be
tempted to increase his profit by showing a higher cost.
Others, however, argue that the preference for Musawamah
rather than Murabaha is moral rather than contractual, as
nowadays it is relatively easy to compute accurately all
costs attached to any transaction, such as shipping,
insurance, storage etc. Those who hold this view believe
that the ancient scholars' preference for Musawamah arose
from the difficulty in computing accurately the cost of the
commodity, a difficulty which they feel no longer exists. In
the past, the nature of trade, was such that commodities'
costs were interrelated and combined, especially if a person
•
worked as an agent for a number of merchants, which was the
usual case in Caravan Trade.
However, it is believed that there is no point in
comparing Musawamah and Murabaha as each of them can play an
important role in different circumstances. In some cases,
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for example, Murabaha may be preferable, as it may generate
welfare for one or both parties to the contract in the case
of goods with special specifications, or goods which are not
common or needed only by a small fraction of the society. In
such cases Murabaha is better for both parties as the goods
can be produced upon the seller's request and to his
specification.
Murabaha as Carried out in Islamic Banks:
A customer approaches an Islamic bank asking it to buy for
him a specific commodity, with a promise to buy it from the
bank on the basis of cost plus a pre-determined mark-up.
This operation consists of a promise to purchase and a
resale with a pre-determined gain: it is not a sale by a
person of something which he does not possess, because the
bank is not offering to sell anything. It merely receives an
order to purchase, and cannot sell until it has acquired
title to what has been ordered, and received confirmation
from the client that the purchase conforms to his
specification. 5 This is why such an activity is called
"sale based on cost plus profit to he who orders a
purchase".
The operation is made up in two stages:
1- The customer asks the bank to buy for him a specific
commodity, which the bank will subsequently sell to him.
The customer also promises to accept and re-buy the
commodity from the bank when the bank supplies it. At this
stage the purchase price, mark-up and the method of payment
441
will be determined. Payment is usually on deferred terms,
though some banks ask their customers to pay part of the
commodity's price at this stage (FIBE, for example).
The request by the customer may be written or verbal.
However, the Encyclopaedia of Islamic banks 6 suggests that
the application should be in writing to avoid ambiguity and
to confirm the customer's good faith.
2- The first stage is only a promise from each side. The
second stage starts after the bank supplies the commodity
and the customer inspects it. If the customer accepts it
then the contract can be signed by both parties.
It is argued that the above operation is legal and
permissible if both parties have the option to withdraw, in
other words, if the bank has the right not to sell the
commodity to the client, when it arrives and falls under its
ownership, and if the applicant has the same right, i.e. to
reject the commodity. However, if both parties are held to
their agreement, i.e. the bank must sell and the applicant
must buy, then the operation is more controversial.7
As compelling the applicant to buy according to his
promise in Murabaha is a controversial issue, many
conferences have been held in order to discuss the matter,
and many•verdicts issued. 8 Kuwait Finance House in 1399h
(1979) issued a Fatwa on Murabaha as carried out in Islamic
banking. The verdict permitted Murabaha, considering that
the promise given by the applicant should oblige him to
fulfil his promise. It was argued that a promise which is a
442
religious obligation could also become
	
a judicial
obligation. In other words, since Islam urges the fulfilment
of promises as a religious obligation, it is natural for
courts to rule accordingly.
In addition, obliging the applicant in Murabaha
satisfies the public interest, for financial dealings will
be easier and more systematic.
I- First Islamic Banking Conference:
The First Islamic Banking Conference was held in Dubai, in
1979, when 59 scholars from different part of Islamic world
convened to discuss Murabaha. The Conference concluded that
Murabaha as carried out in Islamic banking is a permissible
contract, and also accepted that the applicant and the bank
could be held to their promise.
II- Second Islamic Banking Conference:
The Conference was held in Kuwait from 21 - 23 March, 1983.
Twelve Islamic financial institutions participated, along
with Muslim scholars. Many papers, including research
concerning Murabaha, were discussed in the Conference. Many
recommendations were issued, two of them concerning
Murabaha:
a) The Conference stated that a promise for sale based on
cost plus profit after the delivery of the purchased
commodity is a permissible operation as long as the bank is
responsible for the goods until they reach and are received
by the applicant.
Regarding the promise and whether it is binding on
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either or both of the bank and the applicant, it was
believed that such an obligation is preferable as it
achieves stability in financial dealings and satisfies the
interests of both parties. However, each bank is free to
choose whether to give itself and its applicant the freedom
to default or to compel both parties to fulfil their
promises. However, this part of the recommendation was
accepted by majority vote only; some scholars did not accept
it . 9
b- The Conference stated that the payment of a part of the
price of the commodity in advance to the bank is
permissible, and the bank has the right to draw on this to
compensate any losses which arise if the applicant defaults.
III- Al-Baraka Seminar on Islamic Economics:
The subject was also discussed in the Al-Baraka Seminar
which was held in al-Madinah (Saudi Arabia), in June 1983.
The recommendation was a confirmation of the Second Islamic
Banking conference's Fatwa, though with reservations on the
obligatory nature of the promise; the seminar did not fully
agree with obligation of the promise.
However, the obligation of the promise in Murabaha is
claimed to be justified on two grounds:
1- Fulfilment of a promise is obligatory from the judicial
point of view according to Malki Meth shab
 and as a religious
obligation according to other Meth 'ahi b. A religious
obligation, it is argued, may also be a judicial one if it
is practical and serves the public interest.
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the sale of articles which are not
bank, which is forbidden according to
The second justification is also
yet possessed by the
Sunnah.
rejected on the ground
2- Obligation achieves stability of financial dealings; it
is good for both parties and satisfies their interests.
On the other hand, it is suggested 10 that these
justifications are irrelevant and unacceptable:
The first justification is irrelevant as it relates to
non-lucrative promises, for example, a promise initiated
from one party to another to pay him a sum of money. In
Murabaha the promise is from both parties; it is in the
form: I promise to purchase; I promise to buy. Obligation
makes this a contract rather than a promise. Therefore it
should be dealt with as a contract; ultimately, this could
require the bank to sell goods which it does not possess.
In addition, it is argued that a promise must be
fulfilled only if it does not contradict Islamic teaching.
To make the promise binding in this operation could lead to
that any interests which contradict Islamic teaching are not
acceptable. Furthermore, any actions which lead to a
prohibited act are also prohibited. In any case, it is
questionable whether stability in financial dealing is
actually achieved, as this stability depends in the first
place on the commodity market and supply and demand.
It is argued ll that obliging both parties in
Murabaha, the bank to sell and the applicant to buy,
according to their promise would lead to one or more of the
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following forbidden contracts:
1- Two Transactions in One
If the bank stipulates that the applicant should fulfil his
promise and buy the commodity bought at his request, then
the operation contains "two transactions in one", which is
prohibited by Prophet Tradition 12 . The first transaction is
between the bank and a third party which owns the commodity;
the second is between the bank and the applicant, and comes
into force automatically after the completion of the first
transaction, as a result of the obligation of the promise.
On the other hand, some argue 13 that the "two
transactions in one" rule is not applicable to this
operation. The rule is applicable in a transaction whereby
one party asks another to sell him a commodity on a deferred
basis at a higher price on condition that he can then buy it
from him on a cash basis at a lower price. The objective in
this case, it is argued, is not the sale transaction but the
money which will be repaid later with an increment. The
transaction is a trick to by-pass a loan with interest.
2- Sale of Articles which one does not Possess
Obligation in Murabaha might require the bank to sell
articles which it does not possess. Sunnah14 forbids the
sale of such articles.
As the bank does not own the commodity when it has been
asked by the applicant to buy it for him, then the
obligation of the applicant to buy it according to his
promise causes the bank to sell something it does not
446
possess, because:
i) when the bank buys the commodity another sale transaction
between the bank and the applicant will automatically take
place according to the obligation imposed by the promise.
The sale transaction between the bank and the applicant is
not established on the basis of a new offer and acceptance,
but on the basis of the promise.
ii) Accordingly, the promise given by the applicant is a
contract rather than a promise, because the applicant is
obligated by his promise.
On the other hand, it is argued15 that the bank does
not sell articles which it does not own, because it receives
only an order from its customer to purchase for him a
specific commodity. The bank will not sell until it has
acquired title to what has been ordered and shown it to the
client to confirm that it conforms to the specifications
laid down. A new sale contract will then be signed. The
bank, during the purchase transaction, bears the risks of
physical losses, unacceptable quality, delivery delay, etc.
The commodity, until it has been received by the applicant,
is the responsibility of the bank.
3- Gain Without Liability
Obliging the applicant to buy results in the operation
causing gain or profit to the bank without liabilit y . If the
sale between the bank and the applicant takes place
automatically once the bank buys the commodity, then the
profit realised by the bank is not justifiable.
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However, it is argued16
 that the bank, in purchasing
the commodity, becomes the owner thereof and will bear the
liability for any damage: if the commodity purchased
sustained a defect or breakage, prior to delivery, then it
would be the liability of the bank. Therefore, the bank does
not gain without liability.
4- Loan With Interest
It is also argued 17 that the obligation placed on the
applicant turns the Murabaha to a loan with interest; the
applicant who wants the commodity does not have the money
for it, so that when the bank buys it for him in cash and
asks him to repay the value plus a mark-up on a deferred
basis then the operation is effectively a loan with
interest. The bank's role in this case is as an intermediary
between the original owner of the commodity and the
applicant. However, if the transaction is between the
applicant and the original owner of the commodity, then it
is a legal and permissible operation, even if the deferred
price is more than the cash price, because it is trade where
a commodity is involved;
"Allah hath permitted tEade and forbidden usury".
(Holy Qur'an, ii:275).L°
If the bank buys the commodity for itself without obligation
for it to sell and the applicant to buy, then it is a
legitimate operation.
Furthermore, it is argued 19 that both the bank and the
applicant are genuine buyers; the bank buys with the
intention to sell to the applicant and the applicant buys to
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make use of the commodity. The bank is working in this case
as a merchant, not as a financier. If the applicant pays in
cash or on deferred basis, neither contradicts Islamic
teaching. The obligation is stipulated for organizational
reasons. Furthermore, if the applicant fails to pay the
value of the commodity or part of it after he receives it,
then the bank will not charge him any more money, as is the
case in interest-based finance.
To conclude, Murabaha is clearly a legitimate operation
if no obligation is stipulated. If the applicant is obliged
to buy, then the contract is controversial. Many Islamic
banks have chosen the first option and do not oblige their
applicants; for example, Faisal Islamic Bank (Sudan),
Tadamon Islamic Bank and Al-Baraka Bank. Banks which oblige
their applicants include Kuwait Finance House; Faisal
Islamic Bank (Egypt), though does not oblige the client, but
if he defaults, the bank disposes of the goods by whatever
means possible, and any loss to the bank must be compensated
'by the client.
However, Islamic banks in the first category oblige the
bank to fulfil its promise. In other words, if the bank buys
the commodity then it must sell it to the client if he still
wishes to buy it. Such an obligation, it is believed, does
not jeopardize the contract as the option to sell or not is
the bank's right. The bank can thus choose to waive this
right and hold itself to its promise. However, a problem
arises in case of goods which need a license to be imported.
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In the Sudan, 20
 for example, goods are allowed to be
imported only after issuing a license, which is issued in
the name of the importer, a person or a company. If the
importer wants to buys goods through Murabaha he should: (i)
authorise the bank to use the license on his behalf, (ii)
give the bank the right to obtain the license in the bank's
name so that the ownership of the goods is given to the
bank.
However, the license, in addition to being difficult to
obtain, is expensive, and the applicant would be compelled
to buy in most cases.
Murabaha was originally a trade rather than a financial
transaction introduced by an intermediary party. Although it
is similar to credit finance as carried out in traditional
banking, it does not carry the advantage of guaranteed
interest which traditional banking enjoys. In Murabaha, the
bank is a trader rather than a financier, and it bears risk
during the purchase transaction in respect of unacceptable
quality, defects or breakage, delivery delay, etc. In some
cases, the bank has to sell the commodity on the open market
when the applicant defaults. Such risks cause the bank to
bear more expenses such as warehouse expenses, expertise,
etc.
Accordingly, it is believed that it is better for
Islamic banks to depend more on other financing methods.
Furthermore, finance on a participation basis is generally
preferred in long-term projects, which help in development.
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However, Islamic banks can use Murabaha through subsidiary
companies, for the law in most countries where they are
located gives them the right to establish trading and other
subsidiary companies. These companies might be established
on a specialized basis, for example, companies for durable
goods, capital goods, etc.
However, the debate on Murabaha can be looked at as a
result of uncertainty arising at a transitional stage.
Islamic banks are familiar with the methods of traditional
ones and find it easier to finance on a credit basis rather
than participation. Murabaha, although a trade operation, in
practice operates similarly to traditional practice. In
addition, the economic situation in countries where Islamic
banks are located does not help the use of participation
finance. Thus Murabaha, it is argued, 21
 might be a temporary
phenomenon in that Islamic banks rely on it because .they are
working in isolation in an unwelcoming environment. They are
operating on a small scale in a capitalist environment
without auxiliary institutions and no institutional
framework is available to help a participation system to
succeed.
Establishing an appropriate institutional framework to
support participation-based finance would help Islamic banks
to rely more on participation and would encourage them to
turn from the path of traditional banking. The achievement
of a truly Islamic banking system needs a suitable
environment. However, the Islamic banks have the necessary
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experience of interest-free banking and could help to pave
the way for the other major reforms to be introduced later.
Nonetheless, Murabaha as a form of credit finance is
practised in financial institutions which were affected at
their establishment by interest-based institutions.
Furthermore, most of their employees were trained in
traditional banks. Thus there is a danger that Murabaha
forms of sales may change into pure financing arrangements,
with the agreed profit margin being no more than a
camouflage for interest. In practice, those who need finance
for purchase or import of a commodity would approach banks
to buy it for them and buy it from the banks at a higher,
but deferred price. The banks will be assured of receiving
back the price they actually pay, plus a pre-determined
mark-up. For all practical purposes, from the the bank's
point of view, this is like lending at a fixed rate of
interest. Moreover, a tendency to prefer this method to
profit-sharing would prevail, since it helps to keep banking
practice as it was before.
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Appendix 3
Accounts of Islamic Banks
1- Faisal Islamic Bank (Sudan)
Consolidated Balance Sheet as at 30.12.1407(1987)
LS in
Liabilities
Current accounts
Savings accounts
Investment deposits
Migrants transfer
Assets
307.3 Cash in hand 	 19.4
42.1 Balance abroad	 19.8
40.6 Balance(Central Bank) 163.2
9.1
202.4Sub-total
Credit accounts:
399.1
Receivable accounts:
Remittances& Bills payable 6.4 Cheques	 6.0
Credit accounts	 61.8 Accounts receivable 	 92.9
Sub-Total	 68.2 Sub-total
	
98.9
Capital & reserves: 	 Investment:
Paid-up capital
Capital reserve
General reserve
Special reserve
Profit & loss account
Sub-total
Total
58.4 a) Short-term
70.1 - operations 134.2
4.7 - others 29.9
0.3 b) Long-term
8.5 - abroad
	 9.0
- local	 11.0
142.0 Sub-total
Fixed assets
609.3
164.1
20.0
184.1
123.9
609.3
Total	 144.7
	
144.7
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Faisal Islamic Bank (Sudan)
Profit and Loss Account as at 30.12.1407 (1987)
LS (m)
Description
Profit on investment
	
21.2
Earnings from foreign exchange
transactions
	
1.0
Earnings from banking services 	 6.2
Others	 3.7
Total income	 32.1
Less depositors' profit	 3.7
Shareholders' gross profit	 28.4
Less:
Administrative expenses	 18.3
Depreciations	 3.4
Remunerations	 0.3
Auditors' remuneration	 0.1
Employees' bonus	 1.0
Donations	 0.5
Insurance fund	 0.8
Total	 24.4
Net profit before Zakah	 4.0
Less Zakah	 0.4
3.6
Plus Estate Co. profit
	 1.6
5.2
Less:
Islamic Co. for Trade & Services
loss	 3.3
Tax	 1.1
4.4
Net profit	 0.8
Less Legal reserve (10%) 	 .08
0.72
Plus transfer profit	 .001
0.73
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2- Tadamon Islamic Bank
Consolidated Balance Sheet as at 31.8.1987
LS (m)
Liabilities
Current accounts, foreign and local 	 155.3
Savings accounts	 7.9
Investment accounts, foreign & local 	 15.1
Others	 19.8
198.1
Credit accounts:
Bills payable	 8.8
Provisions	 9.8
Others	 2.6
Remittance
	
1.3
22.5
Capital and reserves:
Paid-up capital
Legal reserve
Currency equalization account
Profit and loss account
23.9
1.4
0.5
1.5
27.3
Total Liabilities	 247.9
Contra accounts:
Liabilities against bills & credit 	 44.7
Liabilities against acceptance 	 27.0
71.7
Assets
Cash in hand (foreign & local)	 11.0
Bank of Sudan	 140.5
Correspondents	 12.9
164.4
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Debit accounts:
Cheques under collection 	 11.5
Others	 23.8
35.3
Investment:
Direct investment	 32.9
Others	 5.4
38.3
Fixed assets:
Fixed assets (less depreciation)	 6.6
Equipment	 0.2
Building under construction 	 3.1
9.9
Total assets	 247.9
Contra accounts:
Customers' liabilities against
credit and guarantees 	 44.8
Customers' liabilities against
acceptance	 26.9
71.7
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Tadamon Islamic Bank
Statement of Income for the year ended 31.8.1987
.
LS	 (m)
Sources of income
Investment operations 7.9
Foreign exchange operations 1.2
Banking services 3.2
Others 0.5
Total operating income 12.8
Less:	 Investment depositors' 	 share 1.1
Gross operating income 11.7
Less:	 Administrative expenses 6.8
Net operating income 4.9
Plus:	 Profit from subsidiary Cos. 0.6
Net profit 5.5
Less:	 Provisions 0.7
Profit before Zakah 4.8
Less:	 Zakah 0.3
Profit before taxation 4.5
Less:	 Taxation 2.7
Profit 1.8
Less:	 Legal reserve 0.4
Shareholders' net profit
	 1.4
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Total liabilities
Net Assets
Represented by:
219.4
61.1
3- Al-Baraka Bank (Sudan)
Consolidated Balance Sheet as at 31.12.1987
LS (m)
Assets
Cash and banks
	
94.5
Cheques & bills under collection	 6.8
Investment & finance operations 	 70.0
Miscellaneous debit balances 	 79.4
Investments	 10.1
Fixed assets (less depreciation)	 19.6
Capitalised expenditure (less
amortisation)	 0.1
Total assets	 280.5
Less: Liabilities
Current deposits	 88.2
Investment deposits	 13.1
Miscellaneous credit balances 	 111.2
Miscellaneous provisions	 6.9
Capital	 55.3
Reserves	 5.8
61.1
Contra Accounts
Letters of credit	 46.8
Letters of guarantee	 49.9
Bills (depositors)	 5.9
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6.8
10.0
t
Al-Baraka Bank (Sudan)
Profit & Loss Account for the year ended 31.12.1987
LS (m)
Income
Profit (Musharakah & Murabaha)
Return on foreign currencies
Commissions
Return on investments
Others
Total income
9.7
1.8
4.2
0.3
0.8
16.8
Less: Expenses
Salaries & wages	 3.6
Rent	 0.6
General expenses	 2.3
Depreciation	 0.3
Total expenses
Net income before tax and Zakah
Less: Provisions
Provision for bad investment
operations	 0.9
Zakah	 1.3
Business profit tax 	 5.7
Total	 7.9
Net profit
	 2.1
Less general reserve
	 0.5
Net profit transferred to balance sheet
	 1.6
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4- Islamic Bank for Western Sudan
Balance Sheet as at 31.12.1987
LS (m)
Assets
Cash in hand
Investment operations
Cheques & Commercial bills
Debit balances
Current assets
42.9
32.8
1.2
2.8
0.1
Total current assets	 79.8
Long-term investment	 1.5
Fixed assets	 2.3
Equipment	 1.3
Total fixed assets	 5.1
Total assets	 84.9
Liabilities
Deposits	 54.6
Bills payable	 1.3
Cash margins	 9.4
Others
	 6.0
Total	 71.3
Shareholders' equity:
Paid-up capital	 9.5
General reserve	 0.5
Other reserves	 3.0
Profit	 0.6
Total	 13.6
Total liabilities	 84.9
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Islamic Bank for Western Sudan
Profit & Loss Account for the year ended 31.12.1987
LS (m)
Revenue
Investment operations
	 2.9
Banking services	 3.7
Total
	
6.6
Less investment depositors' share
	 0.3
Gross profit	 6.3
Less administrative expenses	 4.5
Net profit	 1.8
Less tax
	 1.0
Net profit after tax	 0.8
Less general reserve	 0.2
Net profit carried forward 	 0.6
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2,056.2
2,056.2
5- Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt
Balance Sheet as at 30.12.1406 (1986)
US Dollars (m)
Assets
Cash in hand & in Central Bank 	 151.6
Banks & correspondents	 128.7
Financing operations	 1,532.7
Projects under execution 	 45.9
Sundry debit accounts	 178.7
Fixed assets after depreciation	 18.6
Total assets
Liabilities
Investment & current accounts
Bank & correspondents
Sundry credit accounts
Provision for risks of financing
Shareholders' equity:
Paid-up capital
General reserve
Special reserve
Net profit of activities	 106.9
Less Depositors' share 	 97.3
Shareholders' profit
Total liabilities
1,489.5
127.1
318.3
15.2
70.0
23.4
3.1
9.6
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Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt
Profit & Loss Account for the Year Ended 30.12.1406 (1986)
US Dollars (m)
Revenue
Earnings from financing operation 	 114.9
Earnings from banking activities	 8.0
Total Revenue	 122.9
Expenses
General expenses including Zakah	 10.6
Provision & depreciation	 5.4
Total expenses	 16.0
Net profit	 106.9
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Appendix 4
List of Interviewees
1- Faisal Islamic Bank (Sudan)
1- Banking and Finance Affairs Sector:
a) Department of Finance (2 employees, accounting).
b) Banking Department (1 employee).
2- Investment Sector:
a) Studies Department (2 employees).
b) Trading Department ( 1 employee).
3- Research & Statistics Centre:
a) Department of Planning (2 employees).
b) Statistics Department (3 employees).
4- Internal Auditor.
5- External Auditor, located in the bank's headquarters (1
senior auditor and 2 auditors).
6- Manager of Legal Affairs Department.
7- Islamic Supervisory Board (Secretary).
2- Tadamon Islamic Bank
1- Accounting Department (2 employees).
2- Investment Department (3 employees).
3- Islamic Supervisory & Research Department (3 employees
including the Director).
4- General Assistant Manager for Investment.
5- General Assistant Manager for Projects.
6- General Assistant Manager for Financial Affairs.
3- Islamic Bank for Western Sudan
1- Research Department (3 employees including the Director).
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2- Investment Department (2 employees).
3- Accounting Department (2 employees).
4- General Assistant Manager for Investment.
5- General Assistant Manager for Accounting & Finance.
6- General Assistant Manager for Projects.
4- Al-Baraka Bank
1- Accounting Department (2 employees).
2- Investment Department (1 employee).
3- Monitoring Department ( 2 employees)
4- Financial & Administrative Manager.
5- Deputy General Manager.
5- Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt
1- Deputy General Manager for Trading Participation.
2- Manager of Credit Finance Department.
3- Department of Research (2 employees including the
Director).
4- Financial Affairs Sector:
a) Financial Affairs Department (2 employees).
b) Investment Department, divided into internal and
external investment (3 employees).
5- Consultant (Dr. Shehattah).
6- Bank of Sudan (the Central Bank)
I- Research & Statistical Department (3 employees).
2- Control of the Commercial Banks Department (2 employees)
3- Foreign Exchange Control Department (2 employees).
7- General Discussions and Interviews
1- The Islamic Development Bank (Jeddah).
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2- The Islamic Research and Training Institute, an Institute
of Islamic Development Bank (Jeddah).
3- The Centre for Research in Islamic Economics, King Abdul
Aziz University (Jeddah).
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